Reading Brexit through BrexLit: fictional responses to political crisis by Alessio, Sara
  
Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna 
 
 
DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN 
 
Studi Letterari e Culturali 
 
Ciclo XXXII 
 
Settore Concorsuale: 10/L1 - Lingue, Letterature e Culture Inglese e Anglo-Americana 
 
Settore Scientifico Disciplinare: L-LIN/10 - Letteratura Inglese 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TITOLO TESI 
Reading Brexit through BrexLit: 
fictional responses to political crisis 
 
 
 
Presentata da:  Sara Alessio 
 
 
 
Coordinatore Dottorato     Supervisore 
 
 
Francesco Benozzo      Maurizio Ascari  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Esame finale anno 2020 
  
  
 
 
  
  
Abstract 
 
Reading Brexit through BrexLit is a dissertation centred on the 2016 referendum on 
British exit from the European Union and on Brexit Literature (‘BrexLit’). The thesis focuses 
on the relation between Englishness and the Leave vote, analysing themes and images at the 
core of the Brexit campaign in parallel with selected literary works published both before and 
after the political outcome, and on the impact of the referendum on literature itself. 
After an introduction that serves as a framework, the work is divided into three different 
sections. The first one is dedicated to an analysis of Brexit from a political point of view, 
outlining global tendencies and British peculiarities that influenced the vote and explaining 
Brexit as an English (more than British) phenomenon. The second section moves from the 
political aspects of the study to the literary ones, showing that Brexit themes are to be found in 
contemporary fictions published before the referendum and focusing on two novels that are 
particularly concerned both with the structures of feeling at the core of the campaign and with 
English identity: Speak for England (2005) by James Hawes and The White Family (2002) by 
Maggie Gee. The third and last section introduces the reader to Brexit Literature (‘BrexLit), 
which is a new sub-genre that has flourished from the referendum onwards. The section looks 
at the main characteristics of the sub-genre, distinguishing between two main categories of 
BrexLit fictions: political and intimate novels. This sections ends with the close reading of two 
BrexLit novels published in 2018, Perfidious Albion by Sam Byers and Middle England by 
Jonathan Coe, which are the most representative in relation to the two categories mentioned 
above and in the way they engage, as the novels of the previous section, with the structures of 
feeling exploited in Brexit discourse.  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hope is exactly that, that’s all it is, a matter 
of how we deal with the negative acts towards 
human beings by other human beings in the world, 
remembering that they and we are all human, that 
nothing human is alien to us, the foul and the fair, 
and that most important of all we’re here for a 
mere blink of the eyes, that’s all.  
   Ali Smith, Autumn 
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Reading Brexit: An Introduction 
 
The day after the Brexit referendum, the British population woke up divided between two 
opposite impressions: day-dreaming or living a nightmare, with some Britons claiming victory 
and others campaigning for an immediate new referendum. Some of them were, in fact, 
bewildered, scared and angry at the results; some were, instead, flattered and confident. The 
then prime minister, leader of the Conservative party and pro-Remain supporter David Cameron 
resigned1, considering Brexit a personal débâcle; also Nigel Farage, leader of the United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), resigned2, having accomplished the very mission of his 
political career (withdrawal from the European Union); in Wales, prime minister Carwyn Jones 
from the Welsh Labour Party did not resign, but he defined himself «deeply disappointed»3 by 
the pro-Leave majority come out from the referendum; Nicola Sturgeon, Scottish prime 
minister and leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP), described the Brexit scenario as 
«democratically unacceptable»4 for Scotland (in which the Remain-side had won) and 
threatened a new referendum on Scottish independence; in Northern Ireland, fears about a hard 
Brexit and ‘the border question’ with the Republic of Ireland started to flow, with Sinn Féin (a 
major party in both countries) asking for a ‘special designated status’ within the EU.5  
On the other side of the English Channel, reactions to Brexit were also confused and 
marked by bewilderment. British writer Julian Barnes, writing for the London Review of Books, 
recalls that «[a]fter the Brexit vote, many of my European friends expressed disbelief and 
astonishment. It seemed to them that we had run mad in the noonday sun»6. And so it seemed 
to some European leaders: French prime minister François Hollande described Brexit as a 
 
1David Cameron’s full resignation speech in «David Cameron's full resignation speech: 'I'll go before the autumn' 
– video», The Guardian, 24 June 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2016/jun/24/david-camerons-
full-resignation-speech-i-will-go-before-the-autumn-video  (30 June 2018) 
2Nigel Farage’s full resignation speech in «Nigel Farage resigns: The Ukip leader's resignation speech in full», 
The Independent, 4 July 2016, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/nigel-farage-resignation-speech-
brexit-ukip-leader-resigns-quits-read-in-full-a7118741.html (30 June 2018) 
3Jones, C., cit. in Porter, G., « EU Referendum: First Minister 'deeply disappointed' but calls on Wales to unite», 
The Daily Post, 24 June 2016,  https://www.dailypost.co.uk/news/north-wales-news/eu-referendum-first-minister-
deeply-11519604 (30 June 2018) 
4Sturgeon, N., cit. in Cooper, C., « Brexit: Scotland leaving EU is 'democratically unacceptable', says Nicola 
Sturgeon», The Independent, 24 June 2016, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-scotland-
leaving-eu-is-democratically-unacceptable-says-nicola-sturgeon-a7100691.html (30 June 2018) 
5President of Sinn Féin Gerry Adams asking for special status for Northern Ireland, in McDonald, H., «Gerry 
Adams: Brexit will be a disaster for the island of Ireland», The Guardian, 4 February 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/feb/04/gerry-adams-brexit-disaster-ireland (30 June 2018) 
6Barnes, J., «Diary: People Will Hate Us Again», London Review of Books, Vol.39, n°8, 20 April 2017, 
https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v39/n08/julian-barnes/diary (30 June 2018)  
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«painful choice» and «a tough test for Europe»; German prime minister Angela Merkel shared 
Hollande’s statement, defining the vote results as «a blow to Europe and to the European 
unification process»; in Italy, prime minister Matteo Renzi remarked that «Europe is our 
future», while Spain called for a joint sovereignty over Gibraltar, where ‘the border question’ 
is an issue as prominent as in Northern Ireland.7 However, there was also contentment at the 
results, in particular from nationalist and populist parties: for instance, Marine Le Pen, leader 
of the Front National, claimed Brexit was a «[v]ictoire de la liberté»8 and called for an EU 
referendum in France too, as Geertz Wilders in Netherlands and Matteo Salvini in Italy9.  
Then, was Brexit a victory or a débâcle? And, as writer Zadie Smith asks herself and 
her readers, «[w]hat was it really about? Immigration? Inequality? Historic xenophobia? 
Sovereignty? EU bureaucracy? Anti-neoliberal revolution? Class war?»10. Despite uneasiness 
and consternation of cultural elites and mainstream parties, what is certain is that the more 
Brexit is analysed, the less it seems possible to define it as an inexplicable outburst or an 
unforeseeable event. Rather, Brexit looks increasingly like a plausible outcome, connected to 
other events and tendencies outside the UK, but deeply rooted in British contemporary society. 
Firstly, Brexit appears to be, in fact, part of a global trend: as a manifestation of dissatisfaction 
with mainstream leaders and parties; as a cry of anger over growing inequality, low wages and 
insecurity; as a reaction to globalisation and the permeability of national borders. In this wider 
framework we could insert, for instance, Donald Trump’s election (not by chance he will say 
«[t]hey call me Mr Brexit over there»11), or Matteo Renzi’s lost bet on Italy’s constitutional 
referendum, which forced him to resign like David Cameron. Secondly, Brexit is also part of a 
European framework, not simply because the referendum was about European membership, but 
given that the European Union as a political and economic project is generally experiencing 
low levels of support, as well as resistance to any further action, regulation, proposal or 
enlargement. In the middle of this European crisis, walls are being erected inside and outside 
 
7Batchelor, T., «Spain in EU stitch up on Gibraltar: Spanish minister asks EU NOT to negotiate with Britain», The 
Express, 29 September 2016, https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/715900/Gibraltar-dispute-Spain-letter-EU-
foreign-ministers-stance-Rock (30 June 2018) 
8Where not specified, the statements from the political leaders quoted above could all be found in BBC News, 
«Brexit: World reaction as UK votes to leave EU», 24 June 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-
referendum-36614643 (30 June 2018) 
9Statements of Geertz Wilders and Matteo Salvini quoted in Torre, C., «Brexit, Salvini e Le Pen: "Ora tocca a 
noi"», Il Giornale, 24 June 2016, http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/mondo/brexit-salvini-e-pen-ora-tocca-noi-
1275516.html (30 June 2018) 
10Smith, Z., «Fences: a Brexit Diary», The New York Review of Books, 18 August 2016, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/08/18/fences-brexit-diary/ (30 June 2018) 
11Trump, D., cit. in Coe, J., «Is Donald Trump ‘Mr Brexit?», The New York Times,  27 January 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/opinion/sunday/is-donald-trump-mr-brexit.html (30 June 2018) 
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the Continent, members are more and more divided according to interests (the Visegrad Group12 
is an example), and nationalism is rising again as it did in the infamous time window between 
the two World Wars. Thirdly, Brexit is also a product of British Euroscepticism and 
peculiarities, and it is in this framework that the referendum is disclosing most of its meanings. 
As Robert Eaglestone affirms,  
Brexit is not only political, economic and administrative: perhaps most significantly 
it is an event in culture, too. Brexit grew from cultural beliefs, real or imaginary, 
about Europe and the UK; the arguments before, during and after the referendum 
were – and are – arguments about culture; its impact on the cultural life of these 
islands may last for generations.13  
 
What Eaglestone outlines is that the Brexit debate on the country’s future (which saw a 
Remain front supported by the government and, on the other side, a Leave front supported by 
Eurosceptic Tories, members of New Labour and UKIP) has been won on the cultural field, 
playing with British divisions, fears and desires. In fact, as Calhoun notices, 
[f]or most people, voting for Brexit was expressive more than instrumental action. 
A Brexit vote expressed frustration, rage, resentment, and insult – as well as hope 
that a vanishing way of life could be saved and a proud national identity celebrated.14  
 
This set of feelings, emotions and uncertainties was cunningly detected and exploited 
by Leave supporters. In the months preceding the vote, media and politicians strongly 
advocating for Brexit did fuel these feelings, describing a country swamped by Europeans, 
constantly robbed and tricked by the European Union, and even put in danger by the migrant 
influx and the obligations towards the free movement of people. The Sun, for example, even 
demanded British passports «be returned to their traditional blue covers as a ‘symbol of British 
independence’».15 The exacerbation of the political debate had its backlashes, the most 
noteworthy of which was the murder of Labour MP Jo Cox, shot and stabbed multiple times 
for being a defender of immigration and the European Union.16 Her killing followed Brexiteers 
claims of «swarms»17 of immigrants ready to invade the UK after a Remain vote, and the 
 
12Composed by Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. 
13Eaglestone, R., «Introduction: Brexit and Literature», in Eaglestone, R.(ed.), Brexit and Literature. Critical and 
Cultural Responses, Oxon & NY, Routledge, 2018, p.1 
14Calhoun, C., «Nationalism, Populism and Brexit», in Outhwaite, W. (ed.), Brexit: Sociological Responses, 
London & New York, Anthem Press, 2017, p.58 
15Earle, S., «Politics of Nostalgia», Open Democracy, 30 October 2016, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/transformation/samuel-earle/politics-of-nostalgia (30 June 2018) 
16Cobain, I. «Jo Cox killed in 'brutal, cowardly' and politically motivated murder, trial hears», The Guardian, 14 
November 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/14/jo-cox-killed-in-politically-motivated-
murder-trial-thomas-mair-hears (30 June 2018) 
17The term ‘swarm’ was first used by David Cameron, talking about refugees and migrants crossing the 
Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe. For this and other metaphors used to describe migrants see Sharatmadiari, D., 
«Swarms, floods and marauders: the toxic metaphors of the migration debate» The Guardian, 10 August 2015, 
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infamous UKIP’s ‘Breaking Point’ anti-immigration poster. The poster shows coloured 
migrants crossing the Croatia-Slovenia border in 2015, with the white person in the first raw 
covered by a box of text.18 Taking advantage of rhetorical devices playing with race and fear 
of the Other, the then UKIP leader Nigel Farage aimed at appealing to the most racist fringes 
of British population to erect its own political version of the Hungarian wall (built precisely 
along Hungary’s borders with Croatia and Serbia).  
Even after Jo Cox’s murder, the Brexiteers’ scaremongering and scapegoating related 
to immigrants went on. And, in addition, from the referendum results onwards the racist beast 
appears completely unleashed. An example is the stabbing of 21-year-old Bartosz Milewski, 
assaulted in a park in Donnington after being heard speaking Polish.19Also related to the Brexit 
vote is the racist graffiti (like ‘EU Rats go home now’20) which, more often than not, target 
Eastern Europeans, and especially Polish immigrants who constitute the biggest European 
community on British soil. The Home Office has indeed reported an escalation in hate crimes, 
with a 41 per cent increase in July 2016 compared to the data of the previous year.21 These data, 
which report only the abuses denounced to the police, are easily explained if we consider that, 
from Brexiteers’ point of view, Brexit means, first and foremost, immigrants’ ‘time to go’ to 
finally free the country and its people. As Barnes again stresses, «it is as if the Brexit vote has 
given them permission to purify the country except when there is popular outcry and mass 
petition in a particular case».22 
This ‘regained freedom’ of the people and the country is exactly what the populist 
politician Nigel Farage has implied triumphantly celebrating the 23rd June 2016 as British own 
«Independence Day»23 (as Eaglestone notes, the referendum day could not be called VE day, 
since that recalls a ‘collective’ – and European – victory)24. This expression had been already 
 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/10/migration-debate-metaphors-swarms-floods-
marauders-migrants (30 June 2018) 
18Stewart, H., Mason, R., «Nigel Farage's anti-migrant poster reported to police», in The Guardian, 16 June 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defends-ukip-breaking-point-poster-queue-of-
migrants (30 June 2018) 
19Dearden, L., «Student stabbed in neck with smashed bottle 'for speaking Polish' in Telford», The Independent, 
17 September 2016, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/student-stabbed-in-neck-with-smashed-
bottle-for-speaking-polish-bartosz-milewski-donnington-telford-a7313036.html (30 June 2016) 
20Painted on a health centre in Torquay, 6 July 2016. For this and other information on racist graffiti and attacks 
in the aftermath of the Brexit vote, see «Post-Brexit Racism», IRR News Team, 7 July 2016, 
http://www.irr.org.uk/news/post-brexit-racism/ (30 June 2018) 
21On hate crimes data, see the Home Office’s official statistics, 13 October 2016, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2015-to-2016, (30 June 2018) 
22Barnes, J., Diary: People Will Hate Us Again» cit.  
23For Nigel Farage’s speech after the Brexit results, see «EU Referendum: Farage declares 'independence day'», 
BBC News, 24 June 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36613295/eu-referendum-
farage-declares-independence-day (30 June 2018) 
24Cfr. Eaglestone, R., «Cruel Nostalgia and the Memory of the Second World War», in Eaglestone, R., op cit.  
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used by the Tory Iain Duncan Smith, who strongly affirmed that Brexit could give rise to «a 
new renaissance in Britain»25. Farage’s view on Brexit coincides with Smith’s. According to 
him, in fact, Brexit mainly represents a double opportunity: people’s chance to firmly declare 
their dissent about European integration, the consequences of globalization, and a certain vision 
of the country held by the established cultural and political elites; and the country’s chance to 
break free from its European chains, aka European membership, considered a new imperialist 
force responsible for holding Britain back and preventing it to recover its path towards 
greatness. A greatness, by the way, that Brexiteers recover from a simplified and manipulated 
version of the past that forgets British exploitation, slavery and complicity in the racialisation 
of the world or in Hitler’s rise. 
In addition, as Anshuman Mondal stresses, the use of the word ‘independence’ by Nigel 
Farage 
 also enacts a reversal: Britain, for so long held to account by the forces of “political 
correctness” (i.e. anti-racist activists, multiculturalists and guilty liberals) for its 
imperial and colonial overlordship and the historical crimes perpetrated in its service, 
could now be positioned as itself a victim of a kind of colonial dependency and, at a 
(rhetorical) stroke, its colonial history could be at once evoked and obscured.26 
 
Talking about ‘independence’, indeed, means putting Britain on the same level with the 
USA, as well as with the other colonies that sought and won their independence from the British 
Empire. As outlined by Fintan O’Toole, the expression ‘Independence Day’«sacralizes 23 June 
2016 as […] England’s own Easter 1916.  […] The implication, even in the negative, was that 
the EU was the kind of colonizing power that other countries had typically had to overthrow in 
wars of independence»27. In this narrative, Britain is thus depicted as a colony of the EU, which 
is represented as a European super-state imposing on the British. From this perspective, Brexit 
easily acquires the characteristics of an anti-colonial liberation movement, a rhetoric which is 
firmly rooted in the Brexit discourse, as shown recently by Boris Johnson’s resignation 
statement, where the former foreign secretary criticises the then Prime Minister Theresa May’s 
Brexit plan declaring Britain «truly headed for the status of a colony»28. As O’Toole stresses, 
«the hallucination of being a colony»29 ends up in fuelling delusional thinking such as the idea 
 
25Iain Duncan Smith, cit. in Ross, T., «EU referendum: Iain Duncan Smith interview - Tory veteran says vote to 
leave on June 23 will make Britain great again», The Telegraph, 30 April 2016, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/30/eu-referendum-iain-duncan-smith-interview--a-vote-to-leave-on-
ju/ (30 September 2018)  
26Mondal, A.A., «Scratching the Post-Imperial Itch», in Eaglestone, R. (ed.), op. cit., p.82 
27O’Toole, F., Heroic Failure, London, Head of Zeus Ltd, p.81  
28Boris Johnson, cit. in «Britain headed for status of 'colony' to EU, Boris Johnson says in resignation statement», 
RT, 9 July 2018, https://www.rt.com/news/432420-britain-eu-colony-boris-johnson/ (30 June 2018) 
29O’Toole, F., op. cit., p.92  
6 
 
of a European conspiracy against Britain, and of treacherous British representatives in cahoots 
with Europe, giving rise, ultimately, to a fierce sense of victimhood. Since the end of the British 
Empire, Britain’s strategy to deal with its legacy has consistently been a defensive one linked 
with the victim-image, seeking to minimize the extent and brutal character of the imperial 
enterprise and to depict the British as its very victims: first, as captives of the imperial project 
(as Linda Colley defines them), and then as a population invaded by the colonized.30 With the 
mother country Britain –  the ‘heart of the empire’, the colonizer par excellence –  paradoxically 
transformed into the submissive, colonized Other, the transference of the sense of victimhood 
to the British is completed. This sense of victimhood, as we will see later, affects not only the 
country, perceived as a ‘victim of history’ and of the European Union, but specifically England, 
which considers itself a victim of devolution – with the devolution process depicted as an act 
of internal colonialism, a reversal of the internal colonialism the English had actually 
perpetrated against Scottish, Welsh and Irish people, and an act of revenge for it. 
Correspondingly, this sense of victimisation then comes to apply to the white working class, 
which in turn sees itself as a victim of foreign immigration and ethnic minorities on British soil. 
It is not by chance, then, that Farage’s campaign was characterized by a continuous act 
of remembrance, with obsessive references to the Second World War and the British imperial 
past. These two key events in British history are undoubtedly at the core of British collective 
memory and still able to give and reinforce a collective sense of identity. For instance, episodes 
such as the Blitz or Dunkirk were constantly referred to, recalling a vision of community, a 
sense of belonging, and the image of a glorious, victorious past to be proud of in opposition to 
present day. The British post-war narrative, indeed, depicts WWII as the last victory, the peak 
of a greatness doomed to come to an end in the following decades. This explains why the former 
UKIP leader has recently described the country as the actual loser of the war31, defining it as 
the starting point of Britain’s fall from being a world superpower to joining the European 
Economic Community. Relying on a long tradition of British Euroscepticism, Farage has used 
this interpretation of history during his pro-Leave campaign, detrimentally linking British 
misfortunes to the European project. This narrative, therefore, enacts another reversal at the 
core of the Leave discourse: «[t]he moment of greatest triumph - the defeat of the Nazis - can 
 
30For further analysis on the ‘minimal impact thesis’ and on the reversal colonisation of the Coloniser, see Colley, 
L., Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837, USA, Yale University Press, 1992; Ward, S., British Culture and the 
End of the Empire, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2011;  Webster, W., Englishness and Empire 1939-
1965, New York, Oxford University Press, 2005.    
31Peck, T., «If Nigel Farage thinks Britain, not Germany, lost the war and Brexit has 'restored national pride', who 
does that make him?», The Independent, 19 April 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/nigel-
farage-brexit-nick-clegg-germany-ww2-britain-passport-anger-management-a8313136.html (30 June 2018) 
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be reimagined as the moment of greatest humiliation - defeat by the Nazis»32 considering the 
EU none other than a prosecution of the Nazi project. As Fintan O’Toole points out,  
The imagining of a German-dominated Europe through the evocation of Hitler was 
not an authentic popular prejudice against an old enemy. It was a way - albeit one 
that still seemed to have few real-world consequences - of thinking about the 
European Union itself, of summoning it into being as the ghastly ghost, not just of 
the Nazis but of the Nazis who had in reality won the war.33  
 
During the Brexit campaign Boris Johnson, another central figure on the Leave-side, 
has indeed compared the European dream of a more federal union to ‘Hitler’s plan’, while 
Michael Gove, another pro-Brexit Conservative politician, has even associated pro-EU experts 
with Nazi scientists denigrating Albert Einstein’s theories for his Jewishness.34 A (maybe 
involuntary) Nazi reference was also the ‘Breaking Point’ poster itself, which resembles Nazi 
propaganda.35 This way of imagining the European Union may seem a «dystopian fantasy», but 
it is, nonetheless, a deeply-rooted one, as shown by the fact, for instance, that already in 1989   
the Bruges Group of anti-European Tories heard Professor Kenneth Minogue of the 
London School of Economics tell them that ‘the European institutions were 
attempting to create a European Union, in the tradition of the mediaeval popes, 
Charlemagne, Napoleon, the Kaiser and Adolf Hitler’.36 
 
Episodes of the war were also referred to in order to recall a period characterized by 
great anxiety and fear of invasion, to which the British had responded with bravery, strength 
and union. As Robert Eaglestone writes,  
[t]he War in memory stands for a time of national anxiety: a sense of fear, a moment 
in which the whole polity itself is in danger, ‘all-out-war’. […] As importantly, the 
War also stands for defiance against the enemy, against the odds, alone, and with 
that, a kind of certainty and pride: that ‘we’ know who ‘we’ are. This means it has a 
kind of ‘meta’ meaning too: if you don’t share this feeling, you are not ‘one of us’ 
not rooted in the same past. […] It stands also for bearing up to hard times, keeping 
calm and carrying on and as a way of overcoming (‘Britain can take it!’). 
 
All these meanings make the memory of the war a powerful one, and as a matter of fact 
they were all at play in the Leave campaign, where Brexit was conceived as a way-out from a 
period marked by economic struggle and mass immigration (‘national anxiety’), an act of 
liberation from the European ‘colonial’ yoke (‘defiance against the enemy’), and a means to 
 
32O’Toole, F., op. cit., p.30  
33Ivi., pp.39-40.  
34Cfr. Johnson, B., Gove, M., cit. in, Rampen, J., «The 4 most unfortunate EU comparison made by Brexiters», 
The New Statement, 19 January 2017, https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2017/01/4-most-
unfortunate-nazi-eu-comparisons-made-brexiteers (30 June 2018) 
35Cfr. Stewart, H., Mason, R., op. cit. 
36O’Toole, F., op. cit., p.34  
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recover British greatness (its identity, and therefore people’s ‘certainty and pride’). According 
to Brexiteers, leaving the European Union would have had its backlashes, but Britain could 
endure them and survive to be reborn (‘bearing up’, ’keeping calm’ and ‘carry on’). 
Furthermore, anyone against Brexit was considered by Leave campaigners an enemy of the 
country and ruled out from the community (‘not one of us’). Moreover, drawing a parallel 
between present day and wartime allowed Brexiteers to exploit the ‘invasion’ theme not only 
in relation to the empire, but also to the Second World War, comparing the European migrants 
to invaders to fight against as the Nazis during the war. The purpose underneath this narrative 
clearly was to send «[t]he message to voters […] that the referendum represents a defining 
moment in British history»37, like the war itself. This register of war and invasion is, actually, 
nothing new in British politics, if we look at the rhetoric deployed by Conservative Enoch 
Powell against migration from the colonies and the joining of the European Economic 
Community, or at former prime minister Margaret Thatcher’s speeches during the Falklands 
war.  
As stated previously, the British imperial past was as central as the Second World War 
in the Leave discourse, since Brexit was partly constructed as an anti-colonial movement of 
liberation and also «fuelled by fantasies of ‘Empire 2.0’, a reconstructed global mercantilist 
trading empire in which the old white colonies will be reconnected to the mother country»38. 
But the British Empire was also fundamental as a reminder of Britain’s former leading role and 
greatness. ‘Put the Great Back in Great Britain’, one of the many nationalist slogans by Nigel 
Farage, is the very expression of the melancholic longing for Britain’s glorious past. The appeal 
to ‘make Britain great again’ (a slogan first recorded in 1975, the year of another EU 
referendum)39was also popular under Thatcherism and even in the 2003 Iraq war. This 
reiteration of imperial past undoubtedly reveals the country’s inability to accept the demise of 
its empire and deal with its legacy. According to Mondal,  
This imperially nostalgic nationalism is the only thing that working class leavers in 
the post-industrial wastelands of 21st – century Britain and the well-to-do leavers in 
the leafy Tory shires have in common, and it is rooted in what Raymond Williams 
calls the “structure of feeling” produced by ideology, in this case the structure of 
feeling produced by imperial ideologies and imaginaries that have still not fully 
wound their way through the digestive tracts of the United Kingdom’s body politic 
(William, 1977).40  
 
37Buckledee, S., The Language of Brexit, Great Britain, Bloomsbury Academic, 2018, p.122  
38O’Toole, F., op. cit., p.3  
39The slogan was used in the 1975 referendum campaign by the National Front, see Strike, K., «Ephemera From 
The 1975 European Referendum», Flashbak, 23 June 2016, https://flashbak.com/ephemera-from-the-1975-
european-referendum-63088/ (30 June 2018) 
40Mondal, A. A., op. cit., p.85 
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Quoting Raymond William’s ‘structure of feeling’41, Mondal refers to the diffuse set of 
values, perceptions and representations that characterises a people’s culture in a certain time. 
As Robert Eaglestone stresses, «‘Structures of feeling’ are always ‘feeling about’ something»42 
as shared moods and attitudes which affect our ideas, as well as actions and emotional reactions. 
Eaglestone relates Raymond Williams’ conceptualisation to contemporary affect theory, which 
defines ‘affect’ as «the cultural atmosphere in which our emotions form»43. According to 
Eaglestone,  
Affect is crucial for the political world (as Aristotle realised) because while we are 
rational and calculative (we use logos), we are not only rational and calculative. As 
Laurent Berlant, one of the most influential affect theorists writes, ‘a public’s 
binding to the political is best achieved neither by policy nor ideology but the affect 
of feeling political together’ (Berlant 224). Moods and affects are not fixed but 
relentlessly moving: events or political leaders can (through cues) shape or change 
them. Berlant again: our public spheres are ‘affect worlds’ and are ‘constantly 
negotiated’ by our interactions with each other, with the media, with the world 
(Berlant 226).44  
 
Lauren Berlant, quoted by Eaglestone, not only refers to the sociocultural approach45, 
which considers knowledge a product of the interaction between the individual and the world 
(meaning other people and the context), but also to those theories that see individuals 
experiencing reality and embracing moral values through the emotional sphere.46 Since moods 
and affects, as Eaglestone stresses, are not fixed, it follows that they can be manipulated. 
Directing the emotional sphere of the people would mean, therefore, being able to influence 
their vision of the world. Interestingly, Eaglestone defines collective memory as «one of the 
most – if not the most – affective social forces»47, taking the form of shared memory on which 
the very existence of the community is based. A collective memory deployed to move the 
people and influence their vision of the world is, therefore, an affect-memory. Ultimately, when 
Mondal recognises the persistence of imperial ideologies in Leave discourse, the scholar is 
pointing exactly at the cunning exploitation of this structure of feeling to obtain people’s 
‘affective support’, a definition we will elaborate on when discussing the European Union. 
 
41For further analysis on Raymond Williams’s conceptualisation, see in particular Williams, R., Culture and 
Society: 1780-1950, London, Chatto & Windus, 1959, and Williams, R., The Long Revolution, London, Chatto & 
Windus, 1961 
42Eaglestone, «Cruel Nostalgia and the Memory of the Second World War» cit., p.92  
43Ivi, p.93  
44Ivi, p.92  
45The reference here is to Lev Vygotsky’s theories regarding the sociocultural approach to cognitive development. 
46See, for instance, Edmund Husserl’s theories about the origins of values and the way we interpret reality.  
47Eaglestone, R., «Cruel Nostalgia and the Memory of the Second World War» cit., p.96  
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Therefore, referring to glorifying episodes of British history and promising a recovery 
of greatness, the Leave campaigners, as J.K. Rowling claims, sold Brexit as «the courageous 
option» that would have led to the restoration of Britain’s glory: «[t]ake a leap of faith, they 
say. Step off the cliff and let the flag catch you! […] they swear that everything will be glorious 
as long as we disregard the experts and listen to them»48. The Harry Potter writer, a strenuous 
Remain supporter, is here criticising Leavers for leveraging on people’s inner emotions, 
attitudes and desires, neglecting facts and demonising experts. Neglecting facts is part of a 
strategy focused on affect. As Eaglestone underlines, «[a]ffect-memory does not check 
evidence, has no rules, no form of argument, no need to be consistent, or to be engineered into 
a full, explanatory account»49: it relies on the power of the emotions it draws in, which does not 
need factual evidence. The experts are, therefore, prerogative of the counterparty, and their 
opinions were, indeed, the ingredients of the narrative at the basis of the Remain campaign. As 
stressed by Evans and Menon,  
The ‘Stronger In’ strategy consisted of deploying a barrage of arguments about the 
economy, delivered by a coterie of national and international experts ranging from 
the Treasury, to the IMF, to representatives of major corporations, to President 
Obama.50  
 
Many of the contemptuous remarks against experts were, therefore, part of Leave 
strategy to undermine Remain arguments: for instance, the already quoted association made by 
Gove between pro-EU experts and Nazi scientists, his famous statement «people have had 
enough of experts»51, or Nigel Farage’s affirmation that independent experts could have been 
paid by the government or the EU52. Re-named by Brexiteers ‘Project Fear’, the Remain 
campaign indeed tried to generate fear for the unknown consequences of a Leave-victory 
predicting, for instance, that «leaving the EU would result in a £3 rise in the price of a packet 
of cigarettes» or warning «about the danger of war in Europe»53. Focusing more on the 
‘dreadful’ economic consequences of a potential withdrawal than on the worries of ‘the 
ordinary people’, Remainers left the cultural dimension of the debate in the hands of the Leave-
side.  As John Lanchester outlines, 
[m]aking economic arguments to voters who feel oppressed by economics is risky: 
they’re quite likely to tell you to go fuck yourself. That in effect is what the electorate 
 
48Rowling, J. K., «On Monsters, Villains and the EU Referendum», J.K. Rowling, 30 June 2016, 
https://www.jkrowling.com/opinions/monsters-villains-eu-referendum/ (30 June 2018)  
49Eaglestone, R., «Cruel nostalgia and the Memory of the Second World War» cit., p.96  
50Evans, G., Menon, A., Brexit and British Politics, UK & USA, Polity Press, 2017, p.59  
51Mance, H., «Britain has had enough of experts, says Gove», Financial Times, 3 June 2016, 
https://www.ft.com/content/3be49734-29cb-11e6-83e4-abc22d5d108c (30 June 2018) 
52Ibidem  
53Buckledee, S., op. cit., p.113  
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did to the almost comic cavalcade of sages and bigshots who took the trouble to 
explain that Brexit would be ruinous folly: Obama, Lagarde, Carney, the IMF, the 
OECD, the ECB, and every commentator and pundit you can think of. The counter-
argument wasn’t really an argument but a very clever appeal to emotion, to the idea 
that the UK could ‘Take back control’.54 
 
And here, put simply, lies the major difference between the two opposite sides: one tried 
to appeal to voters’ rationality (depicting threatening post-Brexit scenarios), the other exploited 
the very national narratives of the country and its deep divisions, offering people a vague, but 
by no means less effective, hope. Consequently, the Brexit vote, more than a vote against 
Europe, was to a certain extent a way to reassert an image of Britain as a maker of history, and 
(which matters even more) a way of dealing with its identity crisis. 
As we will discuss in more detail further on, talking about identity crisis in Britain is 
nothing new, insomuch as the issue has been at the forefront of any political or cultural debate 
since (again) WWII and the dismantlement of the empire. Soon after the war (especially after 
the 1948 British Nationality Act55), Britain experienced an influx of the colonised, a migration 
that has been defined an unexpected turn and a reversal of the colonising process. These 
migrants, who were praised and celebrated during the war as sons of empire at the rescue of 
their ‘mother country’, started being stigmatised as a destabilising element intruding in and 
corrupting the country. The idea of the empire as a ‘racial community of Britons’ based on 
whiteness soon prevailed on the ‘multiracial’ ideal propagated during the war effort, especially 
after many colonies obtained their independence.56 The continuous presence of the Other on 
the national soil undermined the homogeneous vision of the national community and reinforced 
‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ as national identity’s criteria. Clearly, this vision of the community 
marked by whiteness and homogeneity was (and is) in contrast with the actual composition of 
British population and constantly challenged by the never-ending arrival of new migrants. But 
it is in this vision of the community that the Brexit discourse finds its roots, with its broadening 
of ‘otherness’ to different shades of white.  
 In order to better define the role that the death of the British Empire played in Britain’s 
emerging identity crisis, some clarifications are necessary given that some scholars talk about 
a sort of ‘collective indifference’ in relation to its demise. 57 Thus, even though the empire was 
 
54Lanchester, J., «Brexit Blues», London Review of Books, Vol.38, n°15, 28 June 2016, 
https://www.lrb.co.uk/v38/n15/john-lanchester/brexit-blues (30 June 2018) 
55With the British Nationality Act, all British subjects became British citizens of the United Kingdom, so that a 
citizen of a member of the British Commonwealth could move with no restrictions to any territory of the United 
Kingdom, Great Britain included.  
56Cfr. Webster, W., op. cit.  
57For instance, David Cannadine and Kenneth Morgan, both cited in Stuart Ward, op. cit. 
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a collective enterprise aimed at unifying (as a kind of ‘bonding activity’) the British Isles, the 
ones affected (or affected the most) by its dismantlement were certainly the English. While for 
the others (particularly the Scottish and Irish) the British Empire represented a way to escape 
racism and oppression by moving towards social liberation, for the English the imperial 
enterprise was more a means towards meaning and identity. Being the major ethnic group, the 
English, who avoided nationalistic celebrations in order to keep the kingdom together, 
nonetheless poured typical English traits into the definition of a unifying British identity 
(Britishness). Consequently, the dismantlement of the empire left the English not only without 
a ‘mission’ to rely on (the infamous white man’s burden), but also without a sense of 
themselves, caused by both the subsequent Britishness’ crisis and the undefined status of 
Englishness. The disruption of the empire also weakened ancient loyalties among British 
‘peoples’ and the perception of a wider British community, giving rise to national revivals, 
demands for more autonomy and threats of secessions, both overseas and in the ‘mother 
country’. The devolution process of 1997, which granted devolved powers to Scottish, Irish and 
Welsh parliaments, is a product of these national revivals and could only increase the English 
perception of a loss in power and political representation. In the end, this diffuse feeling of loss, 
which has grown in (and marked) the last decades, is responsible for a search for identity 
addressed not to the future, but to nostalgic visions of the country.  
Unsurprisingly, to be needed and effective, the kind of hope Brexiteers have offered as 
a response to present grievances must be seeded in a land turned towards nostalgia, since it 
feeds off cultural memories rather than futuristic visions. This is claimed also by Eaglestone, 
who defines Brexit a case of cruel nostalgia. The expression refers to Berlant’s influential work 
Cruel Optimism, where the scholar argues that optimism becomes cruel when it is directed to 
an object of desire that is damaging you. According to Eaglestone,  
Brexit is – nearly – a very good example of ‘cruel optimism’. The ‘cues’ given by 
the Leave campaigns and by the Brexiteers in Theresa May’s government suggest 
broad sunlit uplands after the UK leaves the EU (£350 million for the NHS; world 
trade; ‘taking back control’): the reality already looks materially grim. (But the 
benefits of Brexit are often not seen as material; a YouGov poll, 1 August 2017, 
found that “Six in Ten Leave voters and a third of Remain voters say significant 
damage to the economy would be a price worth paying to get their way on Brexit”.) 
However, Brexit offers one crucial difference from the more American ‘structure of 
feeling’ Berlant analyses. Most affect theory deals with the present or (as in the case 
of cruel optimism) a focus on the future which ignores the detrimental effects in the 
present: but Brexit focusses on the past. Not cruel optimism, but cruel nostalgia.58 
 
 
58Eaglestone, R., «Cruel Nostalgia and the Memory of the Second World War» cit., pp.95-96  
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Brexit would, then, seem an example of ‘cruel optimism’, given Brexiteers’ 
representation of a bright future outside the EU despite experts’ analyses. Except that their goal 
is not that representation of the future, but a recovery of the past. In Britain’s case, nostalgia is 
not new (as anticipated talking about identity crisis), but rather characterised by the combination 
of a preceding nostalgic attitude with new tendencies. In a world that is speeding too fast, in 
which communities are more and more multicultural, multinational, multilingual and 
interconnected, nostalgia is indeed a growing global trend, to be considered both a «defence 
mechanism in a time of accelerated rhythms of life and historical upheavals»59 as well as a 
yearning to belong. As Svetlana Boym writes, nostalgia represents «a utopian dimension» 
seeking to forget the present and its insurmountable problems but «no longer directed toward 
the future»60, perceived as the source of new failures and miseries. For this reason, the utopian 
dimension is attributed to the past, which can be interpreted according to contemporary desires. 
As Zygmunt Bauman stresses, commenting on the ‘Angel of History’ drawn by Paul Klee and 
analysed by Walter Benjamin, 
[i]t is now the future, whose time to be pillorized seems to have arrived after being 
first decried for its untrustworthiness and unmanageability, that is booked on the 
debit side. And it is now the past’s turn to be booked on the side of credit – a credit 
deserved (whether genuinely or putatively) by a site of still-free choice and 
investment of still-undiscredited hope.61 
 
 Since the past is considered stable and trustworthy, it is, therefore, to this past that 
expectations are now attached. Boym’s definition of nostalgia is, not by chance, complementary 
to that of Bauman’s ‘retrotopias’, described as «visions located in the lost/stolen/abandoned but 
undead past, instead of being tied to the not-yet-unborn and so inexistent future»62. As Samuel 
Earle acknowledges,  
[f]aced with a neoliberal, globalised future that presents itself as non-negotiable, our 
only strategy seems to be to turn towards the past. Wages stagnate, home ownership 
plummets, pensions diminish and debt proliferates. So we retreat into safe, warm 
waters. Feelings of meaninglessness are escaped by memories that give meaning; the 
discontinuity between past and present is dissolved by re-packaging the past; and the 
ideal of political revolution is replaced by the alternative meaning of that word: 
turning in a circle.63 
 
In this age characterised by the divide between poor and rich, the deterritorialization of 
cultures and the triumph of individualism over concepts such as community and solidarity, 
 
59Boym, S., The Future of Nostalgia, Basic Books, 2001, p.xiv  
60Ibidem 
61Bauman, Z., Retrotopia, UK & USA, Polity Press, 2017, p.2  
62Ivi, p.5 
63Earle, S., op. cit. 
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Earle outlines the role of escape the past plays, offering secure meaning and means of 
identification. In fact, nowadays, 
[n]o one feels like society is ‘theirs.’ Young people feel forgotten. The elderly feel 
isolated, pushed into care homes and cut off from society. Alienated by racism and 
a hostile political discourse, people of colour feel ignored. Alarmed by political 
correctness ‘gone mad’ as they see it, racists feel under threat.64 
 
Claiming that «[n]o one feels like society is ‘theirs’» means, ultimately, that nobody 
feels at home. Everyone feels displaced, surrounded by the unfamiliar, forced into a condition 
of eternal uncertainty. Feelings that could easily be associated with the migrant condition, 
which is, as Salman Rushdie outlines, a displacement both in space and time: 
An old photograph in a cheap frame hangs on a wall of the room where I work. It’s 
a picture dating from 1946 of a house into which, at the time of its taking, I had not 
yet been born. The house is rather peculiar – a three-storeyed gabled affair with tiled 
roofs and round towers in two corners, each wearing a pointy tiled hat. ‘The past is 
a foreign country,’ goes the famous opening sentence of L. P. Hartley’s novel The 
Go-Between, ‘they do things differently there.’ But the photograph tells me to invert 
this idea; it reminds me that it’s my present that is foreign, and that the past is home, 
albeit a lost home in a lost city in the mists of lost time.65  
 
Talking about a picture representing the family house in India, Rushdie ponders the 
famous quotation by L.P. Hartley’s novel The Go Between (1953), ‘the past is a foreign country, 
they do things differently there’, acknowledging how the sentence could be inverted to describe 
the reversal migrants experience: for them, the past represents familiarity and certainty, while 
the present is unknown and embodies everything foreign and incomprehensible. Similarly, 
nowadays, people look at the past as their home, opposed to a present reality perceived as so 
alien that could be defined a ‘foreign country’ on its own. Nostalgia is, therefore, a «mourning 
of displacement and temporal irreversibility»66 as well as the other half of the very condition of 
our age: alienation.  
However, nostalgia in itself can do no harm, especially when it is a reflective kind of 
nostalgia which aims at thinking over the past and its irrevocability. It becomes dangerous only 
when ideas of the past «fertilize the idea of the present»67: when it becomes a restorative 
nostalgia blended with projects of restoration. As Samuel Earle acknowledges, «Brexit and its 
nostalgic outpouring is part of a broader phenomenon that extends well beyond Britain»68. 
Donald Trump’s ‘Make America Great Again’, Marine Le Pen’s desire to recall France’s 
 
64Ibidem  
65Rushdie, S., Imaginary Homelands, London, Granta & Penguin Books 1992, p.9  
66Boym, S., op. cit., p.xvi 
67Rushdie, S., op. cit., p.145  
68Ibidem 
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glorious past and Alternative für Deutschland’s slogan ‘Dare it, Germany’ are all, ultimately, 
projects of restoration, which seek to re-establish borders, celebrate a proud nationalism, define 
an exclusive national identity and reaffirm a homogeneous idea of society. In short, they wish 
to go back in time, reinstituting a past-time line that has been subjected to a rupture and 
recovering the imaginary homeland that their nostalgic vision depicts. This imaginary 
homeland is none other than one among many, and the one that suits better the purpose. 
‘Imaginary homeland’, which refers to Salman Rushdie’s essay Imaginary Homelands quoted 
above, is a definition that well describes the imaginary character and potential of the nation. 
From Benedict Anderson’s conceptualisation, the nation always is an ‘imagined community’, 
since there is no direct contact with each and every member, and given that it is a social 
construct – an idea that people identify with and which will come to shape their collective 
identity.69 To make the idea of the nation concrete, a narrative of identity needs to be created 
and deployed. This national narrative is composed by definite traits of the community, myths 
of origin, glorifying versions of history and invented traditions. In the end, a project of 
restoration is, therefore, a rejection of the present that is deeply rooted in a country’s national 
narrative. But the past we return to «when dreaming our nostalgic dreams», as Bauman stresses, 
«is not the past ‘as such’ – not the past ‘wie es ist eigentlich gewesen’ (‘as it genuinely was’)»70 
but always an interpretation. 
 A country suffering from nostalgia and seeking to retreat into the past inevitably ends 
up rejecting difference. And this explains why the second enemy identified by the Leave 
campaign after Europe was represented by the immigrants. Whether coming from Europe or 
not, immigrants interfere with the nostalgic idyll. As Bauman outlines,  
[a] neighbourhood filled by strangers is a visible, tangible sign of certainties 
evaporating, and the prospects of life – as well as the fate of pursuit of them – drifting 
out of control. Strangers stand for everything evasive, feeble, unstable and 
unforeseeable in life that poisons the daily bustle with premonitions of our own 
impotence and the sleepless nights filled with nightmarish forebodings.71 
 
As anticipated before, strangers (foreigners, immigrants) challenge the homogeneity of 
the ‘imagined community’ and the idea of identity (collective and individual) as something 
stable and immutable. Therefore, restorative nostalgia ends up triggering the return to tribalism, 
which redraws the distinction between ‘us’ and “them”, the ‘native’ and the ‘foreigner’, at the 
 
69Cfr. Anderson, B., Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London & New 
York, Verso, 1991    
70Bauman, Z., op. cit., p.10  
71Ivi, p.60 
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basis of how national identities are still conceived. In fact, identifying with an idea of the nation 
constituted by certain traits and characteristics implies the identification of an ‘Other’: one who 
embodies all of those attributes the nation seeks to reject. The identified ‘Other’, labelled as 
inferior and bridled in a web of stereotypes and simplifications, is placed in opposition to, and 
excluded from, the community in question. If the ultimate purpose of a tribe is, as Bruce 
Rosenblit argues, «to determine whom to support and whom to kill»72, it follows that the 
ultimate purpose of tribalism in contemporary societies is to determine who belongs to what 
and, based on that belonging, who deserves what: jobs, benefits, NHS coverage, asylum. In the 
Brexit case, this opposition between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor, which finds its roots 
in the Victorian age and is strongly linked to imperial hierarchies, inevitably increased hatred 
towards immigrants and exacerbated Britain’s own class divisions. As Zadie Smith writes, 
[o]ne useful consequence of Brexit is to finally and openly reveal a deep fracture in 
British society that has been thirty years in the making. The gaps between north and 
south, between the social classes, between Londoners and everyone else, between 
rich Londoners and poor Londoners, and between white and brown and black are 
real and need to be confronted by all of us, not only those who voted Leave.73 
 
Social classes have always been fundamental in reinforcing the dichotomy that sees ‘us’ 
versus ‘them’ and in shaping British lives and society. Examples of this include the status still 
held by the monarchy (the royal family is considered at the top of the social class structure) and 
the division of the Parliament into two chambers, the House of Lords (representing the upper-
class) and the House of Commons (representing the other classes), with the House of Lords’ 
members outnumbering those of the other chamber. Even though some have tried to disregard 
class (Margaret Thatcher dismissed the concept of class, labelling it a Communist concept), 
while others have tried to overcome class divisions (John Major talked about creating a classless 
society)74, Britain still appears obsessed by this social categorisation, as the BBC’s idea of the 
‘social class calculator’ shows. Launched in 2013 to evaluate the modern class system, the 
social class calculator’s findings pushed the sociologists teaming up with the BBC to declare 
the three-class system out of date and to theorise a new seven-class model. This model is divided 
into elite, established middle class, technical middle class, new affluent workers, traditional 
working class, emergent service workers and precariat.75 The elites would appear to be 
 
72Rosenblit, B., US Against Them: How Tribalism Affects the Way We Think, Transcendent Publications 2008, 
pp.74-75, cit. in Bauman, Z., op. cit., p.50  
73Smith, Z., op. cit.  
74Cfr. Cannadine, D., The Rise and Fall of Class in Britain, Columbia University Press, 1998 
75Sociologist Mike Savage published the results of the BBC’s Great Britain Class Survey in his work Social Class 
in the 21st Century, UK, Penguin Books, 2015 
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concentrated in London and the South-East of England, which are the richest area of the UK, 
the most represented, and those often used to symbolise the country as a whole.76  
Further evidence suggests that class identity is still essential for understanding British 
phenomena and in primis Brexit. For instance, the connection between elites and the South-
East reappears in Evans and Menon, when they outline that most people did not believe pro-
Remain politicians were «necessarily» lying, but that they were «describing a reality from 
another planet (the prosperous South-East)»77 in contrast to that of those areas suffocated by 
the economic crisis. Analyses published so far have also acknowledged that those who identify 
as working class were more likely to be opposed to immigration and, for this reason, to vote 
Leave. As reported by Evans and Menon,  
Some 63% of the working class voted to Leave, compared with only 44% of the 
middle class. Even when the effects of age, region, race, religion, gender and housing 
are taken into account, there was still a ten-percentage point gap between the 
working class and the professional middle class. […] 
The gulf between the working class, and particularly the less highly educated, and 
other social groups when it comes to immigration is even greater than that over the 
traditional core issues of politics - inequality and redistribution.78 
 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the Leave vote has been stronger in those areas defined 
as working-class heartlands. In addition, Evans and Menon have also stressed that «[a]reas 
characterized as ‘white British working class’ were those more likely to leave the EU»79. This 
is strictly related to Robbie Shilliam’s thesis80, which claims that class has returned to public 
discourse in the form of a very racialised concept. As anticipated before, the white working 
class is more and more considering itself in need of protection from the competition represented 
by migrant workers. According to Shilliam, the white working class identifies with the idea of 
a native tribe and seeks to re-stress a racialised distinction between deserving and undeserving 
poor, whose roots are to be found in the division of labour over the British Empire. The 
connection between imperial hierarchies and the British class system is shown by the fact that 
the same characteristics assigned to the colonised were soon used in the mother country to 
define the lower strata of society. In Shilliam’s interpretation, the archetype of the underserving 
poor is the black slave, whose blackness (in opposition to whiteness) determined his/her 
 
76For further analysis on the matter, see Gardiner, M., The Return of England in English Literature, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012 
77Evans, G., Menon, A., op. cit., p.62  
78Ivi, p.83  
79Ibidem  
80Cfr. Shilliam, R., The Deserving Poor: Colonial Genealogies from Abolition to Brexit, Annual Lecture, Seminars 
2017/2018, University of Portsmouth, 10 January 2018.  
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‘undeservingness’. The racialised distinction between white Anglo-Saxons and non-white 
subjects, undermined by the 1948 British Nationality Act, was indeed maintained in the labour 
discourse, with people of colour expected to get low wages and worse job conditions. As 
stressed by Paul Gilroy,  
[t]he arrival of these incomers, even when they were protected by their tenure of 
formal citizenship, was […] an act of invasive warfare. That structure of feeling 
governs the continuing antipathy towards all would-be settlers. Later groups of 
immigrants may not, of course, be connected with the history of empire and colony 
in any way whatsoever. However, they experience the misfortune of being caught up 
in a pattern of hostility and conflict that belongs emphatically to its lingering 
aftermath. Once they recognize the salience of racial categories to their perilous 
predicament, it should not be surprising if these people try to follow the well-trodden 
path pioneered by the most vulnerable and marginal members of the host community. 
They too will seek salvation by trying to embrace and inflate the ebbing privileges 
of whiteness. That racialized identification is presumably the best way to prove they 
are not really immigrants at all but somehow already belong to the home-space in 
ways that the black and brown people against whom they have to compete in the 
labour market will never be recognized as doing.81 
 
But whiteness no longer guarantees protection from the category of ‘undeserving 
immigrant’ nor does it ensure that one will be able to integrate successfully or improve socially. 
Nowadays, the British white working class aims to extend the ‘undeserving’ category to 
different shades of white, viewing Anglo-Saxon whiteness as being distinct from and superior 
to the other shades. This is not so different from the category of ‘genetic diversity’ at the core 
of British National Party(BNP)’s discourse.82 Paradoxically, as John Holmood explains, the 
idea that migrant workers would deserve low wages and worse job conditions is what «draws 
in unskilled migrant workers, at the same time as it commits the UK to a low-productivity, low-
investment economy»83. Nonetheless, whiteness is central both to England’s national revival 
and to Brexit. 
However, the working class could not be the one and only maker of Brexit. As Evans 
and Menon again stress, 
[g]iven the relatively reduced size of the modern-day working class, substantial 
numbers of the middle classes had to vote Leave to ensure a result in favour of Brexit. 
The BES shows that the proportion of Leave voters doing routine and semi-routine 
jobs – the core of the working class – was only 21%. In contrast, the proportion of 
Leave voters from lower professional jobs alone was 27%, intermediate 
administrative posts and the like made up 23%, employers and the self-employed 
11%. It was the often highly educated middle classes that provided the major source 
– some 59% in total – of the Brexit vote. 84 
 
81Gilroy, P., After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture, UK, Routledge, 2004, pp.110-111  
82Cfr. MacKlin, G., «All White on the Right», in Perryman, M. (ed.), Imagined Nations: England After Britain, 
London, Lawrence & Wishart, 2008, pp.63-75  
83Holmood, J., «Exit from the Perspective of Entry», in Outhwaite, W. (ed.), op. cit., p.38 
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It derives that the major core of the Leave vote was composed by working class, by 
those who identify with working class’ struggles even despite social advancement (a research 
by NatCen’s Survey Centre has outlined that people «who sees society as divided between a 
large disadvantaged group and a small privileged elite ‘feels more working class regardless of 
their actual class position’»84), and also (in ‘substantial numbers’) by the middle classes, 
perceiving their lifestyles, income, social position and values in danger. No surprise, then, that 
the perceived clash between elites and ‘the ordinary people’, immigration and ‘regaining 
control’ have been very prominent issues in the Brexit campaign.  
Based on what has been said so far, it is clear that «the seeds of Britain’s decision were 
sown over a far longer period»85 and that behind Brexit there is more at stake than simple 
membership in the European Union. Blended with the economic and political was one 
fundamental national concern: what does it mean to be British? This explains why reactions 
were so conflicting, the results so disarming and divisive, the difference among the amount of 
Yes and No votes so slight.86 This also explains the conspicuous number of articles, interviews 
and studies that have been released in the immediate aftermath of the referendum. Among these, 
the first extended cultural responses to the actual vote have come from literature. Novels such 
as Autumn (2016) by Ali Smith, The Cut (2016) by Anthony Cartwright and The Lie of the Land 
(2017) by Amanda Craig, are only a few of the literary works that have already tackled Brexit, 
engaging with the themes at the core of the referendum and with the divisions it has disclosed. 
In particular, contemporary fictions that could be categorised as such have already been tagged 
‘BrexLit’, a compound noun for Brexit and literature. According to Kristan Shaw,  
[r]ather than engaging with the larger realities of European life, the first wave of 
post-Brexit fiction largely seems to be detailing the specific frailties and parochial 
trivialities of an insular and diminished small island – updated forms of state-of-the-
nation novels that retain a narrow focus on British society and its isolation from the 
continent.87 
 
The fact that contemporary works targeting Brexit are not focusing on Europe or 
drawing a European framework, but depicting, instead, ‘frailties’ and ‘parochial trivialities’ of 
British narrow reality, would be another indicator of the connection between the referendum 
 
84Evans, G., Mellon, J., «Social Class. Identity, awareness and political attitudes:why are we still working class?», 
NatCen Social Research, http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/39094/bsa33_social-class_v5.pdf (30 June 2018) 
85Evans, g., Menon, A., op. cit., p.xiv  
86For the referendum results according to geography, see «Brexit. EU referendum results», Financial Times, 24 
June 2016, https://ig.ft.com/sites/elections/2016/uk/eu-referendum/ (30 June 2018)   
87 Shaw, K., «BrexLit», in Eaglestone, R. (ed.), op. cit., pp.27-28 
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and British peculiarities. Furthermore, this ‘small island’ on which Brexit fictions are focused 
happens to be not Britain, but that big part of the country that is usually confused with it: 
England. All Brexit novels published till now are, without exclusion, set in England, which is, 
actually, the very Brexit nation of the United Kingdom. In fact, as the data shortly after the 
referendum results have shown, the small majority that has voted for Brexit is to be found in 
England («Wales, lacking any significant independent economy, did stick with England against 
Europe but brought a tiny number of votes»88). This means that, of the four nations constituting 
the United Kingdom, only one was fiercely on the Leave-side. This England that mostly «voted 
against membership of the EU is the England of vanished industry in the North, rural poverty 
in the Southwest, and people clinging to middle-class lifestyles in the suburbs of once great 
cities that feel increasingly alien to them».89 And even in England alone the vote was highly 
diversified, with the countryside pro-Leave and London pro-Remain, with the youth population 
voting for EU membership and the elderly voting against and with education as another 
powerful dividing factor.90 
England appears, therefore, to be the very main character of this ‘Brexit dream’, and 
this could not have been more expected. England, as we have said before, is the one that has 
been associated the most with identity issues and national revival, particularly after the 
devolution process and the birth of the so-called ‘English question’. Summing up, using 
Hassan’s words, 
[t]here is a feeling of extrinsic events having an impact on England; there are the 
Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish factors; there is the European dimension and the 
unfolding crisis of the euro; there is the impact of globalization and immigration; 
and there is the absence of the British Empire and the question of what comes after 
it. There is also a direct relationship between the systemic inequality across the UK 
and the increasing economic, social and political dominance of a selected part of 
England – London and the south-east. The UK is the fourth most unequal society in 
the developed world and according to Danny Dorling, on existing trends, may well 
become the most unequal – with London possibly becoming the most unequal city.91 
 
Consequently, it should not be surprising that the major tendencies underneath Brexit 
(nostalgia, alienation, tribalism, the multiple divisions characterizing British contemporary 
society) were also at the very core of many contemporary novels written in the last decades 
 
88Calhoun, C., «Nationalism, Populism and Brexit» cit., p.57 
89Ibidem  
90For tables on the vote results, see Moore, P., «How Britain Voted», You Gov, 27 June 2016, 
https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/06/27/how-britain-voted/ (28 June 2018) 
91Hassan, G., «The Future of ‘the Global Kingdom’: Post-Unionism, Post-Nationalism and the Politics of Voice, 
Loyalty and Exit», in Westall C., Gardiner, M. (eds), Literature of an Indipendent England: Revision of England, 
Englishness, and English Literature, Palgrave MacMillan, 2013, p.35  
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precisely in the wake of such events as the devolution process, the European enlargement, the 
economic crash, as well as other global challenges ‘impacting on’ the country, such as the 
refugee crisis and the thread of Islamic terrorism.  
These themes are central in novels that specifically focus on the immigrant perspective, 
as well as in the so-called ‘state of the nation novels’ or ‘Condition of England novels’. These 
novels usually seek to depict contemporary British (or rather English) society, challenging 
nostalgic and exclusive conceptions of national identity, and dealing with the most pressing 
issues: inequality, racism, the divide between the country and the city, the clash between 
ordinary people and the elites, the fragility of the United Kingdom itself. Again unsurprisingly, 
most of them refer in many ways to both war and imperial narrative. To name but a few, we are 
talking about novels such as England, England (1998) by Julian Barnes, Speak for England 
(2005) by James Hawes, Divided Kingdom (2005) by Rupert Thomson, The White Family 
(2002) by Maggie Gee, Kingdom Come (2006) by J.G. Ballard, Small Island (2004) by Andrea 
Levy, The Road Home (2007) by Rose Tremain, Mr Rosenblum’s List (2010) by Natasha 
Solomons, A Week in December (2009) by Sebastian Faulks, or more recently The Casual 
Vacancy (2012) by J.K. Rowling, Capital (2012) by John Lanchester, Expo 58 (2013) and 
Number 11 (2015 ) by Jonathan Coe, Serious Sweet (2016 ) by A. L. Kennedy, and many others. 
In the end, it is on these very themes, national identity, nostalgia and tribalism that this 
study will focus, looking at contemporary fiction in relation to the Brexit campaign and 
Englishness and seeking to analyse thematic developments from pre-Brexit to post-Brexit 
novels. In the light of the above, it is evident that analysing contemporary fictions, both pre- 
and post-Brexit, could provide us with the opportunity of grasping the multiple meanings of the 
referendum, getting a better understanding of contemporary society, and, ultimately, 
considering the impact of the referendum on literature itself. As Salman Rushdie argues, re-
proposing the metaphor linked to the biblical story of Jonah and the Whale previously used by 
George Orwell92,  
there is no whale. We live in a world without hiding places: the missiles have made 
sure of that. However much we may wish to return to the womb, we cannot be 
unborn. […] What I am saying is that politics and literature, like sports and politics, 
do mix, are inextricably mixed, and that that mixture has consequences.93 
 
No author writes in a vacuum, without being influenced by the events of his time, by 
cultural biases or by his own political ideas. For this very reason, literature often represents a 
 
92The reference here is to Orwell, G., Inside the Whale and Other Essays, London, Victor Gollancz, 1940 
93Rushdie, S., op. cit., pp.99-100  
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window on the reality it refers to. As Jago Morrison claims, literature «needs to be read as a 
product of the cultural conditions from which it emerges»94 and, therefore, could be used as a 
field of analysis for culture and society. This is the case especially in Britain, where writers 
have been defined as the very first sociologists of the country. As Krishan Kumar underlines, 
«both literature and history were in England deeply involved with social and political issues» 
so that «they could in certain respects stand for a peculiarly English sociology – sociology by 
another name, perhaps, or sociology by stealth, or ‘implicit sociology’»95. This idea of literature 
as an ‘implicit’ or «concealed sociology»96 is repeated again by Kumar just a few pages further 
on, when he links the delay of the rise of English sociology to the very sociological approach 
of English literature: «the fact was that for the English their poets, novelists, and literary critics 
seemed to be doing a more than adequate job of analysis and criticism of the novel problems of 
nineteenth-century industrial society»97, and this especially in the form of the novel, if one only 
thinks of writers such as Charles Dickens, Thomas Hardy or Elizabeth Gaskell.  
Moreover, it is important to recall that the English novel, and the representations of 
culture and character contained therein, has had a clear role in the construction of English 
national identity. As Patrick Parrinder outlines, 
[f]irst of all, the nature of national identity and of its now rather unfashionable 
counterpart ‘national character has been consistently debated by English novelists 
across the centuries. Secondly, novels are the source of some of our most influential 
ideas and expressions of national identity. Works of art which are enjoyed and 
appreciated by subsequent generations play a key part in the transmission and 
dissemination of national images, memoires, and myths. Thirdly, the fictional 
tradition adds a largely untapped body of evidence to historical enquiry into the 
origins and development of our inherited ideas about England and Englishness.98 
 
Thus, the novel has been a powerful mean for the creation and preservation of a national 
consciousness (returning to Anderson’s ‘imagined community’) from the beginning, and 
especially, as Parrinder outlines, in Britain, where the rise of this literary form is not by chance 
linked to the development of the British Empire. Moreover, not only has the novel been strictly 
entangled with national identity, but it has always been a privileged recipient of criticism and 
 
94Morrison, J., Contemporary fiction, London, Routledge, 2003, p.7, cit. in Bentley, N., Hubble, N., Wilson, L. 
(eds.), The 2000s: A Decade of Contemporary British Fiction, London, Bloomsbury Academy, 2015, p.28 
95Kumar, K., The Idea of Englishness: English Culture, National Identity and Social Thought, Farham, Surrey 
Ashgate, 2015, p.168 
96Cfr. Lepenies, W. (Die Drei Kulturen 1985), Between Literature and Science: The Rise of Sociology, Cambridge 
University Press, 1988, cit. in Kumar, K., op. cit., p.184  
97Ivi, p.183  
98Parrinder, P., Nation & Novel. The English Novel from its Origins to Present Day (2006), New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, p.6 
 23 
 
rewritings of the national narrative. The novel is therefore clearly a valuable tool for outlining 
the cultural and political considerations which shape British national identity 
In conclusion, as we have said before, Brexit is a political outcome related to the 
European Union, but deeply intertwined with contemporary politics, economic issues, global 
tendencies, as well as with British Euroscepticism, history, culture and divisions. Therefore, an 
analysis which focuses on themes related to the referendum, albeit a literary study on 
contemporary fiction, would not be reliable and complete without giving, first, a brief account 
of the interconnection of these factors. Summarising what has been said before, the Brexit vote 
should be analysed starting from the conjunction of three phenomena, respectively of global, 
European and British reach: disillusionment with and alienation from mainstream political 
parties, leaders, and institutions; disillusionment with and alienation from the structures, 
practices and actors of the European Union and EU membership having never been considered 
a positive condition.99 To this, we should add as a further factor British (English) unresolved 
identity issues. 
 
99Cfr. Susen, S., «No Exit From Brexit?», in Outhwaite, W. (ed.), op. cit. 
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Behind Brexit: Cultural and Political Framework 
Brexit from a global perspective: the rise of nationalist and populist parties 
Dissatisfaction with politics and the idea that traditional parties and their leaders are tricking 
the so-called ‘ordinary people’ is not something either strictly British or European, as was 
proven by Donald Trump’s victory at the American presidential elections in 2016.  This 
phenomenon corresponds exactly to what Antonio Gramsci described as an organic crisis, 
meaning a loss of political hegemony by governing elites, which is caused by many citizens 
lacking trust in traditional parties and turning to what they perceive as anti-regime 
alternatives.100 In terms of the present day, the so called ‘left behind’, which is to say the 
underemployed and the unemployed, would be the main characters of this ‘revolt’, scared by 
integration and mass immigration. Also named ‘rust-belt voters’ and usually identified as 
demographic with ‘the white working class’, the left behind would be those who express the 
most «a sentimental preference for the way things were», prevalent in «those non-metropolitan 
areas associated with industrial decline, diminishing economic opportunity and scepticism 
towards civic values»101. The loss of trust in traditional parties and leaders would be, therefore, 
directly connected to the multiple changes that have characterized the last decades and strongly 
affected contemporary societies. In fact, in this post-industrial era marked by globalization and 
transnational mobilities, the erosion of forms of employment labelled as ‘secure’, economic 
crises, inequality, the dismantlement of welfare systems, populations appear to be more than 
ever divided between poor and rich, powerless and empowered, the so-called winners and losers 
of globalization. This division between powerless and empowered people would have been 
fundamental in the Brexit case, where globalization was associated with the political processes 
of European integration. This was also Theresa May’s interpretation of the vote, considering 
that, after taking up the post as prime minister, she declared the Conservative Party ready to 
«stand up for the weak», «restore fairness» and work for those people «just about managing»102.  
Brexit, indeed, has been defined as a «manifestation of the disequilibrium of power and a cry 
of protest against it»103, a disequilibrium that has grown deeper after the turn to neoliberalism, 
a turn, both in the UK and USA, that many European countries have followed suit, relying 
heavily on neoliberalist policies after the 2008 economic crisis. Paradoxically, neoliberalism’s 
 
100Cfr. Gramsci, A., Quaderni dal carcere, Einaudi Editore, 1975 
101Kenny, M., «Back to the populist future?: understanding nostalgia in contemporary ideological discourse», 
Journal of Political Ideologies, Vol. 22, NO. 3, 2017, pp.256-273, p. 257  
102May, T., cit. in Evans, G., Menon, A., op. cit., p.99 
103 Hearn J., «Vox Populi: Nationalism, Globalization and the Balance of Power in the Making of Brexit», in 
Outhwaite, W. (ed.), op. cit., p.26  
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consequences are none other than more deregulation and less social protection, which, instead 
of helping those more affected by the crash, have contributed to further impoverishment of the 
lower strata of society. This link between neoliberalism, dissatisfaction with politics and turn 
to populist and nationalist parties, has been well-explained by Craig Calhoun, who has stressed 
that: 
[t]his is not a uniquely English set of frustrations and wishful thinking or political 
responses. Populism and nationalism are prominent around the world partly because 
since the 1970s inequality has grown sharply and the middle and working classes of 
once-prosperous countries have seen living standards stagnate and economic 
security disappear. At the same time, migration has increased globally – largely 
because of globalization itself as well as wars Western countries like the United 
States and the United Kingdom chose to fight in the Middle East. And the world 
quite simply looks scary. Nationalism flourishes precisely when people feel 
threatened by international forces. Populism flourishes when people feel betrayed by 
elites.104 
 
Leave voters seem to be governed exactly by these two key feelings: a general fear of 
the world outside of Britain and a distrust of the elites who govern their lives. This naturally 
leads to a desire to ‘take back control’, both of one’s own life and of the country itself. 
A slogan particularly dear to Nigel Farage, ‘take back control’ gives the idea of 
something that has been lost, or stolen, and should be reclaimed back. In the case of Brexit, this 
reclaiming mostly regards, at a superficial level, regaining control of borders, lands, laws, from 
the interference of the EU, and, in doing so, giving back sovereignty to the nation. But the desire 
for reclamation refers to more than that: ultimately, it comes from the feeling that one’s own 
life is out of control and to the perception that the future is not going to bring anything good. It 
stems from the desire to return to a safer, and indeed more isolated, way of life, one which is 
perceived as being more manageable. Nowadays, issues such as terrorism or global warming 
require cooperation and supranational decision-making, while advance in the sectors of 
technology, communications and transport have created a world that simply seems to have no 
barriers, walls or borders able to keep the ‘Other’ out.  As Eva Aldea stresses, 
[s]tudies have shown how perceived lack of control over one’s life and surroundings 
corelates with more conservative attitudes and even ethnocentrism (Agroskin, 2010). 
Clearly economic situation, individual and communal, as well as education are 
central to a sense of control.105  
 
Turning to conservativism and ethnocentrism would be, therefore, an attempt to protect 
one’s self from the threat of growing immigration, which is perceived as the most significant 
 
104Calhoun C., «Nationalism, Populism and Brexit» cit, p.63 
105Aldea, E., «The Lost Nomad of Europe», in Eaglestone, R., op. cit., p.156  
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risk to economic and national insecurity. Since both economic situation and education are 
factors commonly central to one’s feeling of control, those that are more afflicted by the feeling 
of things slipping through their fingers tend to be the less educated: people that travel less and, 
consequently, have fewer opportunities for experiencing a positive encounter with the Other, 
as well as less job security following the arrival of migrant workers. This ‘educational gradient’, 
claimed by Labour MP Barry Sheerman commenting on Brexit, has been supported by a few 
research studies106 as well as YouGov data107. Evans and Menon, in particular, assert that  
[n]o fewer than 72% of those with no educational qualifications voted to Leave, 
compared with only 35% of people with a university degree. There was a remarkable 
30 percentage point gap between those with low versus those with high levels of 
education even when all other factors were taken into account.108 
 
However, not all the experts agree on education’s impact and interpretation: age, access 
to education, specifics of the geographical area are only a few of the variables jeopardising this 
indicator. Focusing on age, for instance, it is interesting to note that «over 40% of the Leave 
vote was aged over 55»109. The elderly, who are less likely to live in urban areas and have a 
university degree, seem to require the addition of another label next to the ‘left behind’ one: 
that of ‘left out’, «people whose views are out of step with dominant liberal political values»110 
and do feel betrayed by traditional mainstream parties, which embrace, today, the same set of 
liberal values.   
The presence of migrants on the national territory is an issue not only for the competitive 
force they represent, but also because they are the personification of everything labelled as 
‘alien’, threatening the reassuring homogeneity of the community. Their presence is, indeed, 
another factor activating the fear of loss: the loss of the very cultural and ethnic identity of the 
community. From this perspective, nationalism and populism appear to these individuals, who 
do feel threatened, betrayed and abandoned, as the last defence against a reality they do not 
know how to cope with, and against political and cultural elites that, more often than not, 
demeaned their fears, desires and opinions. Nationalism, as Craig Calhoun acknowledges, is 
often «denigrated by proponents of transnational society who see the national and many other 
 
106See, for instance, Goodwin, M., Heath, O., «Brexit vote explained: poverty, low skills and lack of opportunities», 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 31 August 2016, https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/brexit-vote-explained-poverty-low-
skills-and-lack-opportunities (30 June 2018) 
107Weaver, M., «Facts support MP's claim that better-educated voted remain – pollster», The Guardian, 30 October 
2017, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/oct/30/facts-support-mps-claim-that-better-educated-voted-
remain-pollster (30 June 2018) 
108Evans, G., Menon, A., op. cit. p.84  
109Ibidem  
110Ibidem  
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local solidarities as backward or outmoded, impositions of the past on the present».111 What 
these cultural elites do not recognize is that nationalism is still fundamental in building 
collective identities and solidarities. As Shaw notes talking about the Brexit results, 
 [f]or many undecided voters it was difficult to perceive the benefits of a vague 
supranational identity when their national identity was much more tangible and 
intrinsically tied to their cultural memory and day-to-day lives. Such cosmopolitan 
citizenship seemed to be the purview of privileged elites alone.112 
 
While Shaw sees European identity as something vague, not as visceral as the national 
one, he also argues that cosmopolitanism — as an ideology based on the vision of a single world 
community with shared ideals — seems to be a prerogative of the elites. This is the exact 
ideology that Theresa May, in a bold attempt at currying the so-called ordinary people’s support 
(and that of the most nationalist members of her own party), has sharply criticized in the post-
Brexit speech she delivered at the Tory party conference in 2016, saying that «if you believe 
you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere».113 As far as this statement is open 
to criticism, referring to new conceptions of citizenship and collective identities, it certainly 
conveys an understanding of what nationalism is about. Nationalism, basically, is the emotional 
attachment that permits the very existence of nations as social constructs. It is the recognition 
of being part of a community of individuals, sharing a common territory, language and culture. 
Therefore, it is not exogenous, but endogenous to democracy. A democracy is based on people 
that have agreed to walk together, to have a common political future and common institutions, 
not according to any rational arguments but moved by the belief of sharing a common identity. 
According to Ghia Nodia, we have experienced three waves of resurgent nationalism since the 
Second World War: firstly, the nationalist wars for independence against colonialism; secondly, 
the fall of the Soviet Union with the subsequent rebirth of Eastern European nations; thirdly, 
the contemporary global nationalist resurgence, visible in the appeal nationalist slogans such as 
‘Make America Great Again’ and ‘America First’ had in the last American presidential 
elections. Brexit would be the «salient expression» of this third wave and a «heavy blow» for 
post-nationalist theory, since «Britain is not some developing country or even a new democracy. 
On the contrary, it is arguably the very cradle of modernity in general, and of modern 
 
111Calhoun, C., Nations Matter: Culture, History, and the Cosmopolitan Dream, London, Routledge, 2007, p.170 
112Shaw, K., «BrexLit» cit., p.24 
113May, T., Conference Speech, 5 Ottobre 2016, in «Theresa May's conference speech in full», The Telegraph, 
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democracy in particular».114 This third wave, moreover, is clearly proven by the good 
performance of parties that carry on nationalist themes in many European countries. 
Populism is an endogenous element of democracy as well, considering that, in order to 
be voted in as representatives, politicians always must convince the people that they are their 
best choice. They do that, inevitably, by trying to please the voters, focusing specifically on 
issues the electorate seems to care about the most. Nowadays, we are dealing with an inward 
evolution, since the term now defines political parties, movements and politicians that have 
taken this to the extreme, shaping completely their speeches and political ideas on what they 
consider to be the mood of the people. To do that, populists must be ready to easily shift from 
one stance to the other. It is not by chance, then, that, populists often embrace left-wing and 
right-wing elements. As McCarthy stresses, populism is  
 comfortably at home on the political left, fuelling dark narratives of exploitation, 
colonialism, mercantilism, and income equality when the establishment to be 
opposed is private wealth. It has found a home on the right, particularly in the era of 
Reagan and Thatcher, when the targeted establishment was the statist government 
and its incursions into the shrinking realm of individual liberty.115 
 
 Focusing especially on European populism on the right of the political spectrum, 
Michael Freeden has outlined three distinguishable core attributes of populist parties:  
an inclination to conceive of society as a singular unitary body […]; an appeal to the 
origination and integrity of a defining founding moment or natality, even if not 
articulated as such; and a visceral fear of imported change in law, customes and 
people.116 
 
The first attribute refers to the idea of the ‘indivisibility’ of the people as a «bloc that 
cannot be disaggregated in any shape or form»117. According to populists, the people are a 
homogeneous body and should be preserved as such, and this, paradoxically, makes 
contemporary populism «incompatible with democracy» since «populism’s conception of the 
people as a homogeneous body is fictional and «generates a logic which disregards the idea of 
otherness […] and aims at the suppression of diversity within society»118. This also explains 
why the agenda of European populist movements and parties is usually characterized by «the 
 
114Nodia, G., «The End of the Postnational Illusion», Journal of Democracy, Vol.28, No.2, April 2017, pp.5-19, 
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115McCarthy, A. C., «Populism Versus Populism», The New Criterion, February 2017, 
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116Freeden, M., «After the Brexit Referendum: revisiting populism as an ideology», Journal of Political Ideologies, 
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preservation of the status quo – or the status quo ante – as it was before mass migration, 
Europeanization and globalization started to challenge the nation states»119 introducing 
diversity.  
Strictly connected to the preservation of the status quo and of the presumed homogeneity 
of the people is the second attribute Freeden identifies, which refers to populists’ commitment 
to «an initiating moment of a society»120. This idea of origin is fundamental in the imagination 
of a national community and – which is even more interesting –    
implies the monopolistic ownership of the national timeline. Significantly, its main 
interest lies in reformulating sovereignty not merely as the spatial control over 
territory but as the appropriation of a temporal trajectory of ‘we were here first’, 
hence we are the ultimate deciders, the fons et origo of what matters and happens 
here, and hence also we always have precedence over immigrants, disregarding the 
fact that our ancestors were immigrants too.121 
 
According to populists, being there from the alleged moment of origin gives people the 
right to choose, possess and, ultimately, even continue to exist on the national soil, excluding 
from these rights everyone who cannot claim a connection to that initial moment, in primis 
immigrants whose recent arrival testifies their unrelatedness to the origin of the nation and its 
community. The visceral fear of changes to the country’s laws and customs therefore stems 
from changes to its national composition. Those not born here, or not fitting in with 
homogenous national identity, represent a threat to Britain’s sense of self, resulting in hostility 
towards immigrants. 
Freeden connects two other important features to right-wing populism, speed and 
emotion. Speed relates to the rapidness with which populists respond to current events, 
commonly in a way which lacks those filters (for instance internal ideological debate, a stable 
set of values and ideas) which apply to the responses of the traditional parties. The speed of 
impact is directly connected to the emotion populist leaders seek to leverage, in particular to 
those anxieties and fears that find no space in mainstream politics. As Scruton underlines, Nigel 
Farage, Marine LePen, Donald Trump, would have 
one thing in common, which is their preparedness to allow a voice to passions that 
are neither acknowledged nor mentioned in the course of normal politics. And for 
this reason, they are not democrats but demagogues – not politicians who guide and 
 
119Mral, B., Wodak, R., Khosravinik, M., Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse, Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2013, p.10 
120Freeden, M., op. cit., p.1  
121Ibidem  
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govern by appeal to arguments, but agitators who stir the unthinking feelings of the 
crowd.122  
 
What transforms a politician into a demagogue, according to Scruton, is giving space to 
people’s inner worries and emotions, even to those that overstep what is considered civilised 
(and ethically acceptable) discourse. For this reason, populists consider themselves the true and 
only spokesmen of the people and appeal directly to them, bypassing regular political processes. 
This is evident in the Brexit case, where prominent figures of the Leave front declared 
themselves advocates of the people and defined the referendum results ‘the will of the people’, 
«conveniently ignoring that 62.5% of the electorate (Remainers, and those who abstained from 
participating) did not vote to leave the EU»123. As Freeden underlines,  
[m]ost populist references relating the people to democracy have a manipulative 
rhetoric effect, in which democracy is the abstract rule of the people en masse, 
without the liberal and intricate constitutional trappings that have come to be 
associated with European and North American democracies.124 
 
Therefore, ‘people’ would be a «stylized entity» used as a «weapon of argument»125, 
that is to say a rhetorical instrument intended to gain recognition and recruit the ‘ordinary 
people’ for the party’s own political agenda, as it claims to be their spokesman against common 
enemies. This populist figure of speech, ‘the will of the people’, has become so pervasive in 
Brexit discourse that it has been used both by Conservative and Labour MPs, who have ended 
up legitimatising the populist narrative. An example of the pervasiveness of it comes from the 
media too: «The Judges VS the People» or «Enemies of the People»126 are only two of the many 
newspaper’ and magazine’ headlines that have circulated from the referendum onwards. These 
titles also hint at the populist narrative regarding the elites. According to populists, the elites 
are an element in opposition to the righteous and good people, alien forces on their own 
conspiring against the everyman. Related to this, populists are no more guided by the idea of 
an equality between the people and the elites, but ‘by the belief that the people […] are actually 
 
122Scruton, R., «Populism: VII: Representation & the People», The New Criterion, March 2017, 
https://newcriterion.com/issues/2017/3/populism-vii-representation-the-people (30 June 2018) 
123 Freeden, M., op. cit., p.7 
124Ibidem 
125Ibidem  
126Headlines of the The Telegraph and The Daily Mail referring to three High Court judges and their judgement 
on the triggering of article 50. The articles in question are Dominiczak, P., Hope, C., McCann, K., «Judges vs the 
people: Government ministers resigned to losing appeal against High Court ruling», The Telegraph, 3 November 
2016, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/03/the-plot-to-stop-brexit-the-judges-versus-the-people/ (30 
June 2018); Slack, J., «Enemies of the people: Fury over 'out of touch' judges who have 'declared war on 
democracy' by defying 17.4m Brexit voters and who could trigger constitutional crisis», Mail Online, 3 November 
2016, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3903436/Enemies-people-Fury-touch-judges-defied-17-4m-
Brexit-voters-trigger-constitutional-crisis.html (30 June 2018)  
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better than their rulers and better than the classes – the urban middle classes – associated with 
the ruling powers.’127 Moreover, as Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell explain, 
populists depict the elites in cahoots with «dangerous ‘others’» trying to deprive «(or attempting 
to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice.’128The 
elites are, then, accused of acting against people’s interests, protecting those responsible for 
their miseries: bankers, multinational corporations, international organisations, immigrants. 
Similarly, everyone who is pro-Eu is associated with the elites and considered a collaborator 
and a traitor of its own people. Consequently, the political debate ends up being framed in terms 
of ‘us’ versus ‘them’.129 Interestingly, as o’ Toole stresses, «t]he quisling theme was also 
endemic in the revolt against black and Asian migrants» when Enoch Powell was the populist 
politician arguing that «immigration was proof that a treacherous elite was selling out the 
victory of the war»130.  
Ultimately, the success of a populist party is related to the issue it represents. Van Kessel 
has underlined that populist parties generally tend to focus on four specific themes, which are 
culture and ethnicity, economic hardship, European integration and corruption. These issues 
can all be intertwined, some can be more prominent than others, or the party in question may 
focus on one specific issue: what matters most is the importance of that issue to a part of the 
electorate and the extent to which the established parties are considered ineffective in dealing 
with it, or whether they have attempted to bury it.131 This, according to Scruton, is exactly what 
could explain European nationalist renaissance and the populist rise, which would have been 
triggered by the inability of the establishment, both cultural and political, to deal with the 
identity issues provoked by the major changes of the last decades:  
 what happens when the issues closest to people’s hearts are neither discussed nor 
mentioned by their representatives, and when these issues are precisely issues of 
identity – of “who we are” and “what unites us”? This, it seems to me, is where we 
have got to in Western democracies, in the United States just as much as in Europe. 
And recent events in both continents would be less surprising if the media and the 
politicians had woken up earlier to the fact that Western democracies – all of them 
without exception – are suffering from a crisis of identity. The ‘we’ that is the 
foundation of trust and the sine qua non of representative government, has been 
jeopardized not only by the global economy and the rapid decline of indigenous ways 
of life, but also by the mass immigration of people with other languages, other 
 
127Shils, E., The Torment of Secrecy: The Background and Consequences of American Security Policies, The Free 
Press, 1956, p.101, cit. in Van Kessel, S, op. cit., p.5 
128Albertazzi, D., McDonnell, D., Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy, 
2008b, p.3, in Van Kessel, S., op. cit., p.6 
129Cfr. De Vries, C., «Populism on the Rise?, 19 December 2016, University of Oxford, http://www.ox.ac.uk/news-
and-events/oxford-and-brexit/brexit-analysis/populism-rise (28  June 2018) 
130O’Toole, F., op. cit, p.91  
131Cfr. Van Kessel, S., op. cit. 
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customs, other religions, other ways of life, and other and competing loyalties. 
Worse than this is the fact that ordinary people have been forbidden to complain 
about it publicly, forbidden even to begin the process of coming to terms with it by 
discussing what the costs and benefits might be.’132  
 
The crisis Western democracies would be living, whose manifestations are the rise of 
nationalism and populism, is here related both to identity (the jeopardised ‘we’, which is now 
impossible to imagine as well as undermined by individualistic approaches) and the elites. The 
establishment is accused of ignoring the ‘ordinary’ people’s worries and fears and, at the same 
time, of tabooing them. This has created the distance between the elites and the people, and 
ultimately pushed the people to rely on anti-establishment alternatives, ready to embrace those 
issues ‘closest to their heart’, in primis the search for identity. Global economy, the decline of 
indigenous ways of life, mass immigration, the mixture of religions and cultures in one 
community, the broad convergence of traditional parties on neoliberal economic principles and 
on liberal values, are all factors that, in Scruton’s account, are pressing on both the national and 
the supranational, as well as on the corresponding identities. In the case of the European Union, 
the identity crisis investing the imagined (supranational) ‘we’, jeopardised by all these 
variables, is affecting none other than the very engagement of the people to the project of a 
united Europe. 
 
Brexit from a European perspective: the end of the European dream? 
The very formation of the first nucleus of the European Union was a response to what has been 
defined as the evils of nationalism. As Ghia Nodia stresses, «[t]he EU was deliberately designed 
to gradually weaken nation states and make them less relevant, eventually leading to some kind 
of federal Europe». For the founders of the first European community, 
 [t]he two world wars were the turning point. Their carnage made nationalism a dirty 
word. In their wake, the vision of a postnationalist world became widely seen as not 
only desirable, but feasible. The rise and disastrous fall of Fascism and Nazism 
dramatically discredited nationalism and legitimised the European Union.133 
 
The horrors perpetrated during the two World Wars, therefore, stimulated the birth of 
the European project, since the constitution of a European community was intended as an 
insurance against international antagonism. Nationalism was considered a major threat, while 
the formation of a European conglomerate was a ‘dream’ of peace, co-operation and prosperity. 
On the contrary, nowadays the European Union is considered less a dream and more a mixture 
 
132Scruton, R., op. cit 
133Nodia, G., op. cit., p.9 
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of obligations and restrictions, and therefore is far beyond the era of ‘permissive consensus’ 
that has marked the project’s concrete realisation. And to make matters worse, nationalisms are 
spreading again throughout the Continent. So, what happened to public support towards the 
European Union? 
Political support, as outlined by many scholars, is multi-faceted. For instance, the UK 
has always shown low support for the monetary union, and in fact did not embrace the ‘euro’ 
project, but, on the contrary, it has always been favourable to further enlargement (at least 
before the 2008 financial crash). Thus, political support could be directed towards different 
objects (in the EU case, for example, it could be directed towards the community or the 
institutional power structure) and it could be diffuse or specific, meaning support based on a 
general positive evaluation of the EU itself, or based on the positive evaluation of a concrete 
policy outcome. Moreover, the nature of support could be utilitarian or affective. An affective 
political support towards the EU refers to an emotional response, to a support rooted in the 
vision of a common past, in the dream of a united Europe and in the belief of a common identity. 
Instead, utilitarian support is policy-oriented, which means that it depends on analyses about 
costs and benefits of being a member of the EU.134 Therefore, utilitarian support, using 
Goodwin and Milazzo’s terminology, is built on ‘economic arguments’, while the affective kind 
is built on ‘identity’ ones. For what concerns the ‘economic arguments’, factors influential in 
lowering or increasing support are both the actual economic situation and the very perception 
of the economic performance of one’s own country, since «individual level evaluations of the 
state of the national economy» appear to be «far more important than macroeconomic 
indicators».135 For what concerns ‘identity arguments’, the most important element is the way 
national identity is constructed, together with attitudes towards immigration. In fact, citizens 
that are strongly attached to their nation and that consider immigrants a threat to the welfare 
and homogeneity of their country are more likely to oppose to European integration, resulting 
in their being less supportive of European institutions and international cooperation. On the 
contrary, those citizens whose national identity is not based on exclusiveness are more likely to 
give space to the development of a European identity that could positively influence EU 
support. As Goodwin and Milazzo underline, 
It is not unusual for an individual to have a strong national attachment and yet be 
positively oriented to European integration. What matters is whether a person 
 
134Cfr. Easton D., «A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support», British Journal of Political Science, 
vol.4, n°5, October 1975, pp.435-457  
135Armingeon, K., Ceka, B., «The Loss of Trust in the European Union during the great recession since 2007: the 
role of heuristics from the national political system», European Union Politics, vol.15(1), 6 August 2013, pp.82-
107, p.97 
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conceives of her national identity as exclusive or inclusive of other territorial 
identities. Individuals with exclusive national identities are predisposed to 
Euroscepticism if they are cued to believe that love of their country and its 
institutions is incompatible with European integration.136 
 
Economic and identity arguments would be, ultimately, more or less effective according 
to the cultural background as well as social and economic conditions of a given individual. But 
economic and identity-related arguments, together with the specific circumstances of the 
individual, are not the only factors influencing EU support. Especially referring to trust and 
commitment to the European Union, Armingeon and Ceka have argued that people’s opinions 
on the EU do not depend solely on EU policies, political philosophy or individual perception, 
but they would be strictly linked to the levels of support for national governments. To 
understand it better, it is fundamental to keep in mind the premises of the so-called ‘cue theory’, 
which states that citizens tend to rely on cues for issues they perceive as being far away from 
them or too complicated. These cues  
could be ideological, deriving from an individual’s position on left/right 
distributional conflict, or they could come from the media, intermediary institutions 
such as trade unions or churches, or from political parties. In fact, there is evidence 
for each of these. However, when one examines the content of such cues, it is clear 
that they engage identity as well as economic interest.137 
 
Concerning the EU, this means that citizens tend to rely on cues they receive from 
different sources, for instance newspapers, websites, religious leaders, union representatives 
and, in general, members of national elites. It follows that an appreciated national government 
that supports the EU would induce its citizens to do the same. This does not imply, of course, 
that all citizens rely on cues coming from national authorities they trust in, and in fact the 
analyses regarding cue theory have shown that the well-educated, such as students, managers, 
practitioners – those that Armingeon and Ceka define «more knowledgeable Europeans»138 – 
tend to collect their information directly from the EU institutions and are more likely to trust 
the European Union. 
Related to this, the two scholars have also argued that, while high levels of trust in 
national elites and governments correspond to trust in European institutions, low levels of 
support for the European Union reflect distrust of those elites and dissatisfaction with one’s 
 
136Goodwin, M., Milazzo, C., UKIP, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, p.13 
137Hooghe, L., Marks, G., «A PostFunctional Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to 
Constraining Dissensus», in British Journal of Political Science, vol.39, 2008, pp.1-23, pp.10-11 
138Armingeon, K., Ceka, B., op. cit., p.87 
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own government and its policies.139 This hypothesis is corroborated by the analyses on 
European elections’ results, which usually suggest the approval rating of national governments. 
An example is the 2014 European elections won by the United Kingdom Independence Party, 
one sign of the growing distrust in the British Conservative government. This also means that 
the two levels of government, the national and the supranational (meaning European), are so 
intertwined in the mind of the citizens that not only the national context is used to shape one’s 
own evaluation of the European Union, but ‘less knowledgeable’ citizens happen to be unable 
to distinguish between national and EU policies, and are therefore more prone to blame and 
distrust the European Union itself for the economic and social conditions of their specific 
country. National policies that have been recently criticised are none other than the economic 
manoeuvres implemented to stem the 2008 economic crisis, which, as «neoliberal counter-
revolutionary measures», are even in «apparent violation of the legal obligations of EU member 
states, and perhaps also EU institutions»140 and therefore creating another crisis: one of legality. 
Eventually, the austerity policies applied by the EU itself in exchange for financial assistance, 
which have been perceived as an imposition (the Greek case is particularly poignant), have only 
worsened a public aversion towards the EU that was already present. Related to austerity and 
the economic crisis, Javier Solana underlines that 
the EU’s weaker economies faced skyrocketing unemployment, especially among 
young people, while its stronger economies felt pressure to ‘show solidarity’ by 
bailing out countries in distress. When the stronger economies provided those 
bailouts, they included demands for austerity that impeded the recipients’ economic 
recovery. Few were satisfied, and many blamed European integration. […] But, 
while the economic pain that many Europeans feel is certainly real, the nationalists’ 
diagnosis of its source is false. The reality is that the EU can be criticized for the way 
it handled the crisis; but it cannot be blamed for the global economic imbalances that 
have fuelled economic strife since 2008. Those imbalances reflect a much broader 
phenomenon: globalization.141 
 
The European Union has been, therefore, criticised for two reasons: on one side, for 
forcing more stable members to help the countries most affected by the 2008 crash; on the other 
side, for bonding this help to economic policies that have worsened their situation. The grudge 
held by both sides did facilitate the transformation of the EU into a scapegoat for the economic 
crisis.  
 
139This hypothesis was first supported by Martinozzi and Stefanizzi (1995) and Haller (1999), both cit. in 
Armingeon, K., Ceka, B., op. cit., p.88  
140Ewing, K., D., «The Death of Social Europe», in Birkinshaw, P., Biondi, A., Britain Alone! The Implications 
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In conclusion, we could argue that cues by nationalist and populist politicians, 
dissatisfaction with national governments and opposition to national policies are directly 
connected to the EU’s current unpopularity and could, therefore, be considered responsible for 
the sudden spread of distrust and disillusionment with the European project itself. But 
obviously, when there is an unexpected fall in support – particularly when it regards the diffuse 
and affective kind, which is supposed to be long-term and stable – this cannot be attributed to 
only one factor, especially an economic one, and certainly not only to factors that are national-
specific. Reasons of the escalation in distrust towards the EU must be, therefore, multiple. Apart 
from national issues and the economic crisis, other factors that, according to Susen142, should 
be held accountable for the contemporary spread of Euroscepticism, would be the perception 
of a European Union slow to act and inadequate in its responses, as well as the challenges posed 
by the refugee and migrant crisis and the thread of international terrorism. The first factor is 
strictly related to the very way the EU has been shaped in the last decades and to the divisions 
regarding further integration. Nowadays, European member states appear unable to move 
forward towards the ‘United States of Europe’, and, at the same time, unable to come back to a 
‘less-closer’ union.  In fact, worries regarding loss of sovereignty and European interference 
(especially, as we know, in Britain) have determined the prevailing of an intergovernmental 
approach in EU structures and institutions. Consequently, as John McCormick explains, «[t]he 
cumulative interests of the member states dominate the EU decision-making process»143, with 
the EU limited by the treaties the same national governments conceive. This was particularly 
visible after the 2008 economic crash and with the influx of refugees escaping from the war in 
Syria. As Auer states, 
[b]oth the refugee crisis and the eurozone crisis, which were the backdrop to the 
British referendum, highlighted the paradox that no amount of rhetorical flourish 
about multilevel governance, democracy or Europe’s experimental union can wish 
away: member states have ceded too much control to the supranational level to be 
able to set effective policies in important areas independently of each other and of 
the Union institutions. Yet, they retain enough initiative to resist compromise and 
thwart common solutions. As we have seen, the efforts of national and European 
leaders to deal with economic challenges and the unprecedented influx of migrants 
share certain features. These include the inability to agree on binding common 
policies, the unintended and unwanted elevation of Germany to the pre-eminent 
leadership position and a widespread populist backlash – particularly in those states 
in which a loss of sovereign control is most acutely perceived».144  
 
 
142Cfr. Susen, S., op. cit. 
143McCormick, John, «Why Europe Works», in Dür, A., Zimmermann, H. (eds.) (2012), Key Controversies in 
European Integration, Palgrave MacMillan, 2016, p.18 
144Auer, S., «Brexit, Sovereignty and the End of an Ever Closer Union», in Outhwaite, W.(ed.), op. cit., p.50  
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Secondly, the refugee and migrant crisis has certainly been fundamental in fuelling 
resentment towards the EU and undermining transnational loyalties. In fact, while some 
member states complain about the lack of solidarity and the little help they receive in saving, 
accommodating and sustaining refugees and migrants, others refuse to take their own share and 
consider the measure itself an EU attempt to interfere at the national level. Moreover, the crisis 
is challenging the very conception of the free movement of people, the pillar of the European 
Union (the others are free movement of goods, capital and service) notoriously at the centre of 
the Brexit campaign. Thus, national governments have put again on the table the question of 
national borders, with many countries building or threatening to build walls along their borders 
to prevent illegal immigrants entering their territory. In the UK, however, it was not fear of 
refugees that put under scrutiny the free movement of people, but fear of Europeans. As Freeden 
points out,  
[t]he UK avoided similar sentiments of alarm simply by accepting a trifling number 
of refugees in the first place, so that their visibility was negligible (and in the case of 
the now dismantled Calais ‘jungle’ camps, forcibly keeping most of them out of 
British territory). […] And the modes of movement across borders were dissimilar: 
Europeans from EU countries entered and exited the UK freely, while non-European 
migrants into the European mainland entered illegally or were subject – usually 
retroactively – to national quotas.145  
 
Therefore, claiming back control of national borders, Brexiteers were not influenced by 
the same factor as other European nations equally hostile to the free movement of people (the 
refugee and migrant crisis), but by European immigration, especially that of the Eastern 
Europeans. 
International terrorism, on the other side, has increased fear and suspicion for the non-
native in all of the Continent’s nation states as well as in the UK. The terrorist attacks of 9/11, 
in particular, have deeply influenced Europe, which, from then on, has undergone the rise of 
racist and xenophobic attitudes, as well as the development of new cleavages strictly linked to 
security agendas. These cleavages could be summarized in three major oppositions: ‘Capital vs 
Labour’, ‘Radical Cultural Pluralism’ vs ‘Neoliberal Techno-Conservatism’ and 
‘Cosmopolitanism vs Nationalism’. Coming back to the referendum, a key issue in the 
negotiations between the Prime Minister David Cameron and the EU to avoid the Brexit vote 
was, together with Eastern European migration, none other than the European Convention of 
Human Rights, which is perceived as interfering precisely in national security matters. 
According to Delanty, the cleavage that has come out from Brexit is, unsurprisingly, 
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“Nationcenteredness” vs “Cosmopolitan Pluralism”.146 Especially in Britain, «the ‘War on 
Terror’ has doubled as a concern with protecting the nation’s integrity from pollution by 
‘outsiders’»147and strengthened  a vision of the country based on the dichotomy ‘us/them’ and 
a register based on a simplistic distinction between ‘good’ and ‘evil’.  
All these factors, ultimately, seem to be equally responsible for the crisis of support the 
European Union is experiencing. To stem and solve this crisis, European institutions and pro-
EU national elites are coming back to the origins of the project, which is to say to the themes 
of unity, peace and prosperity exploited in the early days of the first European organisation and 
related to the post-war narrative of catastrophe and renaissance. This would confirm Javier 
Solana’s thesis, which is to say that  
[t]he European Union has a dangerous case of nostalgia. Not only is a yearning for 
the ‘good old days’ – before the Eu supposedly impinged on national sovereignty – 
fueling the rise of nationalist political parties; European leaders continue to try to 
apply yesterday’s solutions to today’s problems.148 
 
Resorting to the European narrative of catastrophe and renaissance is, undoubtedly, an 
old strategy to keep the Union together. According to this European narrative, after the Second 
World War the Continent would have experienced a period of exceptional peace, stability and 
solidarity, thanks to the very existence of a European community. Therefore, the maintenance 
today of the European Union would be not only desirable, but necessary to prevent the horrors 
of the war.  This narrative had been previously put aside, as proven by the fact that «[t]he 
‘permissive consensus’ towards European integration that existed amongst European 
electorates until the beginning of the 1990s was predicated on rising living standards and 
lowering costs rather than the memory of past conflicts».149But it has been drawn in again after 
fears of a more federal union started to spread, especially from the Maastricht Treaty onwards. 
The memory of the Holocaust, for instance, was extensively adopted to legitimise the next phase 
of European enlargement, a phase that worried more than one member of the Union. 
Furthermore, the narrative of catastrophe and renaissance, which is a fully-fledged ‘EU 
myth of origin’, could not work to keep Britain in the European Union, since the British post- 
war narrative is completely opposite to the European one. As Wellings affirms,  
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147Malek, B., «Bhaji on the Beach: South Asian feminity at ‘home’ on the ‘English’ seasidee», in Rogers, D., 
McLeod, J. (eds.), The Revision of Englishness, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004, p.122 
148Solana, J., op. cit. 
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European unity demanded some sort of supra-national mythology that could 
accommodate the pre-existing states and nations of the European sub-continent. 
British nationalism was forged by war. European identity was constructed in 
opposition to it.150 
 
Since ‘British nationalism was forged by the war’, the very interpretation of the conflict 
differs from that of the other European countries, where the war did not forge their nationalism, 
but was, if anything, a product of it. ‘British’ war was not a ‘catastrophe’, but a glorious victory, 
a proof of British strength and endurance against the continental foes. On the contrary, the 
decades after the war, in which the European community has grown while British world 
influence has decreased, are considered a phase of constant decline, and consequently 
interpreted more as a slow death than a renaissance. This has contributed in giving a negative 
shade to European membership. In the UK, moreover, memories of the war are already 
exploited to reinforce the ties of kinship and trade among the members of the Commonwealth 
(that ‘wider community of Britons’ who actively participated in the Second World War to save 
Britain from a possible German invasion). Clearly, the same strategy could not be applied twice, 
both to European fellow members and to the Commonwealth. 
 Given that there is no British myth around European integration, the UK has always 
perceived the ‘European dream’ in economic terms and not as a cultural and political project. 
This has created a fracture between Britain and Europe and their corresponding narratives that 
became particularly visible during the Brexit campaign, where the war time was remembered 
as a kind of British ‘golden era’. This fracture has also been deepened by other factors, in primis 
by traditional British attitudes towards the Continent.  
 
The ‘Awkward Partner’: British Euroscepticism  
As implied earlier, «lack of enthusiasm for the political, let alone the cultural, dimensions 
underlying the European project, can be regarded as one of the primary reasons for the outcome 
of the 2016 UK referendum»151. This would lead us to include Brexit in a wider framework, 
that related to Euroscepticism and low EU support. But, as Tournier-Sol and Gifford underline 
in their introduction to The UK Challenge to Europeanization,  
there is something very British about the concept of Euroscepticism. Its origins can 
be traced back to articles in the British newspaper, The Times, in 1985 and 1986 
(Spiering 2004, p.127). It began to be used to refer to a particular section of the right 
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of the Conservative party that increasingly objected to the Delors project for a new 
move of integration, including the prospect of economic and monetary union.152 
 
Therefore, even if Euroscepticism is rapidly spreading throughout the Continent, it is 
indeed undeniable that Britain has never put its heart and soul into the European project and 
that its Euroscepticism has previous roots and distinct characteristics. This is strictly connected, 
as discussed earlier, to the fact that British perception of the European Union differs completely 
from the one of the other member states. While for the other European countries the birth of a 
European supranational entity was conceived as an opportunity of «national regeneration»,  
[f]or Britain, and especially for England, things look very different. Membership of 
the European Union is perceived against a historical background of industrial 
supremacy, world empire, and victory in the Second World War. Entry into Europe 
therefore carries the character of a loss, if not outright humiliation, an admission that 
Britain is an ordinary nation, just like other nations. […] Moreover, for over two 
centuries Europe in various guises has functioned as “the Other” of “this island 
race”.153 
 
As Kumar stresses, in addition to the narrative of decline, the Continent in the guise of 
the foreign invader, the Catholic enemy and the imperial opponent has always been fundamental 
in the formation of a British identity as the ‘Other’ put in opposition. Therefore, British 
mythology based on the notion of endurance against a Europe conceived as a continental foe 
should be dated way back before British post-war narrative, which would only have reinforced 
it. It follows, as Catharina Sørensen states, that British Euroscepticism is 
closely tied to [Britain’s] perceived role as an independent actor of the world stage 
as well as to the impression of not forming part of the continent of Europe. 
Scepticism, thus, appears directed both towards the wording ‘European’ and ‘Union’ 
in the European Union.154 
 
This triumphalist view of national history in relation to the Continent, together with a 
vision of the economy defined by the free-market, liberalism and open seas commercial trading, 
is central to Britain’s constructed sense of self. It has also held Britain back from fully 
committing to the European Union, as it would prefer to be seen instead as an outside supporter 
and commercial partner. This vision of a United Kingdom as friendly supporter of Europe but 
separated from the Continent is particularly visible in Winston Churchill’s Zurich speech, just 
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a year after the end of the Second World War. Churchill’s importance as a key figure of British 
national narrative is demonstrated by the fact that both the Remain and Leave campaigns have 
either directly referenced him or used what Eaglestone describes as «Churchill’s language»155, 
as well as by the 2012 London Olympics games video James Bond and The Queen 2012 London 
Performance.156 In this video, Queen Elizabeth the II is accompanied to the opening ceremony 
by actor Daniel Craig (the current incarnation of James Bond)157. As they fly over London, a 
statue of Winston Churchill comes to life and waves at them, smiling. One of the many symbols 
of Britishness and British glory in the video, the statue that comes to life is also a symbol of the 
‘undead’ character of the past and of the role the war still holds in the British imaginary. Turning 
now to the Zurich speech, it is relevant to stress that, while Churchill was ahead of his time in 
recognizing the need for a United States of Europe to maintain peace and freedom in the 
Continent (which are still today two key terms in the narrative of the European Union), on the 
other hand he was scrupulous in stressing that the British already had their equivalent of ‘United 
States’ (the British Commonwealth of Nations), together with a special relationship with the 
USA to preserve. The ‘imperial preference’ was reaffirmed in Churchill’s doctrine of the three 
circles, in which Britain is even depicted as the necessary, connecting element among Europe, 
USA, Canada and British Empire, Commonwealth and Dominions: 
The first circle for us is naturally the British Commonwealth and Empire, with all 
that that comprises. Then there is also the English-speaking World in which we, 
Canada, and the other British Dominions and the United States play so important a 
part. And finally there is United Europe. These three majestic circles are coexistent 
and if they are linked together there is no force or combination which could 
overthrow them or even challenge them. Now if you think of the three inter-linked 
circles you will see that we are the only country which has a great part in every one 
of them. We stand, in fact, at the very point of junction, and here in this Island at the 
centre of the seaways and perhaps of the airways also have the opportunity of joining 
them all together. If we rise to the occasion in the years that are to come it may be 
found that once again we hold the key to opening a safe and happy future to 
humanity, and will gain for ourselves gratitude and fame.158 
 
Britain’s disengagement from any European community was also at the centre of 
Churchill’s speech to the House of Common in 1953, when he declared that the British «are 
 
155Eaglestone, R., «Cruel Nostalgia and the Memory of the Second World War» cit., p.100 
156For watching the 2012 Olympics video with Queen Elizabeth the II and Daniel Craig, see «James Bond and The 
Queen London 2012 Performance», Youtube,  27 July 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1AS-dCdYZbo 
(1 July 2018) 
157See Casino Royale (2006), Quantum of Solace (2008), Skyfall (2012), Spectre (2015) and Bond 25 (to be 
released in 2020)   
158Churchill, W., Conservative Party Mass Meeting, Llandudno, Wales, 19 October 1948, cit. in Davis, R., «WSC’s 
“Three Majestic Circles”» International Churchill Society, Autumn 2013, 
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with Europe, but not of it.  We are linked but not combined. We are interested and associated 
but not absorbed.  If Britain must choose between Europe and the open sea, she must always 
choose the open sea»159. It is not surprising, then, that the British would ask for entry in the 
EEC only after the Suez crisis and the loss of many of its colonies. In fact,  
[i]n an era when the nation-state was seen to be limited in its effectiveness, and with 
no other viable international political community on offer, Europe seemed to many 
politicians the only way to restore Britain’s place on the world stage. However, the 
idea that Europe could restore British greatness was in itself an admission of national 
decline. ‘Europe’ became an expression of Britain’s diminished place in the world.160 
 
And here we come back to that ‘negative shade’ assigned to European membership, 
considered a reminder of British decline. As the British joined the EEC only out off self-interest 
(improving its commercial opportunities and restoring its glory), and in the belief that the entry 
was a sort of defeat, their approach and support have always remained utilitarian. Seeking to 
take what could be taken and withdrawing from any agreement considered disadvantageous, 
the British have gained an on-going reputation as instrumental partners. Unsurprisingly, co-
operation with Europe was always subject to certain conditions: as long as the co-operation 
was in the interest of the British Commonwealth, as long as the USA agreed with the matter 
into question, and as long as British sovereignty was not questioned. This is evident in the fact 
that any time there has been a proposed decision-making process or an operation which was 
purely European, Britain had withdrawn from it. A case in point is the Atomic Energy 
Community, in which the British did not participate because their representative could not 
subscribe to the principle of majority decision-making on substantive policy matters, as this 
would theoretically undermine British national sovereignty and potentially compromise 
Britain’s special relationship with the USA.  
The special relationship with the USA would continuously influence British politicians, 
from Margaret Thatcher to Tony Blair, contributing to maintaining a certain distance from the 
political dimension of the European project. But the major issue in the relation between Britain 
and the European Union, and therefore a constant source of Euroscepticism, would always be 
the question of sovereignty. This fierce defence of British sovereignty was especially prominent 
during the Brexit campaign, where the stress was on sovereignty regarding national security 
(the control of national borders) and sovereignty regarding economic policies (undermined by 
 
159Churchill, W., House of Commons, 1953, cit. in Danzig, J., «A revealing deception about Winston Churchill)» 
New Europeans.net, 25 January 2015, https://neweuropeans.net/article/604/revealing-deception-about-winston-
churchill (30 June 2018) 
160Wellings, B., English Nationalism and Euroscepticism: Losing the Peace cit., p.117 
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European austerity politics after the 2008 financial crash). However, sovereignty has been at 
the forefront of the British debate about the EU since before Brexit, as well as before becoming 
protest-material in many other European countries. To explain this, we should consider how the 
concept of sovereignty has evolved in Britain, where sovereignty represents the only 
constitutional principle and lies not in the people, but in Parliament. According to Newman, 
this peculiarity regarding British sovereignty lying in Parliament should be connected to the 
«decisive battles against feudalism happened in England in the seventeenth century, before 
ideologies of democracy had fully flourished»161. The Crown-in-Parliament sovereignty, as it 
is usually called, emerged after the Political Compromise between the Crown and Parliament 
in 1688 and remained untouched by the union of the two crowns, Scottish and English, in 1707. 
The monarchy was «the visible symbol of Westminster sovereignty» and «ultimately became 
the focal point of official and popular allegiance, allowing national differences to be mediated 
through loyalty to the Crown»162. Thus, as Ben Wellings stresses, 
[s]o as the British state developed as a multi-national, imperial enterprise after 1707, 
the notion of parliamentary sovereignty emerged as an ideology that was both 
suitable for the ‘unreflecting mass’ and permitted the legitimisation and exercise of 
sovereignty far beyond England’s borders.163 
 
 Assigning sovereignty to Parliament and not to the people would have legitimised, 
therefore, the very British rule oversea. Briefly, according to the Crown-in-Parliament 
principle, the will of the people should be expressed through the will of the assembled 
parliamentary representatives, while Parliament should be considered the supreme legal 
authority – that is to say the only entity that has the right to create, change or end laws. 
According to this principle, while the members of Parliament have the authority to legislate, 
they do not possess the authority to transfer the power of Parliament, neither to a supranational 
institution or to a regional government (and this explains why also devolution is material for 
referenda). This limitation of sovereignty derives directly from John Locke’s Second Treatise 
and is considered a protection against major constitutional changes.164 Membership in the 
European Union has clearly created a conflict, since it has introduced into the British system 
the principle of the supremacy of European law, which is, therefore, in neat opposition to 
Crown-in Parliament sovereignty.  
 
161Newman, A., «A Political Imaginary for an English Left», in Perryman, M., Imagined Nation. England After 
Britain, Lawrence & Wishart, 2008, p.225  
162Wellings, B., English Nationalism and Euroscepticism: Losing the Peace cit., p.39  
163Ivi, p.40  
164Cfr. Newman, A., op. cit.  
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Furthermore, European membership has also created a conflict between parliamentary 
and popular sovereignty. Parliamentary sovereignty was indeed undermined for the very first 
time by the 1975 referendum, called into action precisely for resolving the European issue 
regarding the joining of the EEC. Back then, seventeen million against eight voted to stay in 
the European Economic Community trusting mainstream parties and leaders, who were all 
sided with the EEC. As Butler and Kitzinger explain, this referendum was a distinct innovation 
in British constitutional practice, considering that popular sovereignty had never overcome 
Parliament in decision-making before, and that referenda are based on the idea of a sovereignty 
lying in the people, not in the institutions of the country. Moreover, this was also the very first 
time that the EU question was tied to the instrument of the referendum, a perception of a ‘special 
status’ assigned to the European project only reinforced by the decision of a ‘conscience vote’ 
in Parliament and Cabinet.165  
It is relevant to stress that underneath the decisional paralysis of the European Union 
there is precisely this British attitude to associate everything EU with popular sovereignty. It 
was, indeed, the UK to promote the idea that any further enlargement, or new EU legislation to 
be added to the national one, had to previously meet the approval of the national populations 
through the means of the referendum. The first reference to this in British politics is called the 
‘referendum lock’ and is to be found in the Lib Dem manifesto of 1997, in which the party 
stresses the importance of holding a referendum for any constitutional issues and any transfer 
of power to European institutions. Since the only British constitutional principle is 
parliamentary sovereignty, considered under threat by the supranational character of the EU, it 
is clear how the referendum lock could be applied to any decision at the European level. The 
legal manifestation of the referendum lock is the European Union Act of 2011, which, as 
stressed by Birkinshaw and Varney, has «established a new form of self-embracing sovereignty 
in so far as Parliament has bound its future action on many Union initiatives to a popular 
referendum»166. This means that the Act, which the British strongly hoped would give back 
control to their national parliament, paradoxically had the opposite effect, since 
[i]t resulted in Parliamentary sovereignty being undermined by popular sovereignty. 
In seeking to ‘repatriate powers from Brussels’ and reassert Parliament’s authority 
in the face of the EU, […] it merely shifted that role from the European Union to the 
people of Britain at a historical moment when Euroscepticism was running high, but 
 
165Cfr. Butler, D., Kitzinger, U. W., The 1975 Referendum, MacMillan Press, 1999  
166Birkinshaw, P., Varney, M., «Britain Alone Constitutionally: Brexit and Restitutio in Integrum», in Birkinshaw, 
P., Biondi, A. (ed.), op. cit., p.15 
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when the notion of the ‘British People’ as a category with a future was challenged 
by the growth of separate nationalisms in the UK.167 
 
Ultimately, the referendum lock demonstrates that, even after the 1975 referendum’s 
popular verdict in favour of remaining in the EEC, Euroscepticism, in the guise of opposition 
to any kind of European community and further integration, has only continued to grow, helped 
by British politicians and media. Quite central in the proliferation of ideas of a European 
conspiracy against British interests was, for instance, Margaret Thatcher’s strong opposition to 
the European Union, particularly after her change of heart concerning the Single European Act 
of 1986. In fact, Margaret Thatcher, who passionately fought in defence of British sovereignty, 
privileging an intergovernmental approach and opposing any supranational vision of Europe, 
was undeniably a supporter of the common market, an idea that in her opinion would have led 
to economic growth and benefits for all the European nations involved. Thatcher did not 
foresee, though, the consequences of the Act, meaning the establishment of a common currency, 
further integration and the beginning of a ‘more political’ union. It was the nightmarish prospect 
of a supranational and domineering EU that led her to declare the signing of the Single European 
Act a terrible error and which strengthened her negative views towards the European Union.168  
Euroscepticism and conspiracy theories have also been fuelled by the media, which 
could be considered partly responsible for the predominance of the European issue in British 
politics. As Wellings stresses,  
[t]he British public were served up a diet of so-called ‘Euro-myths’ by the British 
press from the 1980s onwards. Most of these stories were simply untrue, but they 
were able to flourish in a political structure where member-state politicians could 
‘blame Brussels’ for unpopular policies or directives and where the European 
Community itself was remote from its citizens. In a day-to-day sense Europe was 
largely experienced as a restraint on liberty and a surveyor of health and safety 
regulations that removed fun and freedom from the workplace169 
 
Ultimately, Euroscepticism has even ended up stimulating the birth of new political 
players, such as, for instance, Alan Sked’s Anti-Federalist League, James Goldsmith’s 
Referendum Party and the more famous United Kingdom Independence Party, better known as 
UKIP and founded by Alan Sked. Sked was later replaced by Nigel Farage, who fronted UKIP’s 
2016 Leave campaign. These politicians are all fundamental Eurosceptics, that is to say 
 
167Wellings, B., «Beyond Awkwardness: England, the European Union and the End to Integration», in Tournier-
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supporters of direct withdrawal from the EU. For the fundamental Eurosceptic, withdrawal from 
the EU means the return to inviolable parliamentary sovereignty. It is, therefore, a paradox that 
it is thanks to fundamental Eurosceptics that referenda have been gradually legitimised, 
constitutionalized and popularized, thereby undermining the authority of Parliament as well as 
the authority of law-makers. Fundamental Eurosceptics are opposed to radical renegotiatiors, 
whose requests are usually limited to revisions of European deals. David Cameron, for instance, 
is generally held to be one of those radical re-negotiator, as it was never his intention to opt out 
of the European Union. If anything, the former Prime Minister actually tried to change the way 
his own party viewed the EU, calling for the end of the politicization of the European issue. 
Therefore, his promise of a referendum on British membership (and his consequent Eurosceptic 
stance after 2013) probably had less to do with his political ideas and more with UKIP’s rise in 
popularity among Conservative voters. 
The rise of UKIP, as well as its stunning performance at the European elections in 2014, 
is strictly connected to the failures of both the Conservatives and the Labour party to understand 
their electorate, as well as the rise and potential of English nationalism. It should, therefore, be 
related to the phenomena previously described: lack of trust in traditional parties, the perceived 
divide between the so-called ordinary people and the established elites, the establishment’s 
stigmatization and the neglecting of certain issues ‘close to the voters’ heart’. In the British 
case, an issue ignored by the establishment, but which nonetheless is a common source of fear 
for ordinary people, is immigration. An issue that, according to O’Toole, no mainstream 
politician has been able to address «[a]fter Enoch Powell destroyed his political career with the 
inflammatory racism of his ‘rivers of blood’ speech in April 1968»170. From then on, O’Toole 
affirms, «the gradual marginalization of open racism» ‘crippled’ the debate on immigration 
facilitating the ‘transference of blame’ from the migrants to the EU: 
‘Brussels’, as Richard Weight puts it, ‘replaced Brixton as the whipping boy of 
British nationalists.’ That the EU did indeed partly occupy the space where open 
racism had once flourished is evident in the large overlap between pro-Brexit and 
anti-immigrant sentiment. But this suggests that much of the animosity was never 
really about the EU itself - it was a sublimated or displaced rage at Them. The black 
and brown Other fused with the European Other.171 
 
Nigel Farage, once he became leader of the UKIP party, succeeded not only in picking 
up the baton from Enoch Powell (whom he defined, unsurprisingly, as his political hero)172, but 
 
170O’Toole, F., op. cit., p.17  
171Ibidem  
172He did so in 2015 during an interview for Absolute Radio, cit. in Shilliam, R., Race and the Undeserving Poor, 
Newcastle upon Tyne, Agenda Publishing, 2018, p.153  
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also in linking the issue of immigration with fear of European integration, loss of sovereignty 
and the recovery of past greatness. Describing the English in a similar fashion to Powell (that 
is to say, as strangers in their own country) he succeeded in «aligning conservative 
Euroscepticism with a longstanding populist nationalism that held immigration responsible for 
the diminution of welfare provision and wages experienced by England’s “indigenous” 
workers»173. And, more importantly, he made those feeling ignored, left-behind and left-out – 
economically and culturally speaking – feel as if they were being both listened to and 
represented. This helped UKIP in the Brexit debate. Steve Buckledee notes that  
[a] tactical error by the Remain campaign was not to engage with people who 
expressed their concerns about the impact of immigration from the EU in rational, 
non-racist terms, and instead to adopt a self-righteous attitude in accusing all Leavers 
indiscriminately of racial prejudice.174 
 
While the Remain front ignored and even made a mockery of worries regarding 
European migration, UKIP embraced those concerns combining it with a «racialized 
melancholia»175 at the core (as we will soon see) of English nationalism. It is not a coincidence 
that those areas in which UKIP has gained more and more supporters (Wales, Northern 
England, part of South-West England and Eastern and Southern English coasts), are also those 
most hit by de-industrialization and economic crisis. Just as crucially, these areas are also 
predominantly white and (excluding Wales) most likely to identify with Englishness. 
 
Divided Kingdom: Brexit and English national identity 
In the 1975 referendum, England provided the strongest support for European integration176. 
Forty-one years later, England has maintained its decisive role, but they have taken the opposite 
stance: they are, now, the strongest supporter for leaving the European Union. As mentioned 
earlier, Brexiteers won the referendum with a narrow margin, 51,9% against 48,1%, but in 
England alone the margin was, instead, seven percent. This is of great relevance, since England 
«is home to 84% of the UK’s population» and therefore its Leave-vote  
«outweighed substantial Remain majorities in Scotland (62.0%-38.0%) and 
Northern Ireland (NI) (55.5%-44.6%). Whilst Wales also had a Leave majority 
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(52.5%-47.5%), with less than 5% of the UK’s population, it did not play a decisive 
part in the overall outcome […]. Brexit was made in England».177 
 
But Brexit was made in England not only in relation to the technicality just revealed: 
Brexit was made in England because «England’s choice for Brexit was driven 
disproportionately by those prioritising English national identity»178, meaning, as previously 
anticipated, by those who identified more with Englishness.  
Identification with Englishness has exponentially increased during the last decades, in 
particular from the devolution onwards, to the extent that it represents a kind of ‘English 
revolution’. According to the UK census’ data of 2011,  
[i]n England, fully 60 per cent of the population identified themselves as solely 
English. Remarkably, given that people could choose ‘English’ and ‘British’ if they 
wanted to, only 29 per cent of census participants in England identified themselves 
as feeling any sense of British national identity at all. In some parts of England, the 
embrace of an exclusively English identity is overwhelming: 70 per cent in the North 
East, 66 per cent in the North West, Yorkshire and the East Midlands. By contrast, 
only 37 per cent of Londoners chose ‘English only’ […]. 
 
There are three considerations to draw from these data: firstly, regarding ‘English and 
British identity’, the data shows how the increase in identification with Englishness seems to 
correspond to an estrangement from Britishness, which would signal a correlation based on 
opposition between these two identities; secondly, the areas marked by the increase are also 
those most hit by the economic crisis; thirdly, these same areas showed a preference for Brexit 
in the referendum, which highlights a correlation between English identity and perceptions of 
Europe. This correlation started to emerge especially looking at the findings of the Future of 
England Survey (FoES), which does not considered Britain the unit of analysis, focusing, 
instead, on England. The very first data of the FoES, launched in 2011 showed that  
[w]hile most eurosceptics focus on the apparent threat to Britain and Britishness 
posed by ‘Brussels’, those in England who felt more British than English were 
actually most positive in their attitudes towards the EU. By contrast, those with a 
strongly or exclusive English sense of their own national identity were the most 
(overwhelmingly) hostile. This finding was confirmed by the 2012 survey.179 
 
These analyses have confirmed a link between English nationalism and Euroscepticism 
also acknowledged by Ben Wellings in the title of his famous work English Nationalism and 
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Euroscepticism: Losing the Peace.180 Up until now, considerations regarding British 
Euroscepticism and the relationship between Britain and Europe have not taken account of a 
‘detail’ which is, actually, quite crucial regarding attitudes towards the European Union: the 
fact that the United Kingdom is not properly a nation state but a union, that is to say a state in 
which the ‘national borders’ do not correspond to the borders that define the territory of the 
kingdom. In fact, the United Kingdom is constituted by four nations, which share a common 
past, a common ‘institutional’ collective identity (Britishness), but not a common national 
identity. This means that the European Union, as a supranational entity like the United 
Kingdom, is a project in direct competition to the British one, an argument particularly dear to 
British Eurosceptics. Nonetheless, in England it is Englishness, and not Britishness, which is 
‘overwhelmingly hostile to the EU. This is extremely relevant, considering that identity-related 
arguments, as explained before, are particularly influential in increasing or lowering EU 
support, especially the exclusive or inclusive character of the national identity citizens embrace.  
 Further information relating to these findings came from the 2014 FoES, which also 
deployed parallel surveys in Scotland and Wales. According to Henderson who analysed the 
data,  
[i]n Wales and Scotland, national identity (British or Scottish/Welsh) does not 
appear to structure attitudes on EU membership consistently. England is very 
different. The more strongly or exclusively English their sense of national identity, 
the more likely respondents were to think EU membership a bad thing and to want 
to leave the EU. The contrast between England and Scotland in these data is striking. 
If Euroscepticism is associated with English identifiers in England, it tends to be 
British identifiers who hold this attitude in Scotland. […] in England, British-only 
identifiers are slightly more Eurosceptic than the previous (more British than 
English) category. This may lend some support to Ormston’s subsequent finding that 
stronger feeling of both Britishness and Englishness each have an impact on attitudes 
to EU membership.181 
 
Therefore, while national identities do not appear to be a predictable factor in Wales and 
Scotland, the same cannot be said for England, where the data has shown an undeniable link 
between a strong Englishness and the likeliness to oppose to the EU. Moreover, data have also 
shown that both Englishness and exclusive Britishness (the category of British-only identifiers) 
are indicators of a Eurosceptic attitude. Basing their conclusions on these and other findings, 
Henderson and the other contributors of ‘England, Englishness and Brexit’182 have affirmed 
that there is evidence that «exclusive identities, whether British or English/Scottish/Welsh, may 
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push towards Euroscepticism»183. Nonetheless, as they acknowledge, it is Englishness, more 
than any of the other identities making up the UK, that is most linked to Euroscepticism and to 
representations of the Continent as ‘the Other’. This statement is also supported by several 
studies conducted in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum, which, with some distinctions, 
stress the significance of Englishness. One of the most recent analyses on the Brexit results 
comes from Henderson, Jeffery, Wincott and Wyn Jones, who co-signed a study entitled ‘How 
Brexit was made in England’184, published in the British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations. This study focuses on national identity variables and their effects, using FoES data 
and including variables used by other post-referendum analyses, such as age, education and 
class (which have led Goodwin and Heath185 to argue the ‘left-behind’ thesis), and others 
connected to nostalgia, immigration, and traditional British attitudes. The results have given, in 
the scholars’ words, «limited support»186to the ‘left-behind’ thesis (with social variables 
seeming less influential than expected) and are of great interest in relation to national identities 
and attitudes towards immigration. Among the variables regarding immigration, attitudes 
towards the effect of immigration on public service and the economy seems to be the most 
relevant, putting first what they define ‘material circumstances’ over ‘cultural aversion’. 
Identity variables, on the other hand, 
suggest that English and British identity influence Brexit vote intention in different 
ways. English identifiers are significantly more likely to say they will vote Leave 
and the effect is unchanged in the fully specified model. Feeling British is initially a 
predictor of support for Remain, but the addiction of subsequent variables dilutes 
this effect. In short, English identity and British identity do not exert the same level 
of influence on attitudes to EU membership, nor do they work in the same 
direction.187  
  
According to the results, therefore, Britishness would not be an indicator of a Leave 
attitude, while the connection between voting Leave and Englishness would be striking and 
even untouched by the addition of other variables. More surprisingly, nostalgia and perception 
of England as a distinct national identity have not emerged as attitudes influencing the vote. 
This has led scholars to downplay their significance, as well as that of cultural dimensions in 
relation to immigration.  
 Reducing the impact of nostalgia, the perception of being a distinct national 
community, and the cultural dimensions influencing attitudes towards immigrant, could be very 
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counterproductive, considering that analyses such as this one, despite their merits, are always 
based on people’s perceptions and could, therefore, leave out factors that are mostly 
unconscious. As Robert Eaglestone writes, «moods are moods about something. They have a 
hard-to-pin-down history, form and shape and cannot be easily analysed (in a survey) but they 
are still there and potent. Indeed, they carry meaning or consequences on their own».188 The 
very significance of Englishness, in fact, could not find a plausible explanation without relating 
these findings to previous historical and cultural analyses in relation to Europe, which have 
stressed that  
[i]t is England, not “Britain”, that has the greatest difficulty in coming to terms with 
Europe, and the greater European integration currently under way. The Irish, the 
Scottish, even the Welsh have always had a different view of Europe from the 
English. It is far easier for them to contemplate a new relation with Europe than it is 
for the English.189 
 
Thus, even if it certainly remains valid that Britain has shaped its image in opposition 
to a European Other represented as ‘the continental foe’, a specification here is needed. During 
British history, Europe was undoubtedly the evil conqueror, the Catholic entity, the imperial 
competitor, but with relevant distinctions: it was not the Catholic enemy for Scotland and 
Ireland, since for a great part of their history both areas were largely Catholic and striving to 
preserve or recover their independence from the ‘English’ conqueror; and it was not an entity 
in opposition to Wales either, which, at least before its annexation by the English, had relevant 
cultural contacts with the European continent. This explains Kumar’s affirmation that  
[l]ike the countries of Central and Eastern Europe seeking to escape the embrace of 
the Russian bear, “Europe” for the so-called Celtic nations of the British Isles 
represents a way of escaping the longstanding hitches of the imperial power in the 
Isles, England.190 
 
It was England, therefore, as the colonizer and founder of the United Kingdom, to shape 
(and still detain) this image of Europe, and it is, first and foremost, in the light of this 
consideration that the data should be read. Even the weight of the ‘material circumstances’ on 
attitudes towards immigration has a cultural dimension, considering that it is strictly linked to 
the socio-cultural category of the undeserving poor and to the rise of tribalism. Moreover, even 
if nostalgia has appeared largely absent, it certainly was relevant, as many scholars previously 
mentioned have stressed, in the Brexit discourse, where it has been used to depict an image of 
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the country rooted in an English (more than British) imaginary, and therefore at the core of 
English nationalism. As Shilliam reports, a «melancholic racialized nationalism» was probably 
at the very basis of the white working class’ Leave-vote more than «class interest» since «[...] 
“imagined communities” delineated by national and ethnic belonging were more influential to 
referendum voters than tangible connections to local communities»191.  
Furthermore, the perception of being a distinct (and neglected) national community 
cannot be ruled out too, since it is deeply intertwined with the English call for an institutional 
recognition of England after devolution and for self-government, which is perceived as being 
undermined both by the devolutionary measures and the EU. The neglection of England in the 
devolution process is at the centre of the so-called ‘West-Lothian Question’, coined by Enoch 
Powell after the constituency of the then MP for West Lothian, Tam Dalyell, who raised it for 
the first time in Parliament. Known also as ‘English Votes for English Laws’, the West-Lothian 
Question aimed at exposing the contradiction of representatives from Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland voting on English matters while English representatives could not vote on 
exclusively Scottish, Welsh or Northern Irish issues after the creation of the devolved 
assemblies. This could happen because, as Colin Copus outlines, England has been denied 
«even the faintest recognition of nationhood by the British state and has been prevented from 
choosing its own governing arrangements, or whether or not it wishes to remain in the 
UK».192On one hand, in fact, British mainstream politics decided to deal with nationalisms in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, accommodating it through devolution arrangements; on 
the other,  
[n]o such accommodation was made with English nationalism. On the contrary, 
prominent politicians in the three parties have spoken out vociferously and often 
insultingly against the English, in ways they have not about Scottish and Welsh 
nationalism. Some examples include Jack Straw’s and William Hague’s comments 
about the dangerous and violent nature of English nationalism (and the English) 
(BBC Radio 4, 9 January 2000); or David Cameron’s repeated comments about ‘sour 
little Englanders’ and the ‘ignorance of the English about their Celtic neighbours’ at 
the Conservative Party Conference in 2006.193  
 
The neglection of England’s people, the stigmatization of English nationalism, the open 
and ignored question of English self-government are rooted in old habits inherited from the 
 
191Shilliam is here referring to a study of recent data from the UK Household Longitudinal survey by Surridge et 
al. (2017), cit. in Shilliam, R., Race and the Undeserving Poor. cit., p.161  
192Copus, C., «Englishness and Local Government: Reflecting a Nation’s Past or Merely an Administrative 
Convenience», in Aughey, A., Berberich, C. (eds), These Englands: A Conversation on National Identity, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2011, p.207  
193Ivi, p.210  
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formation of the United Kingdom. As Colin Copus suggests, the development of Britain as an 
imperial power did not rely  
on the supremacy of parliament to prevent Scottish, Welsh and Irish localism fraying 
the Union. Far from it, rather, the success of Britain as a supranational state rested 
on subjugating England and Englishness to the British project and in preventing 
English distinctiveness maintaining itself and emerging from under the cloak of the 
British project.194 
 
But these mechanisms sooner or later do cause backlashes. As underlined by O’Toole, 
«[j]ust one in five English people now consented to their current form of governance». Not 
having the chance, quoting Outhwaite, to vote to «withdraw from London or neoliberalism or 
globalization»195, the English could still vote against what years of populism, Euroscepticism 
and nationalism have depicted as a symbol of all the powers conspiring against its interests and 
of the deceiving and dangerous ‘Other’ par excellence: Europe. As O’ Toole has affirmed, 
«[t]he long history of displacing onto the European Union the unresolved anxieties of England 
made possible a deft transference: if you can’t secede from Britain, secede from Europe»196. 
 The transference was also made possible by a crucial misconception: that the EU would 
be the most influential layer of government, and therefore the primal culprit (together with the 
treacherous national elites) of everything wrong in English lives. It follows that Brexit could be 
interpret as an ‘act of displacement’:  
[d]eeply disaffected with Westminster and Whitehall, England-without-London 
unleashed its fury on Brussels and Strasbourg. Unable to name the ‘us’ of England, 
it was offered the chance to name the ‘them’ of the EU (and implicitly the real and 
imagined migrants that somehow embodied it) and took it.197 
 
At a loss in a world in constant change, in a nation that does not look familiar anymore, 
frightened by the future, the English would have decided to retrieve a sense of self and 
nationhood by drawing (again) a line of demarcation between themselves and the Continent 
and withdrawing from the EU.  
The stress on the cultural dimension underneath Brexit does not want to suggest that the 
other dimensions, for instance the economic factors, are of less relevance. It is not coincidental 
that those areas of England which most favoured Brexit were in the north-east, areas that have 
also been the most affected by immigration (especially the Polish one), de-industrialisation and 
the collapse of the labour movement. The same situation can be observed in Wales, and this 
 
194Ivi, p.196 
195Outhwaite, W. (ed.), op. cit., p.68  
196O’Toole, F., op. cit., p.191  
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would explain its slight majority in favour of leaving the EU despite the substantial funds the 
Welsh receive from Europe. But, of course, immigration, de-industrialisation, neoliberalism, 
globalisation, devolution, are not ‘caused’ by the European Union. Therefore, Brexiteers would 
never have obtained their ‘Independence Day’ without leveraging on prior, powerful structures 
of feeling able to affect the vote. It is here that cultural and literary analyses find their place and 
value and that ours begins. 
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Before Brexit: Brexit Discourse and Contemporary Fiction 
From Politics to Literature: The Nation and the Novel 
When several spokesmen for the Remain front started campaigning, they all seemed to have 
something in common: a strategy based on facts, numbers and statistics, usually regarding the 
economic consequences of a withdrawal from the European Union. However, as Charlie Cooper 
wrote in The Independent a few weeks before the vote,  
[i]n this feverish post-truth atmosphere, facts and reason go out the window as 
effective political arguments. Many voters simply don’t trust anything anyone says 
on the EU anymore. The eventual winner in this referendum therefore won’t be the 
side with the best facts, it will be the one with the best story to tell.198 
 
As the definition of post-truth states, «objective facts are less influential in shaping 
public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief»199; or, using Lauren Berlant’s 
words, «a public binding to the political is best achieved neither by policy nor ideology but the 
affect of feeling political together»200. Moods and attitudes which influence voters’ intentions 
are not fixed, as Robert Eaglestone underlines, but can be ‘shaped’, or better ‘directed’, as they 
are «“constantly negotiated” by our interactions with each other, with the media, with the world 
(Berlant 2006)»201.  
This does not mean that facts do not count at all. They do, as long as they serve the 
story. It is the story, in the end, that is fundamental in effectively communicating any message. 
Thus, human understanding of the present, recording of the past and imagining of the future, 
are all made possible through storytelling: it is our means, as J.K. Rowling writes, «to make 
sense of the world»202, to comprehend and retain information. And this is how it works in 
politics too, where stories are deployed to make sense of the present and to make up visions of 
the future that could appeal to the voters. Consequently, when the polls began to show that the 
strategy based on ‘objective facts’ was not working (people, as Gove made explicit, ‘have had 
enough of experts’), Remainers tried to re-direct public opinion referring, instead, to glorious 
moments in British history and by depicting dreadful scenarios of a Europe dragged (again) 
into war by nationalisms. In short, the pro-EU campaigners tried to compete with Leavers on 
the same level: the art of storytelling. But it was, as the saying goes, too little, too late: the new 
 
198Cooper, C., «David Cameron is no Europhile: and that’s why his opponents tell a more convincing story», The 
Independent, 6 June 2016, https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/brexit-eu-referendum-david-cameron-is-no-
europhile-tell-a-convincing-story-a7067686.html (7 July 2019) 
199The definition is found in Buckledee, S., op. cit., p.151  
200Berlant, L., Cruel Optimism, Durham, Duke University Press, 2011, p.224  
201Eaglestone, R., «Cruel Nostalgia and the Memory of the Second World War» cit., p.94  
202Rowling, J.K., op. cit.  
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narrative hinted at ‘a past greatness never lost’, maintained an element of fear, but had no 
‘beliefs’ or ‘desires’ to build on: no vision. «At a time of great uncertainty and insecurity», 
Cooper points out, «an electorate want to hear a story about how voting to Remain could make 
their lives better – not just how it could ensure their lives don’t get worse»203, that is to say, not 
a report or a reliable analysis, but rather a fairy-tale to believe in. As Jorn Precht, professor of 
storytelling and scriptwriter, explains, 
[t]here are certain ingredients to a story. One is a catastrophe or disaster of some 
kind. We, the heroes of our stories, are in some kind of mortal danger. And then 
there's a sort of resurrection and we fight back from the crisis. If we look at 
typical populist stories, then we see that the evocation of a crisis or decline is always 
there. It's one of the basic elements of populist argumentation structures. Others are, 
for example, the notion of common people versus the elite and that the people have 
a kind of common sense underlying their judgments. And then populists also have 
conspiracy theories regarding the evil intrigues of the elites. And the discourse 
becomes very moralized.204 
 
These elements, as we know, were all at play in the storytelling enacted by the Leave 
campaign: mortal dangers (Europeanization, mass immigration, loss of sovereignty); the heroes  
(the people and their true spokesmen); the enemies (the EU, the elites, Remain voters) 
conspiring against the heroes; and lastly, the resurrection (make Britain great again by voting 
Leave). Ultimately, the Leave storytelling struck the right note owning to the fact that the sort 
of resurrection it offered was constructed after the very identification of people’s fears and 
urges, which means that it was a ‘happily ever after’ ingrained – and therefore extremely 
powerful – in the structures of feeling of the nation. A cultural imaginary, as we have seen, 
strictly related to English national identity and history.  
As Sarah Upstone writes, 
 [r]ather than focusing our attention on immediate socio-political contexts, cultural 
imaginaries ask us to consider how places and communities have been represented 
over time and to ask how attitudes to national and international identities and 
alliances exist as a result of a long process of representation.205 
 
Upstone is here acknowledging the essential link that exists among culture, national 
identity and its representation in cultural products. Culture, as Eaglestone writes, is indeed «at 
the heart of national identity»206 given that the nation, as an idea, is a product of culture. 
Following Benedict Anderson’s conceptualisation, the nation is none other than an ‘imagined 
 
203Cooper, C., op. cit. 
204Interview to John Precht, in Rasper, A., «Understanding the populist narrative», DW, 28 October 2018, 
https://p.dw.com/p/37AiC, (7 July 2019) 
205Upstone, S., «Do Novels Tell Us How to Vote?», in Eaglestone, R. (ed.), op. cit., p.47  
206Eaglestone, R., «Introduction: Brexit and Literature» cit., p.1 
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community’, meaning a social construct a group of people identify with and from which they 
shape a collective identity.207 Quoting Parrinder, 
 [t]he nation, that is, is not a material entity like a country or a state. It is an invisible 
and (at least partly) theoretical construction which elicits powerful emotional and 
imaginative identifications. Patriotism or love of country, according to this 
argument, may imply an attachment to real things, but nationalism is loyalty to an 
idea.208 
 
To make the idea of the nation concrete and ‘emotional and imaginative identifications’ 
possible, a narrative of identity needs to be created and deployed. It is therefore through an act 
of ‘repetitive narration’, as Homi Bhabha writes, that a nation comes to life: through a set of 
representations that are repeated across time and conveyed by many means.209 National 
narratives that ‘write’ and ‘re-write’ the nation are composed by definite traits of the 
community, myths of origin, glorifying versions of history, invented traditions: they are, 
consequently, rooted in the culture of the group they refer to.  
Literary works are privileged means in relation to representation of the nation and 
construction of its national narratives, since they focus on the understanding of both the 
individual and the community, making possible the imagining of the nation as a whole. As 
Christine Berberich points out, «[l]iterature thus assumes a mythopoeic function: it helps create 
and perpetuate myths old and new alike and so contributes to cementing a notion of community, 
belonging and (national) identity»210. Here the word ‘myth’ is used according to its 
interpretation by cultural historians, that is to say ‘myths’ as «images that are commonly 
recognized and understood»211 and that recall a ‘horizon of references’ with the power of 
impacting on people’s imagination and affecting their emotional sphere. There are many myths 
that are at the core of English literature and may be considered, on their own, markers of 
nationality: for instance, the myth of Robyn Hood or the myth of King Arthur and his Knights 
of the Round Table.212 A ‘new’ myth that cements – and summons - notions of community, 
belonging and national identity is, as we have seen, the Second World War itself, which, as the 
«memory of the country at war against foes who are simply, tidily, and uncomplicatedly evil», 
has recently acquired, quoting Paul Gilroy, «the status of an ethnic myth»213, becoming in 
 
207Cfr. Anderson, B., Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London & 
New York, Verso, 1991  
208Parrinder, P., op. cit., p.14  
209Cfr. Bhabha, H. (ed.), Nation and Narration, London & New York, Routledge, 1999  
210Berberich, C., «Bursting the Bubble», Journal of Postcolonial Writing, Vol,51 No.2, 2015, pp.158-169, p.159  
211Ivi, p.160  
212For further analysis on the two myths mentioned, see Knight, S., The Politics of Myth, Melbourne, Melbourne 
University Press, 2015   
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58 
 
different ways – according to which nation of the UK is taken into consideration – a «signifier 
for a rooted Britishness or even Englishness»214.  
A literary genre that is particularly involved with national identity is the novel, whose 
development, incidentally, coincides with that of the nation-state as a form of government. For 
this reason, Franco Moretti has even described the novel as «the symbolic form of the nation-
state»215. Thus, the act of reading a novel, even though fictions are produced by an individual 
(the author) and addressed to another individual (the reader) to be read in isolation, enables the 
imagining of a community of readers speaking the same language and performing the same 
action at the same time. The imagination of a community of readers, in its turn, ensures the 
possibility of imagining another community: a national one to belong to. As Parrinder stresses,  
[w]ith the rise of the novel came a shift in the literary idea of nationhood. In The 
Making of English National Identity (2003) Krishan Kumar adopts the distinction, 
first put forward in 1907 by Friedrich Meinecke, between the ‘political’ and the 
‘cultural’ nation. The political nation is the nation as defined by John of Gaunt. It is, 
in Kumar’s words, ‘the “state-nation”, rather than, strictly speaking, the “nation-
state”. It is a nation formed, in many cases, “from the top down”, as in France, Spain 
and Britain where centralizing monarchies accomplished the main work of national-
building as the necessary complement to their state-making.’ The cultural nation is, 
according to Kumar, the ‘nation-state proper’; it is a concept in which the state arises 
from the nation rather than vice versa. It is the idea of the cultural nation, not the 
political nation, that inspires cultural nationalism and popular independence 
movements.216 
 
While the political nation stands for the state and the ruling elite, the cultural nation 
represents, instead, the very idea of the nation bonding the community, which makes the 
formation and survival of a state possible. It is the cultural nation that the novel portrays, 
addresses and reflects upon, even contributing to create the conditions for the formation of the 
political nation. This is easy to acknowledge looking at the process of decolonization, where 
literature has been fundamental in creating national myths and instilling a sense of belonging 
that fuelled the fight for independence.217 The novel, therefore, can legitimately be described 
as an influential source of ideas of nationhood and national belonging, as well as «a vehicle for 
national myth and [...] the principal artistic expression of postcolonial nationhood»218.  
The identified connection between the novel and the nation has also let «[c]ultural 
historians often assume that there is a direct relationship between the state of literary art and 
 
214Eaglestone, R., «Cruel Nostalgia and the Memory of the Second World War» cit., p.97  
215Cit. in Parrinder, P., op. cit., p.14  
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the state of the nation, so that literary change becomes a metaphor for national resurgence or 
national decline»219. Let’s think, for instance, of the development of modernist literature and 
its relation not only to new theories and discoveries in other fields (among many, 
psychoanalysis), but also to the horrors of the First World War and the state of the nation in 
that period. This is particularly true of the English novel, where the preponderance of discourse 
around national identity, with consequent representations of traditional and alternative views 
on Englishness, is directly connected to historical moments of decline and resurgence of the 
perception of the English as a ‘nation’. On this matter, Parrinder acknowledges that  
[c]ritics of eighteenth-century English fiction such as Hazlitt and Scott were, 
perhaps, the first to identify and describe the ‘cast of nationality’ in the English 
novel. The development of the form from the earliest times to the twenty-first 
century has been intimately linked to changes in national consciousness in 
successive epochs.220 
 
Not by chance, analysing the work of novelists from Defoe onwards, it is possible to 
identify, sometimes in the foreground, sometimes in the background, the presence of an on-
going conversation about Englishness, with a distinction between radical (alternative) and 
conservative (traditional) definitions: «the radical definition is fluid, hospitable, and welcoming 
to immigrants while the conservative definition is static, defensive, and xenophobic to a greater 
or lesser extent»221. The term ‘conversation’ is used intentionally, to recall Aughey and 
Berberich’s definition of Englishness as  
a conversation, an imaginative rather than a purely functional engagement, with the 
country’s history, culture and society, where what is conversed about, explicitly or 
implicitly, is the meaning of England itself.222  
 
The debate on the meaning of England is strictly related, as stressed before, to the 
development of the First and Second British Empire (the UK itself and the empire overseas) 
and the construction of a bonding, inclusive identity that could overcome national belonging: 
Britishness. This collective identity, born to create a sense of supranational community, could 
(more or less) easily coexist with Scottishness, Welshness and Northern Irishness, considering 
that an individual can identify with more than one collective identity at a time (a Scot may feel 
British and European at the same time, with no conflict among the three identifications). The 
same ‘smooth’ process of multiple identifications is not to be found among the English. As we 
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60 
 
have seen, the label of ‘Otherness’ attached to Europe in the construction of the English identity 
is one of the elements that, consequently, makes the construction of a European English identity 
so difficult, while the fabrication of Britishness through the incessant pouring of English traits 
and the simultaneous silencing of any expression of English nationalism is what has made the 
relation between the two identities so confusing and conflict-ridden. According to Michael 
Gardiner, «[t]his is why English has always been a field defined by loss, since it was founded 
on an always precedent system of values in which the national was said to be represented while 
it was actually being estranged»223. This sense of loss has also been fuelled, as anticipated, by 
the demise of the British Empire and the devolution process, causing an English outcry against 
alleged imbalance of power and distribution of resources.  Furthermore, the English question 
of identity has also been worsened by massive immigration, the formation of global cities and 
the depopulation and impoverishment of rural areas – all elements that make the reality of 
contemporary England very different from the conservative cultural imaginary linked to the 
country and its people. The imaginary in question depicts a rural, pastoral and exclusive white 
England that, through a long-established literary tradition, has been opposed to the racially 
complex empire and transformed into a fully-fledged myth still celebrated today. To confirm 
this, as Berberich highlights,  
one has only to think of calendars featuring picturesquely thatched cottages clustered 
around village greens; marketing campaigns by the tourist board; or period drama 
with, traditionally, rural and upper-class settings. The heritage industry in particular 
thrives on presentations of England as a country idyll unspoilt by “modernity”. This 
image of an England of rolling hills, empty but for flocks of contented sheep, is one 
to which millions of people all over the world, fed on a diet of classic literature and 
TV adaptations, still subscribe; the “real”, 21-st century England, a modern, 
multicultural nation with buzzing urban centres where the majority of the population 
actually live and where chicken tikka masala has long since replaced fish’n’chips as 
the most popular “English” food, is excluded.224  
 
Although this England of pastoral idylls and upper-class settings is, nowadays, none 
other than a myth such as the Robin Hood legend, it remains, nonetheless, extremely alive 
through its constant repositioning: in television shows and films (Downton Abbey  is but one of 
the most recent examples); in websites and travel guides marketing the country for tourist 
purposes; and, of course, in literary works, where the image of the English rural idyll has taken 
on the characteristics of a tópos in its own right. This vision of the nation survives thanks to 
ceaseless representation, to its ‘repetitive narration’ in different cultural products. And it is 
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again representation through narration that enables its rejection and encourages its rewriting. 
One has only to think of novels such as Monica Ali’s Brick Lane (2003), Zadie Smith’s White 
Teeth (2000) and Natasha Solomons’ Mr Rosenblum’s List (2010), to come to this conclusion. 
It follows that, in order to understand the current English identity crisis and the 
structures of feeling involved in Brexit discourse, there is no better object of analysis than 
contemporary fiction, which continuously engages with cultural imaginaries and social and 
political anxieties. It is hardly a coincidence that literature has recently experienced the 
emergence of new structures of feeling regarding anxiety for the future, failure of knowledge 
and a problematised relationship with time225, considering that we are living in a historical 
moment that is characterized by precariousness and that populist storytelling, as Perch stresses, 
«seems mainly to work [precisely] with two feelings — one is nostalgia, and the other […] is 
fear of the unknown»226. If anything, this should be considered a confirmation of the fact that 
contemporary fiction (and literature in general) should be read as a product of the cultural 
conditions of the time and that these conditions, in turn, can be traced in literature. As Parrinder 
writes, literary works can indeed give us «an inside view of a society or nation, just as [they 
give us] access to personal experiences very different from our own»227.  
Referring specifically to Brexit, Petra Rau has affirmed that the analysis of fiction may 
be considered a  
(homeopathic) archaeology aimed at retrieving a measure of complexity from the 
banality of populist arguments and rash commentaries: this debacular ‘now’ has had 
a long run-up and a number of equally catastrophic predecessors.228 
 
According to Rau, analysing the novels written before the referendum would allow the 
reader to go beyond ‘the banality’ of the Brexit populist narrative and understand the 
‘complexity’ underneath the European bogeyman (the EU as institution and the European 
migrant as its physical manifestation): on the one hand, economic and political issues such as 
social inequality, terrorism, the economic crisis, the migration and refugee crisis; on the other 
hand, the structures of feeling exploited by Brexiteers related to nostalgia (wartime and empire) 
and tribalism (racial and social class hierarchies). The ‘debacular’ now, as Rau defines it, did 
not pop up out of nowhere, and traces of the populist narrative can be found in literary works 
 
225For further analysis see Bentley, N., Hubble, N., Wilson, L. (eds), op. cit.; Hubble, N., Tew, P., London in 
Contemporary British Fiction: The City Beyond the City, London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2016; Rogers, D., 
McLeod, J. (eds.), op. cit. 
226Interview to John Precht, in Rasper, A., op. cit. 
227Parrinder, P., op. cit., p.1  
228Rau, P., «Autumn After the Referendum» in Eaglestone, R. (ed.), op. cit., p.33  
62 
 
published before the referendum, re-reading them at the light of the vote and political analyses. 
Concerning this, Kristian Shaw has highlighted the  
history of Eurosceptic British fiction (relating specifically to the EU) dating back to 
the United Kingdom’s first attempt at joining the European Economic Community 
(EEC), as authors addressed Britain’s loss of political sovereignty and diminished 
post-war role on the world stage from a dominant player to a disempowered 
European member state.229 
 
Shaw is referring to the existence of an established trend of Europhobic fiction that 
developed after the joining of the EEC in the 70s and revolves around the idea of the EU as a 
totalitarian super-state ruled by the Germans. Novels that belong to the subgenre are, for 
instance, Len Deighton’s SS-GB (1978), Robert Harris’ Fatherland (1992), C.J. Sansom’s 
Dominion (2012), or John King’s The Liberal Politics of Adolf Hitler (2016), which is one of 
the latest additions to the subgenre. These novels are all dystopian fantasies, counter-factual 
fictions that re-imagine the country either as being invaded by the Germans and forced to resist, 
or already defeated by the evil Germans and transformed in a small European province. 
Deighton’s SS-GB is a thriller set in 1941, right after a successful German invasion,  with a 
Britain defeated by the Germans, Winston Churchill executed by an SS firing squad, and many 
bureaucrats and members of Parliament ready to align with German politics230; Harris, in a 
fashion similar to Philip Roth’s 2004 novel The Plot Against America, creates an alternative 
story that is set in 1964 in Germany, with the Greater German Reich flourishing and Britain 
having a marginal role even in the narrative, appearing through casual references to the country 
and its people. Sheer’s Resistance, by contrast, is set in a remote valley in Wales and sees a 
British resistance movement come alive after the D-Day has failed and Germans have invaded 
Southern Britain. Finally, Samson’ s Dominion depicts a Britain where Churchill is leader of 
an underground resistance while British collaborators with the Nazi regime are governing the 
country.231  
John King’s The Liberal Politics of Adolf Hitler is one of the most interesting examples 
of this subgenre. Written during the Brexit campaign by a self-proclaimed Brexiteer, it is based 
on the ideas and images the author expressed during the campaign, especially in The Left Wing 
Case for Leaving the EU, an essay for The New Stateman where he defines the EU undemocratic 
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and distant from the people, as well as a tool for multinational companies.232 The novel is set 
in a future where the European nations as we know them have mingled in the alleged final stage 
of the EU project: the United States of Europe. The super-state is strongly centralised, with its 
politics based on doublespeak, appropriation, manipulation and the erasure of pre-existing 
national cultures, and effective surveillance tools to keep track of and suffocate the many 
resistance movements that are spreading in the Continent. One of these resistance movements 
is to be found in Britain, with members trying to infiltrate the ranks of the totalitarian system. 
Leaving aside the thriller-ish spy-plot as well as the most trivial details of the novel, The Liberal 
politics of Adolf Hitler is full of alternative versions of the Second World War and its 
protagonists and clearly refers more than once to the British post-war narrative of decline and 
to the theme of the treacherous elites conspiring against common people.  
Although the novels in question, given their engagement with Euroscepticism and the 
post-war narrative of decline, could be rightly defined as pre-Brexit fiction, they will not be 
further objects of this analysis. As was stressed previously, the principle focus of this study is 
on the emotive strategies employed in the Brexit campaign and how Englishness is constructed, 
both historically and in the present. Though these novels may reference these concepts in 
passing – King’s novel discusses the difference between Englishness and Britishness – these 
references are fleeting. 
Another subgenre that has been immediately connected to Brexit, being particularly 
entangled with social and political anxieties related to Brexit discourse, is the State of the Nation 
or the Condition of England novel. The latter definition clearly linked the subgenre to its 
Victorian precursors and to the ‘Condition of England Question’. Going back to 1839, the 
‘Condition of England Question’ may be defined as a warning to the establishment, raised by 
the Scottish writer, philosopher and social commentator Thomas Carlyle about the condition of 
the English working class during the Industrial Revolution. The subgenre can also be found 
under many other labels, for instance ‘social novel’, ‘social problem novel’, ‘social protest 
novel’ or ‘working-class novel’, clearly all references to its main thematic concern: social 
issues, especially class conflicts. Novels that can be considered representative of this subgenre 
are Gaskell’s North and South (1855) or Dickens’ Hard Times (1854) A common feature of 
this kind of fiction, as Michael Ross stresses, is that  
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[w]hatever the authors’ explicit allegiances, their novels, broadly speaking, project 
a liberal vision, manifesting a compassionate concern with the lives not only of the 
most privileged but also of the most oppressed members of British society.233 
 
The birth of the Condition of England novel was clearly triggered by the grievances of 
the lower strata of society following the Industrial Revolution and the changes in working 
conditions and was inspired by the idea of literature having a social role (quoting again Kumar, 
literature as ‘implicit sociology’). After social reforms and improvement of working class’ 
conditions, and with the imperial conquest coming into the foreground, the subgenre started to 
be put aside, especially after the Great War and the development of Modernism. The Condition 
of England novel, then, re-emerged again in the 1950s, when novelists revived it to analyse 
British social and cultural conditions after the Second World War. These post-war novelists, 
interestingly,  
mostly discussed Englishness and the problems of the English, which was both a 
revision of the sense of national identity that the two wars fostered and a response to 
the question of who was ‘British’ caused by immigration, specifically by the Empire 
Windrush immigration in 1948. They also represented the establishment of the 
welfare state and increased education access in Britain.234 
 
 This has clearly connected the genre not only with themes related to social class 
conflict, but especially with the state of England – the shrinking expectations, the sense of loss 
and the question of identity that were equally at the core of Brexit. Not by chance, a great 
number of state-of-the-nation novels were written in the years following Thatcherism (directly 
dealing with its legacy) and at the turn of the 21st century, with Caroline Lusin even claiming 
that «the Condition of England novel has reached a second peak after its Victorian heyday»235.  
No wonder this literary form flourished in the period in question, which has been characterised 
by devolution, the questioning of the multicultural paradigm, terrorist attacks, the prominence 
of the immigration issue (connected to the entry of Eastern European countries in the EU and 
to the migrant and refugee crisis), the economic crisis and the consequent austerity policies. As 
Justin Cartwright outlines 
[w]hen nations are undergoing some form of stress, be it financial or ethical or even 
military, state of the nation novels tend to be more numerous;  they come in many 
 
233Ross, M. L., «On a Darling Planet: Ian McEwan’s Saturday and the Condition of England», Twentieth−Century 
Literature, 54.1, 2008, pp. 75−96, p.75  
234Kiliç, M. Ö., Maggie Gee: Writing the Condition-of-England Novel, Bloomsbury Academic, 2013, p.10  
235Lusin, C., «The Condition of England Novel in the 21st Century: Zadie Smith’s NW (2012) and Jonathan Coe’s 
Number 11, Or Tales That Witness Madness (2015)» in Nünning, V, Nünning, A., The British Novel in the Twenty-
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guises, but they have one thing in particular, that they provide a commentary or a 
judgment on the times.236 
 
Many of the novels that have been published from devolution onwards are, in fact, 
fictions that, in different ways deal with the current state of the nation: examples are Zadie 
Smith’s White Teeth (2000) and NW (2012),  Ian McEwan’s Saturday (2005), Rupert 
Thomson’s Divided Kingdom (2005), James Ballard’s Kingdom Come (2006), Chris Cleave’s 
The Other Hand (2008) and Martin Amis’ Lionel Asbo: State of England (2012). These novels, 
which use a dystopic or more realistic approach, convey the native or/and the migrant point of 
view and reflect upon the tendencies, events and issues that are at the core of contemporary 
national reality.  
Among the Condition of England novels published in the last decades, the writer Alex 
Preston has even identified a sort of ‘sub-category’  that he has connected with a specific author, 
Anthony Trollope, and in particular with his novel The Way We Live Now (1875), written after 
his return from Australia and denouncing the greed of the national financial world through the 
now archetypal character of the banker Augustus Melmotte. According to Preston, the revival 
of Trollope’s model would be due to the similarities between the Victorian period in which he 
wrote and ours which, «[w]ith our robber-baron bankers, our financial panics, our privileged 
political elite and our disenfranchised migrant workers»237, would perfectly resemble 
Trollope’s times. Preston identifies several key elements in The Way We Live Now: engagement 
with comtemporary themes, a focus on the financial elite with the depiction of shady bankers 
detached from people’s ordinary lives, multiple viewpoints and a London setting. These are all 
elements he also finds in Justin Cartwright’s Other People’s Money (1994), Amanda Craig’s 
Hearts and Minds (2009), Sebastian Faulks’ A Week in December (2009) and John Lanchester’s 
Capital (2012), which he consequently defines as neo-Trollopians. While Craig’s Hearts and 
Minds, along with The Road Home (2007) by Rose Tremain and Two Caravans (2007) by 
Marina Lewycka, focuses more on economic issues related to immigration and the exploitation 
of migrant labourers, Cartwright’s, Faulks’s and Lanchester’s novels are, instead, more centred 
on economic issues related to the housing crisis and the gentrification process, the 
impoverishment of working and middle classes, and the consequent class conflict between the 
lower strata of society and the well-off national elites. Sebastian Faulks’s A Week in December 
and John Lanchester’s Capital, in particular, are very similar: in the way they depict the world 
 
236Cartwright, J., «Justin Cartwright's top 10 state of the nation novels», The Guardian, 9 March 2011, 
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of high finance through the respective characters of John Veals and Roger Yount; in the way 
they use the techniques of shifting viewpoints to put in contrast the different realities of their 
characters and to give voice to the marginalised (both legal and illegal immigrants, asylum 
seekers, members of the older generation perceived to be left-out and ethnic minorities); in the 
way they both focus on the difficulty of being Muslim and British/English after the terrorist 
attacks and the war on terror.  
Another Condition of England novel that portrays some of these characteristics is 
Jonathan Coe’s Number 11, which was published in 2015 and is one of the most affected by 
contemporary events related to Brexit (the war in Iraq and Afghanistan; the terrorist attacks; 
the economic crisis; the ‘outbreak’ of the migrant and refugee crises, growing inequality and 
distrust towards the establishment). The novel is especially marked by a sense of insecurity and 
vulnerability, emphasised by the choice of a Gothic atmosphere. Focusing on the concept of 
‘truth’ as something easily manipulated by the media and politicians, and on the rigid structures 
of class that deeply divide contemporary society, the novel convey the image of a nation 
haunted by the ghostly presence of immigrants and ‘undeserving’ poor, trapped by greedy and 
self-centred elites in a state of intended ‘invisibility’.  
Given the themes they focus on, especially the issue of (Eastern European) immigration 
and the economic cleavage, many of these novels have been defined in the aftermath of the 
referendum pre-Brexit fictions. However, even if they are undoubtedly important for 
understanding the condition of England and the economic concerns underneath the Brexit 
outcome, they engage only occasionally with the structures of feeling related to nostalgia 
(wartime and empire) and tribalism (racial and social class hierarchies) and, especially, with 
the question of English identity. For the same reason, other novels that could have been selected 
for further reading for their link to thematic concerns at the core of Brexit, for instance 
Everything I Found On The Beach (2011) by the Welsh author Cynan Jones, have been put 
aside because of their non-English setting or because less focused on the perspective of an 
exclusive English identity. 
Given that the primal concern of this literary analysis, also for reason of space and time, 
is not to give a comprehensive account of all the novels that could be labelled as pre-Brexit 
fiction and of the interaction among them, a further selection has been carried out. Ultimately, 
the novels selected for close reading are Speak for England (2005) by James Hawes and The 
White Family (2002) by Maggie Gee, which have emerged as the most representative pre-Brexit 
fictions according to the following selection criteria: being set in England; being characterized 
by a focus on a perception of events driven by Englishness; engaging with the economic issues 
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and the structures of feeling regarding nostalgia and racial and class hierarchies at the core of 
Leave narrative. Published in 2005, Speak for England is a novel that, after the Brexit results, 
has been immediately labelled as Brexit fiction as the proud author, James Hawes, remarks on 
Twitter238. A classic state-of-the-nation novel with a dystopian ‘what if’ scenario, Speak for 
England has anticipated, like Julian Barnes’ novel England, England, a withdrawal from the 
European Union. In addition to this, the novel engages with the widespread and harmful 
nostalgia for the Empire and with the overwhelming national narrative of decline, as well as 
being centred on themes such as the housing crisis, the role of the media, the manipulation of 
reality, the ‘treacherous’ political class and the question of identity, both on an individual and 
national level. Despite being published well before Brexit, The White Family is also a Condition 
of England novel that focuses on the same tendencies at the core of the 2016 referendum: fear 
of immigration; distrust towards the elites; nostalgia for a past in which everything seemed 
easier and the nation appeared to be constituted by a homogeneous body; the rising of a white 
working-class consciousness fuelled by English mass media (in this case, the newspaper 
Spearhead); and, in the end, an idea of Englishness that rotates around a white, male, 
heterosexual ideal and – most importantly – the exclusion of anything Other. 
 
Restoring a ‘Phantom Homeland’: The Brexit Dream in Speak for England 
If Brexit is, as argued previously, a dreamlike narrative of redemption and resurrection, the 
basis of its imaginings are to be found in this assumption: that England is a nation haunted by 
nostalgia and that any vision of ‘the Brexit dream’ could not miss – and messed up with – this 
crucial ingredient.  
Nostalgia has been described as «the incurable modern condition itself»239. The word 
was first used in the medical dissertation of Swiss doctor Johannes Hofer240 to define «the sad 
mood originating from the desire for return to one’s native land», which was responsible for 
«“erroneous representation” that caused the afflicted to lose touch with the present»241. At the 
beginning, people diagnosed with nostalgia were displaced subjects, for instance soldiers 
serving abroad, economic migrants, refugees. But rapid industrialization, different rhythms of 
 
238The reference is to James Hawes’s Twitter account, where he has posted a quotation in which it is stressed that 
his novel has been able to predict Brexit. The quotation Hawes refers to may be found online in Cohen, N., «The 
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work, new discoveries (radio, phone, television) and now de-industrialisation, globalisation and 
internet, have disrupted prior ways of life and upset people’s perception of present and future. 
Consequently, nostalgia has ceased to be an illness related to longing for a physical place but it 
has become, instead, a longing for a previous ‘time’. Bauman points out how difficult it is to 
understand this passage if we do not take into consideration the changing conception of time. 
According to Bauman,  
nostalgia spreads now that our “space of experience”, using Koselleck’s definitions, 
does not fit the new “horizon of expectations”. What does it mean? When Time 
started haunting us, with clocks, schedules, its strict division in past, present and 
future, it has also been connected with the idea of progress, born in the age of 
political and industrial revolution (nineteenth century). Time was something 
escaping us, something we had to grasp to use it to progress, to enrich our lives. Time 
started being money. To understand the new temporality, and in particular how past 
and future begin to be internalizing (considering, as Kant said, space as an outer 
experience and time as an inner one), Koselleck introduces those two definitions 
above, with the first, space of experience, being concerned with our assimilation of 
the past, and the second, horizon of expectations, with our imagining of the future. 
In it, progress became a marker of global time and central to the evaluation of 
everything, and it has not to be perceived as only a temporal progression, but also as 
a spatial expansion, contributing to a new understanding of time and space that made 
the division into local and universal possible.242 
 
If progress is considered a point of reference to evaluate life and life expectations, it 
follows that its negative perception influences, in many ways, both our ‘horizon of 
expectations’(our imagining of the future) and our ‘space of experience’ (the way we look back 
at our past), causing on one hand fear of the unknown, and on the other an intense nostalgia. 
Fear of the unknown is indeed triggered by deluded expectations and the deep-seated certainty 
that nothing good awaits in the future. Since the future is conceived as being «worse than the 
present» or at least «more of the same», there should be 
no wonder that, when seeking genuinely meaningful ideas, we turn, nostalgically, to 
the buried (prematurely?) grand ideas of the past. We are allowed to conclude that 
the vision of a ‘better life’ has disentangled itself from its made-in-Heaven marriage 
to the future.243 
 
Divorced from the future, Bauman argues, visions of a ‘better life’ have nowhere to go except 
for the ‘good old days’ which, differently from the days to be, are already known and therefore 
reliable and trustworthy. Thus, the ordinary people 
are not the ones who control the present from which the future will germinate and 
sprout – and for that reason […] entertain little, if any, hope of controlling that future; 
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in the course of its formation we seem to be doomed to remain pawns on someone 
else’s chessboard and in someone else’s – yet someone unknown and unknowable – 
game. What a relief, therefore, to return from that mysterious, recondite, unfriendly, 
alienated and alienating world, densely sprinkled with traps and ambushed, to the 
familiar, cosy and homely, sometimes wobbly but consolingly unobstructed and 
passable, world of memory.244 
 
Longing for «continuity in a fragmented world»245, and for belonging in a society deeply 
marked by individualism, ‘the world of memory’ becomes a consoling element that contrasts 
the scary conception of time’s irreversibility, the ‘predictability’ of the future as a forthcoming 
catastrophe, and the alienating character of contemporary life. For the nostalgic, words such as 
‘before’, ‘yesterday’ and ‘in the past’, undergo a metamorphosis, becoming evocative 
expressions for an alleged ‘golden era’: a place to hide from the present. This promised land 
situated in the past is supposed to be a place where everything is easy and bright; where people 
can feel secure and trust the establishment to do what is best for them; where alienation, 
loneliness, displacement and vulnerability have no space to grow; where the nation is something 
to be proud of and there is still a recognizable, reassuring and uncontroversial national 
community to belong to. 
Though common to many countries, inside and outside Europe, these feelings are 
particularly embedded in the English character, considering that anxiety for the future and a 
yearning for the ‘best days’ are, in England, strictly linked to the end of the Second World War, 
the demise of the British Empire, the Suez Crisis and the precariousness of the United Kingdom. 
Furthermore, these feelings are constantly renovated – and strengthened - every time the 
diminished role of the country is ‘exposed’ causing a clash between the national narratives of 
greatness and the reality of the present day. These features clearly distinguish English nostalgia 
and anxiety from those held by other countries. As Arthur Aughey stresses, this English 
particularity 
can be traced to the assumption that Englishness has been of universal, not just local, 
significance (unlike the identities of Scotland and Wales). But there is now a double 
English tragedy: although the sense of world-historical significance has been lost, 
the inheritance of that way of thinking remains a crippling political and cultural 
defect […].246 
 
Undoubtedly, this change in England’s status from being a dominant world power to 
becoming a  member of the EU and a satellite country of the USA has created a question of 
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identity that «cuts right across political, class and gender divides and unites all kinds of people 
in England in a sense of loss»247. It is this sense of loss, ultimately, that is responsible for the 
location and search of identity in the ‘memorable’ past, and that paves the way to projects of 
restoration. Restoration, as Boym writes, 
is a word that signifies a return to the original stasis. According to restorative 
nostalgia, the past is not to be considered a duration, but a snapshot, something 
happened but immutable. It has to be preserved in its original image, remaining 
forever young without showing any signs of disruption.248 
 
But the ‘original image’ the narrative that nostalgia depicts is not as original as many 
pretend. The ‘snapshot’ a project of restoration selects and proposes is always a memory 
transformed, manipulated, adapted to the current ‘taste’, from which any unpleasant or 
contradictory feature is excluded. It is by undergoing this process of manipulation and 
fabrication that, ultimately, the past becomes a political tool. And here, as Berberich writes 
referring to national myths, «lies [the] danger: for what is recognized so popularly, and so 
easily, is also, often, accepted unquestioningly»249 and, just as easily, transformed into 
ideology. 
When the past becomes a political tool, we are no more dealing with what could seem, 
at the beginning, an example of harmless nostalgia. As Boym acknowledges, «[w]hen nostalgia 
turns political, romance is connected to nation building and native songs are purified. The 
official memory of the nation-state does not tolerate useless nostalgia, nostalgia for its own 
sake»250. Nostalgia for its own sake is, if anything, the reflective kind identified by Boym, 
which differs from restorative nostalgia since it is a simple act of meditation on the past and its 
irrevocability. As Boym explains, the 
[t]wo kinds of nostalgia are not absolute types, but rather tendencies, ways of giving 
shape and meaning to longing. Restorative nostalgia puts emphasis on nostos and 
proposes to rebuild the lost home and patch up the memory gaps. Reflective nostalgia 
dwells in algia, in longing and loss, the imperfect process of remembrance. The first 
category of nostalgics do not think of themselves as nostalgic; they believe that their 
project is about truth. This kind of nostalgia characterizes national and nationalist 
revivals all over the world, which engage in the antimodern myth-making of history 
by means of a return to national symbols and myths and, occasionally, through 
swapping conspiracy theories. Restorative nostalgia manifests itself in total 
reconstructions of monuments of the past, while reflective nostalgia lingers on ruins, 
the patina of time and history, in the dreams of another space and another time. 251 
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What has happened in Brexit England is precisely a dangerous transition from harmless 
to harmful nostalgia, from reflective to restorative one. Thus, nostalgia has long stopped being 
an innocent recalling and or – at least - a celebration of the national past to become a tool for 
«a politically motivated manipulation of the image of England that is highly exclusive and that 
needs to be challenged»252. It is exactly this image of England that Brexiteers have put at the 
core of their narrative and on which they have built their own project of restoration. 
Many contemporary novelists have engaged with English tendencies towards nostalgia, 
among them Kazuo Ishiguro and Julian Barnes, whose novels, The Remains of the Day (1989) 
and England, England (1998), alert us to the dangers of an uncritical manipulation of the past 
for one’s own purposes. Ishiguro’s The Remains of the Day reflects precisely upon that mythical 
England at the core of the heritage industry. Choosing a typical upper-class setting (the country 
estate), the author presents the point of view of an aging butler, Mr Stevens, who is soon 
revealed to be an unreliable narrator due to misremembered and biased interpretations of the 
events he reflects upon. Set in the 1950s, the dying days of the empire and of Britain’s role as 
a superpower, the novel follows Mr Stevens in a trip around England that is also a trip into the 
past. Little by little, memories unfold with the reader forced to investigate and distinguish 
between what is tinted by nostalgia and illusion, what has been purposely manipulated or 
obscured, and the reality of what really happened. In this way, the novel subtly refers to the 
abuse and manipulation of the past for commercial means and, especially, for political ones. 
The past comes to be depicted not only as an interpretation opposing the real thing, in a very 
postmodernist attitude, but as the interpretation that suits better the purposes of the narrator. 
The same mechanisms are also at the core of the England, England project, the theme park the 
tycoon Jack Pittman decides to create on the Isle of Wight and that is based on the manipulation 
of English history, the repositioning of its myths and invention of new traditions. Published in 
1998, England, England is a novel that reflects, among many other themes, on individual and 
collective identity. To do so, the novelist writes in parallel about the nation and the life of 
Martha Cochrane, the main character of the novel, whose childhood, adulthood and old age 
represent three different stages of England: rural, industrial and post-industrial. Writing the 
novel, Barnes has focused on some tendencies that, according to him, «are implicit in 
contemporary Britain», such as the «complete dominance of the free market» and «the tendency 
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of the country to sell and parody itself»253. Selling the country is exactly what the lawyer Jerry 
Cabot suggests to Sir Jack Pittman: 
It’s a question of placing the product correctly, that’s all. […] You – we – England 
– my client – is – are – a nation of great age, great history, great accumulated wisdom. 
Social and cultural history – stacks of it, reams of it – eminently marketable, never 
more so than in the current climate. Shakespeare, Queen Victoria, Industrial 
Revolution, gardening, that sort of thing. If I may coin, no, copyright, a phrase, we 
are already what others may hope to become. This isn’t self-pity, this is the strength 
of our position, our glory, our product placement. We are the new pioneers. We must 
sell our past to other nations as their future!254 
 
The passage certainly refers, ironically, to Tony Blair’s attempt at rebranding Britain, 
and it is a perfect example of the act of manipulation. The author is here hinting at the British 
post-war narrative of national decline which, as stressed before, fuelled the «loss of faith»255 
the nation is still experiencing, the idea of a lost greatness never to be recovered. But Jerry 
Cabot describes it differently: in his opinion, the country’s greatness has never been lost since 
it is still traceable in its past, and that past, after being recovered, replicated and restored, can 
even be sold to others as the goal to achieve. Even if the replica of England the theme park 
represents is addressed to tourists, it is easy to translate it to the world of politics and consider 
England, England a vision of the country that could be sold to voters. In the same fashion of 
political projects, to be sold, the replica must be palatable, to meet and satisfy the needs and the 
expectations of its buyers. To establish what people want, Sir Jack orders his employees to 
conduct some surveys, choosing from the founding what he considers to be acceptable and 
ruling out what doesn’t align with his own image of the country, manipulating history and 
repositioning national myths according to contemporary values. The fantasy world England, 
England stages becomes so powerful that the actors start believing in it, making the fantasy 
their actual reality. This is, as Kazuo Ishiguro commented, the risk inherent in the business of 
nostalgia: that people may actually ‘buy’ (tourists) or ‘believe’ (voters) in the misleading 
narration of the country. Ultimately, the complete blur between reality and fiction started inside 
the project ends up involving the country itself, with Sir Jack’s replica substituting the original 
and forcing England (which has «stop[ped] believing in things»256) to change its name to avoid 
being confused with the theme park. The nostalgic dream has become an inhabitable, physical 
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reality which ultimately eclipses the complex original. As Svetlana Boym writes, ‘[n]ostalgia 
(from nostos – return home, and algia – longing) is a longing for a home that no longer exists 
or has never existed’257 and this can lead, still quoting Boym, ‘to confuse the actual home and 
the imaginary one. In extreme cases it can create a phantom homeland, for the sake of which 
one is ready to die or kill’.258 
A phantom homeland like Sir Jack’s theme park is the perfect definition for both the 
nation coming out of Brexit narrative and the Colony depicted in James Hawes’ novel Speak 
for England (2005), which is, as anticipated, one of the first pre-Brexit novels labelled as ‘Brexit 
fiction’ and the very literary manifestation of the nostalgic Brexit dream. In the novel, the main 
character Brian Marley – stuck in what he considers a mediocre life (a teacher of English as a 
Foreign Language, divorced and broke) – agrees to participate in a TV program about surviving 
in an inhospitable jungle in Papua New Guinea in order to become rich and make his son proud. 
He wins the contest, but a crash between two of the production company’s helicopters destroys 
his dreams of fame and money. Forced, this time, to survive for real, he climbs a vertical cliff 
and collapses. When he wakes up, he is surrounded by people and questioned about his 
Englishness by the Headmaster, the leader of the Colony, who tries to determine – and this 
seems crucial for his survival there – if Brian is an Englishman.  
Brian Marley should be, indeed, a representation of a typical Englishman, or at least this 
is what the authors of the TV program hoped for, as Brian had been placed in opposition to 
other participants from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. As his friend, who is also the 
producer of the programme, explains to him when offering the job,  
[…]to be honest you’re so, well, so bloody English, Brian. We’ve got our regulation 
chatty Welshman and bolshie Scotsman and charming bloody Colleen and plain-
speaking Northern git already so we don’t want any more of those. We need someone 
else from real England.259 
 
In the passage, there is a neat acknowledgement of the United Kingdom as a state 
composed by distinct nations, a distinction exemplified by the clashing personalities of the 
participants. The producers affirm to be done with that, meaning that they need no one else of 
‘those’ types: they have already found who they considered to be true representatives of those 
areas of the UK and are now looking for what is still missing: a true representative of what 
England means to them. Brian appears, to his friend, the obvious choice, since he is a «forty-
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odd-year-old English teacher, not in terribly good shape»260 whose qualities and attributes make 
him so unmistakably English. This is exactly how Brian is usually perceived and categorized 
by anyone coming in his way: the old lady selling poppies at the entrance of the tube; the 
Argentinian student he has a crush on, Consuela; even the colonists themselves, who, after 
checking The Peoples of Mankind and questioning him about « name, rank, and all that sort of 
thing»261, come to the conclusion that probably he really is an Englishman.  
According to Brian, «[o]f course the old lady had picked on him»: because «she had 
seen a normal, decent poppy-buying Englishman who wore this sort of thing without thinking 
about it»262, because he perfectly fits in that idea of Englishness, as in the one the classics of 
English literature convey for Consuela. Brian’s Englishness, as he himself articulates it, seems 
to be a matter of appearance, posture, choice of clothes, ways of behaving, even accent. But 
when you base your assumptions only on people’s outward look and manners, you often end 
up misjudging them. As Brian comments, both the old lady and Consuela look at him as the 
typical ‘decent poppy-buying Englishman’ because they do not know 
that his jacket was second-hand and the whole get-up was actually just his wretched 
quasi-uniform, the rig of all established Teachers of English as a Foreign Language 
from Bournemouth to Bangkok.  They could not tell that he was only still in England 
because he was now a part-time single father with a three-year-old son and, since he 
could not abandon his son, he could no longer do what your normal TEFLer does 
whenever things get too tough or too real, i.e. flee to some new foreign country where 
he can play the English card again. Nothing showed that he was not, in fact, a happy, 
easygoing Englishman who was working at the London English School in Piccadilly 
simply because he loved teaching people his beloved English language, but a 
wretched failure who could think of no other way to pay the bills.263  
 
The colonists make the same mistake categorising Brian as an upper-class Englishman, 
a mistake they soon realise once back in England. As one of them remarks, «a chap can seem 
perfectly clubbable east of Suez, but when you get home you realise he isn’t really the thing 
after all»264, meaning that Brian does not own those attributes that makes one a proper 
Englishman.   
It follows that this ‘real England’ he should represent is actually one that deserts him, 
for two main reasons: because it is an England in which he constantly feels inadequate and 
unsuitable, given that he belongs to those ruled out from «the golden age […] of safe and steady 
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job»265 and constantly worrying about their future options; and because it is an England that 
does not fit the representation of the country embedded in his cultural imaginary, an alien place 
that makes him feel as a foreigner in his own country. Thus, Berberich points out that  
the England [Brian] sees around him is one devoid of meaning; a country punctuated 
by noise, pushy behaviour, dirt, and ‘without much hope’ (Hawes 2005:97), with 
‘heartless urban centres, pedestrianised to death, chewing-gum splotches march[ing] 
as far as the eye can bear, unscrubbable witnesses, like scene-of-crime stains of grey, 
lifeless blood on greasy concrete slabs’ (98). It is a far cry from the evocation of rural 
England perpetuated by and sold to the rest of the world in period drama and coffee 
table books.266 
 
Berberich also highlights that Brian’s job makes his sense of displacement even worse, 
considering that his profession includes teaching English lifestyle and culture: in one word, 
teaching Englishness. But his national identity only opens troubling questions: what is England? 
What does it mean to be English? His sense of loss and the perception he has of being a 
‘wretched failure’ mirror the national loss of faith and the taint of failure that would be marking 
the nation, after the dismantlement of its empire and the internal dismantlement of the kingdom 
after the devolution process. These feelings inevitably instil in Brian a longing for «an England 
where at last he could be truly at home»267, where he would not need to ‘sound the thing’, but 
he could be the thing itself: a true Englishman, whatever this means.  
Confused about his identity, no wonder that « Marley seems to lack a voice»268, to be 
lost in multiple representations of himself that, ultimately, are none other than masks he wears 
according to the occasion. This is particularly evident soon after the helicopters’ crash, when 
Brian, certain that he is going to die, decides to use the little camera the program gave him to 
send a video-message to his son. The problem he encounters in recording the video-message is 
precisely that he has no idea of what his real voice sounds like, only what it does not: 
[n]ot the mad military voice that had been ordering him around, of course. That was 
not how we wanted his son to remember him. That was not really him. 
But then, what was? 
The ridiculous, falsely enthusiastic, carefree voice he used to his boss at work? No. 
That was a blatant lie. What, then? The accent he put on in tough pubs when he was 
trying to disguise how middle class he really was? The chipper tone he assumed 
when reassuring his mother vaguely that everything was going to work out somehow 
despite his apparently complete failure in life? The ludicrous, shameful, sub-
Oxbridge drawl he had learned to use at college and still fell into with his old college 
friends? The would-be semi-transatlantic twang that always began to infect him after 
a few days spent with Americans? The risible faux-Irish throatiness that he affected 
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when he sang folk songs in allegedly authentic theme pubs to impress his foreign 
women? The bizarrely, unreal Spanish-influenced rhythms he had started falling into 
when talking to Consuela Martinez? 
Which? How? Who? 
Marley’s body stood frozen before the soaring rock face, but his mind staggered with 
internal vertigo as he stared into the endless, meaningless blackness of his own self. 
Where his voice should have been, where he should have been, there was nothing by 
a dizzying void.269 
 
With the battery of the camera running out, facing death, wanting to leave something to 
his son (an explanation, a last love message, a legacy), and forced to choose in the blink of an 
eye between «digital immortality or eternal silence», Brian pathetically struggles to find an 
«authentic tone of himself»270, as if this authenticity, its nude self, is nothing but a void, 
something that probably does not even exist, a ‘who’ without answer lost in the many characters 
he has learned to perform. 
The question of identity is immediately shifted from the individual level to the national 
one when Brian links his difficulty in tracing his true self to the equally undefined character of 
Englishness: 
Christ, if only he was Irish. They knew how they sounded. Or Scots. No problem for 
them. Welsh, whatever. Anyone who knew exactly what they were supposed to 
sound like and just did it without thinking. Someone who knew exactly who they 
were. A Geordie, a Scouser, even a Brummie for fuck’s sake, there, see, for fuck’s 
sake, that was not how he spoke, that was something to do with Ireland or Australia 
or something, that was someone else, that was learned, taken on, taken up, 
borrowed.271 
 
According to Brian, everything he says is something learned, borrowed, taken on from 
somebody else, which is actually the way any identity is shaped: through processes of 
identification that imply the acts of borrowing, mirroring, modifying, till a defined sense of self 
–  though always ready to assume new characteristics –  appears. But in his case, as Brian 
stresses, these mechanisms did not seem to have been applied to a defined self: rather, they 
serve as a means to hide the empty container his national identity appears to be, slowly scattered 
in a British identity and now retrieved in a past and with characteristics that do not align with 
his reality. This distinguishes his situation from that of a Scottish or a Welshman (whose 
national identities, in contrast with Englishness, have continued to flourish and have been 
celebrated both during and after the empire), who can count on those collective identities as a 
point of reference. 
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Even though he knows that, among the many voices he can assume, the ‘military one’ 
is not the ‘real thing’ he is looking for, it is precisely the military voice, in the end, that helps 
him survive, ordering him to «[k]eep the line straight», put his «[t]rousers up and let’s show the 
buggers how an Englishman dies»272, «pick up that damn camera and […] say no more about 
it»273. The military voice, which has prevented Brian from abandoning the show and 
accompanied him step by step in the hellish jungle, is the voice of a «battle-hardened officer», 
a man sure of himself, used to rule, trained to do the job and get on with it. This is a ‘role model’ 
that has nothing to do with Brian’s personality, marked, if anything, by doubting and longing; 
nonetheless, it is a very familiar one to him, since it is deeply rooted in the national narratives 
of greatness related to the empire and the Second World War and, consequently, in English 
culture. Not by chance, Brian associates the voice to that of an officer, linking it to the image 
of the English military hero. This imaginary is one Brian is very familiar with, through works 
such as Best of Breed and the Eagle annuals and the myth of his father, a Navy veteran that 
abandoned his family for another woman. 
Best of Breed is a coffee table book, a personal idea of the Senior Editor of the 
Intelligencer, which consists of already published obituaries of military men. Opposite any 
obituary,  
[w]ith its formal wartime portrait on glossy paper, appeared a historical photograph 
of the fight, or at least the theatre of action, in which the late man had gained his 
most notable decoration, together with photographs and brief biographies of 
comrades who had not survived, all placed in context by maps and scholarly notes 
about the course and significance of the battle in question.274  
 
Soon a best-seller, the volume clearly represents, with its wartime portraits and 
photographs of the places in which the war was actually fought, a celebration of a ‘glorious’ 
time put in comparison with the average present day. Not by chance, the title is Best of Breed, 
meaning that the generation that fought in the war is portrayed as the very personification of 
what a man and his country should be (and, as implied, what neither of them are anymore). The 
idea of the publication is indeed directly linked to the sense of loss of faith, trust and belonging 
that the Senior Editor himself feels, due to the many changes the country has gone through and 
that are exemplified by the hellish image of the M25: 
I saw it the other day from a pal of mine’s little aeroplane. I looked, do you see, just 
looked, at all those poor buggers spending their lives driving round and round like 
bloody lemmings, permanently half knackered and bloody well fed up, decent, 
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normal chaps and girls who never wanted much really except orders they could 
understand, mortgaged up to the eyeballs, worried sick about their kids and schools 
and pensions and just about ready to grab hold of someone in Westminster by the 
balls and ask them exactly what the hell’s going on. Those are our men and women. 
Our tribe.275 
 
The publication should convey a lost sense of pride, identity and belonging, but here 
lies a paradox since the ‘tribe’ the Senior Editor identifies is clearly not the one he belongs to. 
Thus, he remembers looking at ‘those poor buggers’ from ‘a pal of mine’s little aeroplane’ and 
is able to recognise the general experience of alienation, displacement and anger, but these 
emotions are clearly not his. The physical distance between the airplane and the M25 is the 
same distance that exists between those men and women’s reality and the Senior Editor’s one: 
he is, in fact, a member of the elite, one of the privileged few who can look at their Hell and 
remain untouched by it. Tellingly, when Brian happens to read Best of Breed in his friend’s 
bathroom, the volume does not strike him in a positive way. Brian is in every respect one of 
those ‘poor buggers’ and a member of the ‘tribe’ the volume seems to be addressing: 
accustomed to the M25, ‘fed up’ and ‘worried sick’ about his future and that of his son and with 
a mortgage for a flat in Acton «which was now, in the ongoing downturn (as the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer still insisted on calling it) worth scarcely what he had paid for it last year»276. 
Given the clash between the volume’s representation of the past and his reality, the obituaries 
seem to be mocking him and somehow forcing him to imagine his own obituary, one that would 
highlight, in opposition to those of the military heroes, his lack of «moral fibre»277: after all, 
«[w]hat exactly had he managed, pray, with his life, with this one, unrepeatable shot at 
existence? What attacks on anything had he ever pressed home in style? What hostile forces 
had he ever thrown back in confusion?»278. Instead of a sense of pride, the publication ends up 
fuelling Brian with a sense of shame, playing a major role in his decision to participate in his 
friend’s TV program.  
The various ‘theatres of action’ to which Best of Breed refers in its obituaries are just 
the same as those featured in the comics Brian read as a kid, the Eagle annuals. Going through 
the account of the Battle of El Alamein in Best of Breed, in fact, Brian suddenly realises that 
[h]e knew the story. He had heard it before, years ago, so long ago it was as if he had 
always known it. He closed his eyes in disbelief as the cover of a Victor For Boys 
comic (every week, only 6d) flashed up before his eyes, telling him, aged perhaps six 
or seven, of the glorious Defence of Outpost Snipe. No, it was impossible. He turned 
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back a thick, glossy page in the weighty book. […] He was right, Outpost Snipe it 
was. What the hell was this? Why was his head filled with names and battles from 
twenty years before his birth? […] Almost all of them struck some deep, soft-tolling 
bell of boyhood memory inside him.279 
 
As the passage shows, even if Brian was not alive during the war (he was born, as he 
himself stressed, twenty years after), he has vivid memories of it, as if he had, somehow, taken 
part in the war. It is through the act of repetitive narration that the war Brian has never 
experienced has become a memory on its own. In the Eagle annuals published during Brian’s 
boyhood, the war imagery was endlessly replicated through action figures, stories based on key 
episodes of the war, and references to well-known protagonists of the war scenario (in primis 
to Winston Churchill). Reflecting upon his youth, Brian acknowledges that «[t]here were 
several of these images locked away in his mind from those years», especially images of the 
good «grinning British soldiers»280 killing the evil Germans which promoted a biased 
representation of the war based on a simplified distinction between good and evil.  
The biased representation of the war the Eagle annuals stage is also the same kind of 
representation other cultures put in opposition with the national one receive. This is exactly 
what Brian tries to explain to his own mother when he discovered she is passing on his old 
Eagle annuals to his son, hinting that  
he would probably get Social Services calling round to see him if his ex-wife and 
the kindergarten teachers found Tommy telling them about stories in Daddy’s book 
about redskins being wiped out by cowboys, turbanned tribesmen being routed by 
Maxim guns, Boy Scouts defeating the evil schemes of slant-eyed Malaysian 
terrorists, entertaining black people called Mambo and Jambo who spoke pidgin 
English and chirpy commandos mowing down buck-toothed rice-noshers (Banzai! 
Arrgh!), square-headed sausage-eaters (Achtung donner und blitzen! Urgh!) or out-
of-work ice-cream salesmen (Mamma mia! Aieee!).281  
  
But his attempt is like «water off a duck’s back»282. For his mother, born and bred in an 
imperial nation and consequently accustomed to this kind of narrative, the toys she has kept are 
more suitable than the violent videogames and the American toys in fashion, especially the 
Eagle annuals, whose «level of the language is, of course, so much better than in those dreadful 
modern comics»283. The attachment of Brian’s mother to the objects of his childhood is a 
nostalgic one, which mirrors the same nostalgic feeling she has for a time where the Labour 
Government and State organisations were something to rely on: the time Britain won the war. 
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That is why it is so important to her that her apartment is situated «near the BBC»284, 
considering the BBC a kind of «fighting force»285 as one of those State organisations that 
infused the public with a sense of identity during the war, contributing to the national narrative 
and unifying the people in the war effort. 
 Given the way the Eagle annuals depict people from other cultures (stereotyping them 
and establishing racial hierarchies), Brian knows that they should not be on his son’s reading 
list; equally, he does not want his son to remember him through the military voice that follows 
the Eagle’s model. Nonetheless, he cannot help it. The Eagle annuals are, in spite of everything, 
something he still has fondness for and would like to re-read: they are «relics from the past» 
which are «somehow far more real than whatever he had been doing for the past thirty-five 
years» that «seemed to have no substance compared to this»286. The same could be said of the 
photograph of Brian’s father, which the mother shows to anyone coming to visit her: 
This photograph was in black and white, framed, and showed a Naval unit marching 
self-consciously, with shouldered rifles and curious white ankle leggings, across the 
flight deck of an aircraft carrier. The picture was titled, in fading letters of 
handwritten, once-black ink, Green Division, HMS Eagle Malta, Coronation Day 
1953. God Bless the Queen. Mrs Marley kept it hanging in a prominent position near 
to her better pieces of china, well away from the various expensively framed 
photographs of her son posing before well-known cultural artefacts from several 
continents. Whenever she had a visitor whom she suspected of social condescension 
to a woman who had only reached Executive Officer Grade 4 by her retirement and 
who lived in a mere flat in Shepherd’s Bush (however near to the BBC), she would 
skilfully bring the conversation around to this photograph. The visitor would then in 
the nature of things peer politely at it and ask which one was her son’s father, to 
which Mrs Marley would reply, as if absently, in gay triumph: 
- Which one? The one in the front with the bloody sword, of course.287 
 
The only physical evidence Brian has of his father, whom he will later go to find in 
Australia only to be utterly disappointed, the photograph is a dear memory and one that 
represents the father and husband as a hero and not for what he really is: a runaway from his 
own responsibilities. It is the ‘hero’ the mother wants to show to the exterior world, personified 
by the visitors, because this is the representation that makes her and her son shine the most. 
Therefore, this is also the representation that acquires more ‘substance’ than reality itself. 
 As his father’s photograph, the ‘fake’ military voice rising from the void Brian’s self 
seems to be is, ultimately, the one that gains substance as the most useful in those 
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circumstances, meaning that embracing the model and behaving as the English soldier and 
coloniser of the imperial narrative of greatness he is not is the only way-out he can think of. 
Thus, the «right tactics» Brian adopts to survive in «a place utterly hostile to human life, let 
alone civilisation»288 are none other than the same adopted by the English ‘bringing civilisation 
to the darkest corners of the world’ during the imperial era: the very English motto ‘keep calm 
and carry on’, the military discipline, the commitment to the mission.  
The parallel between Brian’s program and the imperial mission also allows another 
comparison that takes us back to the question of identity. As the English exploit their imperial 
mission  to cement a sense of collective identity that could keep the British Union together, the 
author implies, Brian’s travelling to Papua New Guinea is equally a mission towards identity, 
a way to put together the pieces that constitute his individual and national identity. As Berberich 
writes,  
Marley cannot reconcile his ideal image of the England of his childhood with the 
reality of everyday life around him. His decision to take part in the reality TV show 
set in the jungle of Papua New Guinea is his attempt to get closer to England and 
himself by getting away. Rather than trying to find out what England means to him, 
he believes that going far away to gain fame and fortune on a TV show will enable 
him to simply buy the trappings of a stereotypically English lifestyle - the house in 
the country, the Aga in the kitchen, the children in private school - and, with it, a 
sense of belonging.289  
 
This ‘identity mission’ seems to be accomplished when he stumbles into the Colony, a 
kind of «Eagle adventure»290 and a simulacrum of that England lost in the past and therefore 
impossible to recover. Still in a state of confusion and sickness, Brian hears sounds that he 
immediately associates with a leather ball, bats, pads: the game of cricket. One of the most 
famous symbols of Englishness, cricket is, even though Brian never played it, a central part of 
his cultural imaginary. When the cricket ball slides up to him, Brian picks it up 
[w]ithout thinking, almost more surprised that he could sit up than that he should 
have been hit on the ear, here, by a cricket ball, […] and was thus holding it, looking 
at it dumbly, when a tall, lithe, tanned, blond, blue-eyed youth of perhaps fourteen 
came bounding through the bushes, dressed in long, once-khaki shorts and a white 
cotton shirt, both heavily repaired. When he saw Marley he stopped dead and stared. 
Before the amazed young man could speak, Marley upon some instinct tossed the 
cricket ball to him; he caught it with a neat and pure reflex, his eyes still fixed on 
Marley. 
- Well held, croaked Marley. 
- I say, are you English? 
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- English? Of course I’m bloody English, said Marley.291 
 
Unsurprisingly, challenged by a stranger and finding himself abroad, Brian has no 
hesitation in declaring himself ‘bloody English’, using his friend’s exact words. It is the 
encounter with what we label as ‘Other’, as Hawes knows well, that plays a major role in 
building identities, both individual and collective ones. After exclaiming these words, Brian 
passes out and wakes up later in what appears to be «[h]ome, at last»292: there are some 
commodities (a bed, a blanket, a roof on his head), the Union Jack and the Australian flags 
waving next to each other and the Eagle on a bookshelf.  
From a certain point of view, the Colony really is ‘home’, considering that it represents 
a perfect replica of the England Brian could not retrieve from his present reality: the imperial 
ideal of the nation. That was exactly the England the colonists had left behind when their plane 
crashed: a nation which had just won the war, with an Empire still going on, and influence and 
interests everywhere. Thinking that their crash was the start of the Third World War and that 
nobody was going to rescue them any sooner, the survivors have adapted to the place and, at 
the same time, shaped it as the mother country replicating the colonial enterprise in many 
aspects, even the ‘darkest’ ones. Thus, Brian will soon discover that the Colony is not a peaceful 
place and that the colonists’ periodic ‘hunt’ does not involve animals but a local tribe, whose 
heads are impaled on the Gate that delimits the territory of the Colony.  
According to the Headmaster,  
all this stuff here at the Gate doesn’t mean we’ve gone to the dogs and become a 
gang of damn headhunters. It just means that there were things we had to do to get 
by, so we did them, but we shut up about them and we kept it from the women and 
children.293 
 
What the national narrative of greatness about the empire hides is exactly what the 
Headmaster, who shows Brian the heads of the locals prior to being rescued and safely returned 
to England, wants to hide from the British public: the crimes that the colonial enterprise 
perpetrated. In creating his own version of England, the Headmaster has chosen what he wanted 
to be part of it: the «droit de seigneur», the «first bash to see if a girl’s good stock» in pure 
medieval style294; the most glorious episodes of English history taught to the young ones; and 
the myth of the superiority of the white man, with everything that this implies and justifies (the 
conquest of land, the killing, the slavery). As the Headmaster sees it, he has done nothing 
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wrong: the heads are Miyanmin, who as fellow head-hunters prey every three years on another 
tribe, the Altbalmin. Killing the Miyanmin keeps them at bay and, at the same time, obtains the 
gratitude of the Altbalmin and with that the products of their farming. When Brian comments 
that this means that the colonists are actually living off the natives, the Headmaster stresses that 
they are soldiers and therefore belong to a totally «different caste»295 compared to the natives, 
sketching a hierarchy which is both racial and cultural. The natives’ inferior status is also 
underlined when both the Headmaster and Georgina – the girl known as George that helps Brian 
recover and becomes thereafter a sort of girlfriend to him –  point out that the natives cannot 
write, which means, for them, that the natives have no history and no sense of themselves as a 
community. This directly connects them to the many historical accounts written by European 
colonists about the cultures they were encountering, which stress the lack of literacy among the 
natives and consider this a sign of their inferiority.  
According to the Headmaster, the hierarchy established in the Colony and embedded in 
the British Empire itself is not even something to think about: it is a hard-fact, due to the 
superior intelligence, morale and abilities of the colonists. Consequently, Brian should respect 
this as a natural fact and «behave like a white man» should: picking up one of the stakes himself 
and burning the evidence, instead of being like one of those «[b]loody misty-eyed do-gooders 
at home banging on about England’s Mission who never had the foggiest idea what has to be 
done out in the Colonies just to keep things ticking over»296. If Brian wants to be one of the 
colonists, and therefore a real Englishman according to the model they represent, he must look 
up and not look away because  
if you’re going to have an Empire, if you want to send chaps out overseas to set the 
locals straight, if you think we really ought to occasionally knock sense into 
undesirable murdering lunatics and stop fellows burning their sisters when they get 
widowed and eating each other and all that sort of thing, well, then you can’t expect 
your chaps to do it without getting their hands a bit dirty, going a bit native 
occasionally. If you don’t want all that, well and good, we can all sit quietly at home 
like a bunch of fat-arsed Swedes, smoking our pipes and playing golf and not caring 
a damn about who’s invading whom where and who’s burning his sister and why.297 
 
In the Headmaster’s opinion, ‘going a bit native’298, the common fear that characterises 
many literary works produced during the imperial era, is an acceptable compromise to build 
and maintain an empire, a compromise that, due to its necessity, does not taint the greatness of 
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the enterprise. But the same fact that he is ready to kill Brian if he does not oblige, if he threats 
to bleat something out, could mean that deep down he acknowledges the contradiction, from 
which the sense of guilt about the empire generates, between what ‘going a bit native’ implies 
and what ‘a mission of civilisation’ should mean. 
However, during the forty-five years of life in the Colony, the Headmaster’s vision 
about the natives and how the Colony itself should ‘work’ went unquestioned: the general 
consent of the first survivors makes the Headmaster’s ideas, as well as his representation of 
England, something accepted, easily adopted, and finally transforms it into something 
approaching an ideology or, given the reverence with which it is regarded, even a ‘religion’. 
Not by chance the colonists have a book which sounds a lot like a Bible. In this book they not 
only write everything that has happened to them, detailing every event in the community down 
to the smallest detail, but they also learn all of the information they need, and especially 
everything they should know about England taken from the information recorded and passed 
down by the first colonists. This explains why, «even though there’s only half a dozen of us left 
who have ever seen it»299, England is still depicted as the mother country to come back to, more 
real than Papua New Guinea where the majority of them have been born and raised. Using 
Appadurai’s conceptualisation, these colonists, who have never been in England but long for it, 
suffer from a ‘nostalgia without memory’300: even though they do not have any experience of 
England, they have built a representation of it in their collective cultural memory, and it is this 
representation that feeds their nostalgic sentiment. This is the same mechanism we find in 
contemporary nostalgia among young people, where there is no memory for the time itself –  
the past never lived as in Brian’s case referring to the wartime –  but there is a nostalgia, not at 
all less powerful, for the past as described, which, being narrated, depicted, described, has been 
transformed in an actual memory.  
An exemplary case of nostalgia without memory is represented by George, whose 
fascination with Brian is due to the fact that he seems like a «wounded soldier», a «real 
Englishman, from home»301. The desire to get in touch with a land that appears, more than a 
real country, a fabled kingdom, leads George to seduce Brian, whom she defines as ‘new stock’ 
from the ‘old country’, her kind of precious relic of England. Interestingly, while having sex 
with him, George starts ‘chanting’ out loud, as in a chorus, the names of the English places she 
has learned from the Book: 
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_ Trafalgar Square, she murmured, as if intoning some great and secret mistery, _ 
Horse Guards, Whitehall, the House of Parliament. 
 [...]  
_ New stock, she panted. _ From the old country. 
_George, oh George. 
From England. Oh, Hadrian’s wall and Offa’s Dyke, Ullswater, Long Mynd, 
Simmon’s Yat. 
_Oh, George. 
Marley did not listen and did not care. As she recited the book-read names of 
England, her chant to her unknown homeland, he simply chorused her name again 
and again, like a prayer. 
[...] _ White City, Shepherd’s Bush, Holland Park, England, oh England! Oh!302 
 
Her «litany»303, as Aughey and Berberich define it, is an act of listing that aims at getting 
close to England in the same way listing is usually adopted to give a definition of English 
identity. The attempt George makes to relate to England is in contrast with Brian’s inability to 
do it. While George chants the places of England, Brian indeed ignores her, he thinks he does 
not ‘care’ about it, preferring to repeat, instead, her name which, paradoxically, being also the 
name of the English patron, identifies George as the personification of the traditional version 
of Englishness the Colony reproduces. The book-read knowledge George has of England and 
her willingness to get a sense of the nation itself is, if anything, similar to the attitude of Brian’s 
pupil Consuela Martinez, who has come to England with a vision of the country deeply rooted 
in English literature and wants to visit only the places those books describe. For Consuela, the 
reality of present England, so different from the bookish one, contrasts to the preconceived 
ideas she has on the country, ideas she does not want to revise. That explains why she prefers 
to stay in her room, reading other books that talk about England, because she does not want the 
sounds of modern London and its challenging present day to «disturb her dreams» of England. 
Consuela’s English dreams are put in contrast, and in this way labelled as childish fantasies, 
with her father’s vision of England, the Air Colonel Achilleo Martinez, who fought against the 
English and defines them as «pirates and barbarians» who have learned to behave, fooled the 
world, and «always managed to end up on the winning side»304. The Air Colonel represents the 
point of view of an outsider, untainted by the English national narrative of greatness that has 
been instilled in his daughter through the biased representation of the English in literature.  
Back in the Colony, dreams of the mother country and nostalgia for a homeland never 
known are summoned not only by the Book. Thus, the young colonists also attend history 
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lessons which, in a similar fashion to the ‘chants of history’ Martha learns at school in Barnes’ 
novel England, England, are a fully-fledged indoctrination about England and being English: 
Now, boys, can you tell our new friend what is England’s mission? All together now. 
_To civilise to protect the weak to spread freedom sir. 
_Very good. And no one did more for that great cause than Horatio Nelson. [...] Who 
can tell our visitor the date of the Battle of Trafalgar? 
_It was 1805, said Marley, taken unawares by a small, scuttling byte of memory 
which wriggled past his block and through the gate. 
_Splendid! cried the history teacher. 
_Nelson’s flagship was the Victory and he died at the moment of triumph, shot by a 
French musket ball. His last signal was ‘England expects every man to do his duty’ 
and his last words were ‘Thank God I have done my duty’. Oh, sorry, I didn’t mean 
to interrupt, I’ll _ 
_No, no, there, you see, boys. That is what we need to know of England.305 
 
According to the history teacher, Mr Givvens, what Marley says about Horatio Nelson, 
and especially the quotes about doing one’s own duty, is exactly what the boys must know 
about England. The account the boys received on the nation they should long for is one that has 
at its core the imperial rhetoric (‘to civilise’ and ‘to spread the freedom’ is the England’s 
mission in the world) and one from which everything considered useless or less gratifying is 
simply expunged (‘that’ is what they need to know imply that other things do not need to be 
known, for instance the ‘sins’ committed on the way). Interestingly, this is the same account of 
England Marley has received in the mother country and that problematises his feelings towards 
it. Brian has been told – and is told again in the Colony – that  
[p]roper Englishmen do not scrabble about for insights into what the hell it is all 
about, this thing we call our so-called self. No, no, no. True Englishmen avoid all 
that. They know who they are. Oh yes. Simple. They are Englishmen. And as 
Englishmen, they have blonde girlfriends who do not make emotional demands on 
them and look great and sleep easily and cook on Agas and understand that men are 
different and so are never disappointed and do not make you feel guilty. Englishmen 
do not do guilt. They do not doubt their place on earth, their right to saunter across 
it, having fun.306 
 
The only way to be an Englishman, and not a ‘wretched failure’ to be ashamed of, seems 
to come from finally accepting and complying with this narrative: the millions he has won, 
being the last standing of the TV program’s contestants, should guarantee him the right social 
status; his new girlfriend, not born in England but raised in an atmosphere of Englishness, seems 
the perfect match; and he would no longer need to doubt himself, as not only has his life begun 
to take shape, but he has also reconnected with his identity as an Englishman. Specifically, he 
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has reconnected to an idealised, imperial view of the English as a people who ‘do not doubt 
their place on earth’ and ‘do not do guilt’. He can’t wait, now that he feels he can be «really 
and truly English»307, to come back home in an England that, through the hyperreality of the 
Colony, has finally acquired in his eyes both meaning and greatness. 
In the end, Brian is not the only one who struggles with present England, finding it 
difficult to come to terms with the clash between the country’s constructed, mythical identity 
and its reality. Given that the England the colonists have reconstructed in Papua New Guinea 
is a «fabled land, far removed from the rather disillusioning reality of the early twenty-first 
century»308, the encounter with the actual reality, first through Brian’s account, then ‘physically 
landing in it’ after their rescue, is significantly unsettling. Gardiner stresses that « [a]s soon as 
Marley begins to regain his memory, the lost colonists probe him for news of the condition of 
England […] leading to a long comic section during which he has to explain a history which 
sounds strange in his own mouth»309, and this because it is a tale of decline, divisions and 
disappointment that does not align with the official image of England they have. As Brian tells 
them, Labour is now the party governing the country, but those ‘socialists’ – as the colonists 
define them –  are very different from the ones they recall from the 50s, since they seem to 
«hate the unions»310 and like millionaires, private businesses and denationalisation instead. He 
then goes on to explain that there was also a woman Prime Minister that seems actually «quite 
a girl»311 to them; that there was a war in Iraq, for which he is able to provide no explanation; 
that the industry sector and the National Service no longer exist; and that England has even 
joined the European Union. The Headmaster comments that it «[s]ounds like England needs 
us»312 to remind people about what the country should be. 
Back in England, the confusion the colonists experience is exemplified by George’s 
difficulty in understanding how to speak ‘proper English’, since what Brian considers ‘proper’ 
contrasts with the racial and social hierarchies behind George’s way of speaking and relating to 
the world. Thus, Brian is used to pronouncing the word ‘garage’ as ‘garridge’, while the 
teachers in the Colony taught George to pronounce it ‘garaaj’, using a French, and therefore 
upper-class, pronunciation. When George asks him to tell her which of the two pronunciations 
is the one ‘real people’ must use, she specifies that ‘real people’ are «people who matter», to 
be distinguished from «cooks and nannies and so on», who probably have their own way of 
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speaking but – as «dirty smelly people who don’t talk properly» – do not count among the ‘real’ 
proper English. Speaking properly, says George, is the only way to avoid being mistaken for a 
«social climber or a Jamaican nigger»313, which takes us back to Brian’s dwelling on the accent 
he used when speaking with his Oxford friends in order to disguise his middle-class origins. 
Another word that troubles George is ‘nigger’, which Brian tells her should not be used after 
she exclaims that an inspector «was a nigger, can you believe that?» and that he had «the nerve 
to question»314 them during their passport control. As George sees it, the inspector’s questioning 
is an offense since their whiteness – and this is what George is implying – clearly marks them 
as English and superior in contrast to the inspector, whose blackness would mark him, instead, 
as the inferior Other. Later on, in a restaurant full of «countless tables of the laughing rich» and 
«hordes of servile waiters» (as Brian defines it), George asks him again to explain the question 
about «garridges and niggers», because 
everyone here says garaaj and when I was talking about our Colony and how we 
dealt with the locals, I did let nigger slip out once or twice but no one seemed to 
notice. In fact, I’m sure Drogo said it too. It’s very complicated, isn’t it?315 
 
It is not a contradiction that Brian’s indications are immediately challenged. The people 
George gets in touch with are not from Brian’s environment. They are, as the author hints, from 
an upper-class, Conservative background, with a vision of England strongly rooted in the 
imperial past and therefore embedded in the racial hierarchy related to that period. 
Consequently, Englishness comes to be depicted as an upper-class attribute impossible to 
acquire for the other social classes, as shown by the fact that Brian immediately loses his ‘value’ 
when the colonists get that he is, if he wins the contest, no more than ‘new money’.  
Being surrounded by luxury things, with people that mirror her preconceived idea of the 
English, completely changes George’s state of mind. As she tells Brian,  
when we were driving along on that autobahn thing, and then through all those 
wretched places, what were they called? Southhall and Ealing and Acton and 
Shepherd’s Bush. Well, I must admit I felt a bit funny. You know, as if England 
wasn’t at all like the books after all. Actually, I know it sounds funny, but I got rather 
depressed. But then it got better, I started to recognise things from the pictures, 
Marble Arch and Buckingham Palace and things like that […] And now we’re here 
and, well, everything is like in the books after all, isn’t it? I mean, as far as I can see, 
things are pretty much the same.316 
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A sign of modernity, driving along the M25 is again associated with a depressing 
experience, as it is watching from the car glass and seeing an England that has nothing to do 
with its glorious representation. George’s state of estrangement echoes the estrangement of the 
ordinary English people, forced to put up with a reality they do not comprehend and that 
struggle to recognise as their own. George’s bewilderment disappears only when familiar 
symbols, images and manners come into view and the surroundings, both in terms of the 
physical places and the social environment, start meeting her expectations.  
What makes George feels better is, paradoxically, what makes Brian question England 
and the meaning of being English again. If ‘things are pretty much the same’ means that words 
like ‘nigger’ are considered acceptable and that an insurmountable gap of wealth, perception 
and representation persists between the upper-class and the other classes, the ‘real people’ and 
those who ‘do not count’, England is clearly not a home to return to, but a nightmare to escape 
from: 
[w]here to? To a normal bloody country, that was where. To anywhere he could get 
by in the language, and that meant pretty well anywhere in Europe, to any place 
where people judged you by what you said, not by the accent you said it in. Yes, 
true, it would mean he would be foreign for ever, but no more foreign than he was 
here, in his supposed homeland. [...] His son would grow up able to speak English, 
of course, like every educated person in Europe, but he would grow up to be, to be 
thinking in, French, Spanish, Italian, German, Dutch. Anything but English.317 
 
I think, therefore I am. Or, rephrasing the colonists’ way of telling it, if you think the 
thing, you are the thing. Thinking in a different language than English would prevent Brian’s 
son Tommy from making his father’s mistake, that is to say worrying so much about how to be 
English that he had forgotten to simply be. As he had confessed in the video-message to his son 
that was never sent,  
[i]t’s England that’s wrong with me, Tommy. England. When I was a boy, Mum, 
your gran, I bet she won’t admit it now but she used to say: England will never be 
free until there are oak trees growing in the ruins of Buckingham Palace. Ask her. I 
dunno. Maybe when you get this everything will be different. Oh shit, Christ, sorry, 
sorry, just couldn’t breathe then for a sec. Tommy, Tommy, little Tommy, maybe 
it’s just me and the stuff they still filled our heads with when we were kids, maybe 
you’ll be fine and England will just be a normal bloody country and everyone will 
forget all that balls about it mattering how you talk and us being better than everyone 
else in the world, Christ, that would be good! Maybe that’ll be your England. But I 
dunno, Tommy. Sometimes I think England is just too far gone. If I’d made it back 
I would have tried to get you away, so you wouldn’t have to have that round your 
neck. We could’ve . . . ah, ooops, oh Christ, shit, sorry, ugh, hmmm, hard to get up. 
No, wait, don’t go. I’m still here, wait a sec. Ohhhh God. Yeah, look, listen, Tommy, 
if I’m going to get this to you I’d better go now, before . . . you know. Sorry again, 
and goodbye. Just don’t forget to live, that’s all. I was so busy being English I nearly 
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did. Hey, so at least I got somewhere, in the end, even if it was only here! Bye, 
Tommy. Love you.318 
 
In the video-message, Brian recognises how harmful ‘the stuff they still filled our heads’ 
is, the narrative of national identity that the English are subjected to. England needs to become 
‘a normal bloody country’ living in the present, and maybe this will be possible only, as Brian’s 
mother used to say, when ‘oak trees’ will be ‘growing in the ruins of Buckingham Palace’: 
when the English would awake and make their own revolution from below.  
A sort of revolutionary act in the wake of ‘the empire strikes back’ theme is, in the end, 
what appears to be the election won by the Headmaster against the Britain-centred New Labour 
Prime Minister, after only three weeks of campaigning based on nothing else than «common 
sense and decency»319, references to England’s former greatness (with a continuous conflation 
between England and Britain) and the importance of traditions and manners. Referring to 
common sense is, as said before, a typical strategy adopted by populist politicians, especially 
English ones given that, as Ingle stresses, 
George Gissing, one-time socialist and always a passionate supporter of the working 
class noted in the 1880s that the English were not much moved by concepts, even by 
ideals such as the ‘Rights of Man’. But ‘if you talk to them (long enough) about the 
rights of the shopman, or the ploughman … they will lend ear, and, when the facts 
of any such case have been examined, they will find a way of dealing with them. 
This characteristic of theirs they call common sense’ (Gissing, 1903:130).320 
 
Not by chance, ‘common sense’ and the reference to ‘ordinary people’, their lives and 
worries can be found in many real politicians’ speeches, and especially those of Enoch Powell. 
According to Berberich, the Headmaster’s campaign is also «an ironic repetition of Thatcherite 
ideology»:  
in an interview with the Daily Mail in 1988, Margaret Thatcher had railed against 
the ‘permissiveness, selfish and uncaring’ that had ‘proliferated under the guise of 
new sexual freedom [in the 1960s and 1970s]’ when ‘aggressive verbal hostility, 
presented as a refreshing lack of subservience, replaced courtesy and good manners. 
Instant gratification became the philosophy of the young [...] [and] speculation 
replaced dogged hard work’ (quoted in Sinfield 1989:296).321  
 
Reading the Headmaster’s speech, it is indeed easy to note the similarities: 
I am afraid I must say those words. The sixties. The seventies, dear God. The drip of 
hopelessness. The creeping malaise that strips the heart. The despair of betterment. 
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The waking up each day to find that those in power have allowed yet another value 
to go lost, yet another idiocy to be embraced, yet another corruption to go 
unpunished, yet another, and yet another, and yet another question to be fudged. And 
now, here we are, it is the third millennium, and still it goes on, and on.322  
 
Apart from the references to the 60s and 70s as years in which decency and manners 
have been forgotten, the Headmaster’s speech is very contemporary and it is possible to find 
similarities also with the Brexit discourse: the ‘drip of hopelessness’ corresponds to the ‘people 
having enough’ narrative and both derives from an unsettling present and a scary perception of 
the days to be; the ‘creeping malaise that strips the heart’ is the nostalgia for the days gone; the 
‘despair of betterment’ is the desperate and vain attempt to improve one’s own situation in a 
society in which social mobility seems an impossible goal; the ‘unpunished corruption’ of those 
in power is the populist theme of the people versus the elite and the ‘question to be fudged’ is 
the question of identity, and especially the English one. 
According to the Headmaster, 
[w]e were indeed the lucky ones, because we were allowed to keep our belief. Our 
belief in honesty and decency. Our belief in ourselves. Our belief in England. And 
we have kept it. And we keep it still. And we know that in your hearts of hearts, you 
[…] share that belief. Come with us. Believe, with us. And with God’s help, together, 
for England’s sake, let us sort things out.323 
 
With the simple slogan ‘let us sort things out’, the Headmaster focuses his campaign on 
what England is longing for even today: hope. In his opinion, the colonists have been, 
ultimately, the lucky ones because, untouched by the events and changes of the last decades, 
they have managed to keep their faith in the nation. Asking people to believe in England, in its 
greatness and chance of being recovered in its glory, is an appeal to their affective support, 
which leverages the power of the cultural imaginary and the sense of greatness that is still 
attached to the nation.  
In a rainy day very similar to the one of the Brexit referendum, «[e]ighty-three per cent 
of all eligible voters over the age of forty turned out […] in every English county south of 
Chester»324 and voted for the Headmaster for no identifiable economic or political reason: 
[p]erhaps it was the fact that the Chancellor’s ongoing downturn in the property 
market was still going on down; perhaps it was because the Headmaster was the first 
Prime Ministerial candidate since Churchill who could be photographed addressing 
Guardsmen in some foreign hotspot, from the turret of a tank, without appearing 
ridiculous; or perhaps England was simply bored and fed up and ready for change, 
as it had been in 1945 and 1979 and 1997.325 
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The age of the voters is quite important, considering that also in the Brexit referendum 
age has been a factor in voting Leave. Being around forty means being in a phase of life in 
which one is likely to re-consider their choices, possibilities and expectations. These people are 
those more inclined to be ‘bored and fed up’ not only with the government, but also with their 
lives, and to be looking for a change. Thus, the Headmaster is the first candidate in years that 
does not seem, like the others, to say «whatever they think people want them to think»326 but to 
be really listening to people’s actual fears and needs, as he acknowledges himself: «I keep 
finding it quite extraordinary, the way people react to us. It’s as if no one’s actually been 
listening to what people want for years, in England»327 Furthermore, the Headmaster is also 
described as a candidate that mirrors that idea of English leader personified by Winston 
Churchill: a leader of the people, for the people and with the people. Whatever the reason, the 
English thought they had finally found their true representative: an Englishman who has not 
lost faith in the nation and fully belongs not only to the real England as it exists in the 
disappointing present, but to the England depicted in the national narrative. 
A true representative, or better spokesman, for England is what the title itself was hinting 
at and looking for from the beginning. ‘Speak for England’, as Berberich affirms, is an « implied 
question – ‘who is there to speak up for England at a time of dissolution and devolution?’»328. 
Firstly, the implied question in the title aims at reminding another one, which resonated in the 
House of Commons in 1939, certainly a similar time of political dissolution and anxiety. Thus, 
Conservative politician Leo Amery shouted exactly the words ‘Speak for England!’ to Labour 
MP Arthur Greenwood when he announced, in the absence of Labour Party leader Clement 
Attlee, that he was going to speak for Labour. The event famously occurred when the then 
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain addressed the House but did not declare war on Germany, 
although Hitler had just invaded Poland. Consequently, Amery’s remark directly implied the 
accusation that Chamberlain was not speaking for the country (England was here used as a 
synecdoche for Britain) and avoiding reacting to Nazism. The words ‘Speak for England’ 
resonated again during devolution and especially after the Scottish Independence referendum, 
when many commentators thought it was time, now, to let England speak, meaning to finally 
give the English the chance to make a decision about their future in the British Union. Actually, 
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David Cameron himself stressed this parallel saying, after the Scottish results were released, 
that England’s voice was still to be heard:  
I have long believed that a crucial part missing from this national discussion is 
England. We have heard the voice of Scotland - and now the millions of voices of 
England must also be heard. The question of English votes for English laws - the so-
called West Lothian question - requires a decisive answer.329 
 
As is now known, that never happened. No referendum was approved regarding the 
matter and all the tension about the English question, political analyses show, passed on to the 
EU referendum, when, unsurprisingly, the question of ‘who will speak for England’ (again, 
England as a synecdoche) has reappeared, as is widely known, on one of the front pages of the 
Daily Mail. Although the Daily Mail asserted that the title was not designed to suggest any 
parallels between the Nazis and the EU, the hint is undeniable. The Mail invoked the 
comparison in order to highlight the correlation between 1939 and the present day, regarding 
both as two equal moments in history when the country has found itself at a «crossroad» and 
the people had to make up their minds about «what sort of country they want to live in and 
bequeath to those who come after […]»330.  
The question of ‘who will speak for England’ and the act of j’accuse it represents versus 
a political class trying to contrast and hide the rise of English nationalism under the carpet is 
unsurprisingly central in the novel. Thus, among the many interesting characters and sub-plots 
composing it, we also find 
the three most powerful men in Britain, all of whom had spent their entire adult lives 
zealously plotting and planning and climbing various more or less greasy poles in 
order to be here now, were turning their vast experience to the vexed question of 
Monetary Union.331 
 
 Referring to the Monetary Union, the novel immediately takes us to a certain time, 
making it easy to recognise the political entourage it takes inspiration from: talks about the 
Monetary Union are to be found in the years when Labour was governing the country with Tony 
Blair as Prime Minister and Gordon Brown in the role of Chancellor of the Exchequer (1997-
2007). In that time, Blair fervently believed Britain should have entered the Monetary Union 
and that it was against the country’s interests, and therefore a betrayal, not to do so. 
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Consequently, he commissioned five economic tests on the euro by June 2003. The economic 
tests Brown eventually pursued found out that it would not have been in the UK’s interest to 
join the union, considering the different economic situations of the countries involved. 
Therefore, the referendum was never implemented. The fact that Hawes is targeting New 
Labour is clearly demonstrated by the Prime Minister character pointing out, full of doubts, that 
calling out a referendum regarding the Monetary Union seems « y’know, a Tory policy», a 
contradiction that is immediately put aside by his Best Friend («currently without Portfolio 
again»332) and his Press Secretary who had proposed the plan: «[i]t’ll dish them completely» 
affirms the first, «not that the puir wee saps need fixing ony more than they’re fixing 
themsel’s»333 continues the second with a Scottish accent, both referring to Conservatives. 
Furthermore, the Prime Minister being Tony Blair is also suggested by the song ‘Crazy’ that he 
would be trying to play on his guitar while thinking about the referendum plan, considering that 
‘crazy’ is the exact word Blair is said to have used to define the decision of standing aside from 
the economic union.334 Another reference to Tony Blair is the suggestion his Press Secretary 
gives him later about one of his speeches, to «gie it the auld People’s Princess treatment, 
boss»335, which recalls the expression Tony Blair used to refer to Diana Spencer in the speech 
he delivered after her sudden death. 
In Hawes’ fictional version of the events, despite the given reassurances, the Prime 
Minister still thinks it is «a bloody big step»336 to hold a referendum straight after Christmas, a 
referendum he is not sure about («[b]ut I mean, well, I was just thinking, would we really win 
a referendum?»337). Here Hawes seems to have really predicted the future, considering the many 
allegations regarding David Cameron’s decision to promise a referendum on the European 
Union in 2015. Many analyses have outlined that the promise was probably more a ‘sweetener’ 
for Eurosceptics among his party members and voters than a real intention, and that it was a bet 
he was sure not to place: he believed that the referendum promise would have been held back 
by the Liberal Democrats, as happened in 2010 during the time of the Conservative coalition 
government. But in 2015 there was no hung parliament and no coalition government to form: 
Conservatives won an outright majority and Cameron had no justifications to stand back. In the 
end, Hawes’ Prime Minister, like Cameron, calls out the referendum, with his two collaborators 
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stressing convincingly that they will win it, since«[t]he Scots and the Welsh and the Northern 
Irish will all vote For because they all think they’ll get enormous EU subsidies»338. 
Furthermore, they know that they 
don’t have to worry about winning in England, because whatever happens in England 
won’t matter anyway. When the results come in, we’ll break the vote down country 
by country. Three countries to one in favour. Then we point out that Lisbet is Queen 
of several nations bound together by indissoluble links of history and rhubarb and 
all that stuff. She loves that sort of thing, believe me, and she’ll say it on the telly if 
we ask her. That’ll shut the yellow press up. Can’t be seen to be going against dear 
old Lisbet. Then we simply explain that Britain as a whole clearly voted for 
Monetary Union. And you do that speech I gave you about How Can England the 
Champion of Freedom Ride Roughshod over the Democratic Wishes of Our Fellow 
British Nations?, you know the one.  
_Oh yes. I was practising it just the other day actually.339 
 
Whatever happens in England, as Hawes outlines, won’t matter anyway, which is, more 
than just a sentence, a deeply rooted certainty that was confirmed, for many English, by the 
devolution arrangements. In contrast to what happened in the 2016 referendum, where English 
votes were fundamental to the Brexit victory, the Best Friend and the Press Secretary have come 
up with a good plan to bypass the English obstacle: ‘break the vote down country by country’, 
being sure that, contrary to the English, the Scots, the Welsh and the Northern Irish will 
certainly vote in favour of the Monetary Union as «[t]hey know how well the Irish have done 
out of it and [we] will give the Nats a free hand to remind them»340. Winning the referendum is 
essential not because the Monetary Union will benefit the UK, but because it will give «more 
power to people like us»341: power, control, wealth, is, ultimately, the real interest of the elite, 
already opposed, as would happen roughly ten years later, to the people. Thus, the Best Friend 
and the Press Secretary do not believe that huge EU subsidies will be coming in after a yes-
vote, considering that  
[t]he Irish only got so much because of the Germans and the French liking them. The 
Germans like the Irish because they’re the only country that doesn’t go around 
dropping hints about invasions whenever the Germans get fed up with paying for 
everything and the French like the Irish because they think liking the Irish will annoy 
us. No, no, the French want all the subsidies to go to Poland and those places now, 
to make sure they toe the line. the Welsh and Scots won’t get a thing. but they don’t 
realise it, of course.342  
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Nonetheless, they will feed this belief and exploit any information (‘give the Nats a free 
hand’) and any useful narratives or feelings in their favour to get people’s affective support 
towards the referendum. The Prime Minister’s collaborators have no doubt that people will 
accept the results if they remind them that the UK is formed by ‘several nations bound together’, 
and are ready to manipulate even the Queen, who, as the personification of the Monarchy, is a 
living symbol of that conjoining. This strategy aims at silencing both the ‘yellow press’ and 
England, which they will describe as ‘the Champion of Freedom’ to prevent the English from 
rising up against the ‘democratic’ approach chosen for counting the votes. This definition 
cunningly recalls the British Empire and exploits its very national narrative based on the 
concept of a necessary civilising mission and the myth of the white man’s burden. 
Consequently, when the referendum results are finally out and the Prime Minister comments 
that the majority of England is, undoubtedly, against the Monetary Union, the Press Secretary 
immediately answers «[a]ye aye, aye, but what about in Britain, boss? Heh heh!»343, reminding 
him that the trick, from the Union of the Two Crowns onwards, is «plug British British British» 
and «just dinnae mention England», since «British British British, that’s our buzzword, 
remember»344. In other words, Hawes’ characters are playing with the same mechanisms that 
have kept the English at bay from the beginning of the British Union and that are at the very 
basis of the constitution of the United Kingdom and the construction of Britishness. 
Furthermore, the fact that the reminder not to mention England comes, as Berberich notes, «in 
a broad Scottish accent is rather telling for the position of England in the British union overall, 
and reflects Gardiner’s argument that, historically, Scotland, and specifically its elite, has been 
important for creating a British identity»345. 
In the passages quoted previously the author also depicts British widespread 
Euroscepticism, strengthened by a vision of the Continent still embedded in war and post-war 
time: the French are ‘the frogs’ always conspiring against Britain, the Germans are forever 
marked by the stigma of the Second World War, and Eastern Europe (Poland and ‘those places’) 
are represented as Said’s Orientalised East or faraway colonies «scared shiteless by the 
Russkis» and not trusting «the Jerries»346 either. However, as outlined before, Euroscepticism 
is an English more than British characteristic and that explains why it is England’s viewpoint 
that most worries the Prime Minister: the English are the ones more opposed to the European 
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Union, the ones that identify Europe as the Other in opposition, and the ones most worried 
about losing national sovereignty, since the English Parliament is, for them, a marker of 
nationality in itself.   
The national glorification of war and the persistence of warlike thinking even in 
peacetime is also demonstrated by the USA’s constant presence in the talks of the three 
‘powerful’ politicians and by its influence in their decisions. One of the things the Prime 
Minister is deeply worried about is if his Best Friend is «absolutely sure the Americans are for 
it»347and if «the Americans will let us keep Trident», an operational system of submarines 
armed with American missiles which, according to the Prime Minister, is necessary as a 
deterrent and also something that still makes the country «the Top of the Table in Europe»348. 
But the Best Friend clears it too: «[t]hey know we’ll always be their best friends, […] [t]hey 
want us running Europe for them»349. This statement obviously recalls the friendship between 
Clinton and Blair, and then Bush and Blair, as well as the one between Donald Reagan and 
Margaret Thatcher, and, first and foremost, it refers to Winston Churchill’s idea of a ‘special 
relationship’ with the USA and his doctrine of the three circles representing the UK as a kind 
of bridge connecting the American and European continents. The references to Churchill 
continue later: the secrecy of the Prime Minister’s communications with the Trident captains 
makes him feel «a bit like Churchill, really», and the comparison, in parallel, even makes him 
consider it acceptable to ask the Americans before using Trident, since «even Churchill relied 
on the Americans, secretly, from right at the start, didn’t he?»350. As in the Brexit campaign, 
were there were plenty of references to the famous political leader, Churchill is a symbol of the 
country’s unity and strength and referring to him reinforces that vision of the country and of 
the world that he incarnates, a vision dated back to the Second World War and the imperial era. 
Unsurprisingly, considering that the Headmaster’s vision of England and the world have 
the same roots, Euroscepticism is central in his campaign as Americanism in his post-Europe 
plan for England. During the campaign, following typical populist narratives, the Headmaster 
points at alleged enemies preventing the nation from recovering its greatness: one enemy clearly 
is represented by the self-absorbed political class against which he is competing; the other is 
none other than the European Union. As the Headmaster declares, parodying, this time, Enoch 
Powell’s populist style, 
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England is indeed in danger, mortal danger, not of defeat merely, but of extinction 
itself! Our Parliament, the Mother of Freedom, soon to be merely a subordinate 
talking-shop, our forces, the finest in the world, to be instructed by a cabal of so-
called generals from Luxembourg and Belgium, our once-proud youth, whose 
grandfathers defeated the dark legions of the Nazi SS or smashed twenty times their 
own number of the Communist hordes at the Imjin River, intoxicating itself, week 
in, week out, into swinish, drugged oblivion in order to escape the grey vista of an 
aimless future.351 
 
According to the Headmaster, England is indeed in ‘mortal danger’ because the 
European Union, personified by the ‘generals from Luxembourg and Belgium’, threatens the 
‘Mother of Freedom’ itself, meaning parliamentary sovereignty. Furthermore, the subjugation 
of England to the EU authority would be even more shameful considering that the English had 
been the ones to defeat ‘the dark legions of the Nazi SS’ that now, as implied, are again 
threatening the nation: «the dream of a Continental Europe […] dominating all the world» was, 
as the Headmaster acknowledges, «[t]he dream of Philip II of Spain, of King Louis of France, 
of Napoleon Bonaparte, of Kaiser Bill, of Adolf Hitler, of Joseph Stalin», a nightmare the 
colonists had believed all along that «England was once more fighting […] with her loyal 
cousins and powerful allies, the old Commonwealth, and the United States of America»352. But 
the truth is that, instead of fighting, the English preferred to succumb and forget their duty, at 
least until now. As argued before, both arguments, loss of parliamentary sovereignty and the 
depiction of a Nazi EU, were also at the core of Brexiteers’ opposition to the European Union 
and their presence in the novel, however brief, acknowledge their deep roots in the English 
imaginary about Europe. As already stressed, the image of the European Union as a Nazi super-
state is directly connected to the ‘post-war fantasy’ of the Nazi having won the war353, a fantasy 
linked to the English narrative of decline and to the inverse economic rise of Germany from 
unification onwards. 
 After becoming Prime Minister and having formed a National Government ready to 
control any aspects of the country’s life, especially education and sexuality (with repression of 
anything else than heterosexual behaviour), one of the first moves from the Headmaster 
regarding international politics is, consequently, withdrawing from the European Union, which 
leads to the immediate break-up of the United Kingdom. Thus, 
[i]t had been England only which had withdrawn, for when the Welsh and Scots 
Nationalists and their allies had mounted a constitutional objection to the UK’s 
withdrawal (backed, of course, by the French), the National Government in London 
had unilaterally declared Wales and Scotland to be independent, Ireland to be 
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reunited and itself henceforth to be simply the Government of England, Anguilla, 
Bermuda, the British Antarctic Territory, the British Indian Ocean Territory, the 
British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, the Falkland Islands and Dependencies 
(South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands), Gibraltar, Monserrat, Pitcairn, 
Henderson, the Ducie and Oeno Islands, St Helena and Dependencies (Ascension 
and Tristan da Cunha), and the Turks and Caicos Islands. The British 
Commonwealth had been dissolved, but most present members had already applied 
to join the new English Language Community.354  
 
The idea of a sort of ‘English Language Community’ is not far away from the hints 
regarding strengthening ties with the USA and other English-speaking countries after the Brexit 
vote as an alternative to the European Union. Another similarity with present-day reality is the 
change from the dark-red cover of the European passport to the new English ID, which 
resembles the old blue passports The Sun has agitated for during the 2016 campaign: 
The new English ID card was rather more than a mere card. It was a substantial 
affair, deliberately large, dark blue and leather-bound, in order, so Home Secretary 
Devereux had declared, to give a chap a sense of pride again when he feels it sitting 
there in his pocket. As it shall henceforth do at all times in all public places. This ID 
card was not only larger than the red EU passports, but was soon to replace them 
entirely, for England had withdrawn from the EU ten days before.355 
  
The change from a European passport to an English one is not dictated by the 
withdrawal, but by the desire to ‘give a chap a sense of pride again’, to make people feel English 
once more and proud of their national identity. Another means to instil a sense of pride and 
belonging are the Neighbourhood Foot Reserve patrols, whose members are «stout and fit 
mortgage-holders over twenty-six, as the Law required them to be» who get some advantages 
from patrolling (lower car-insurance premiums and higher values to their homes if theirs is a 
registered NFR area) but are generally unpaid if not in «respect among their fellows»356 which 
is what most of them were missing: the feeling of being part of something and doing something 
important, useful, with one’s own life.  
Interestingly, Brian does not even try to join the NFR and also forgets to apply for the 
new English ID card, so that, when the Neighbourhood Foot Reserve patrols of his mother’s 
area stopped him, they end up questioning him: 
_You don’t look like a illegal or a bomber. 
_Ha ha ha. 
_Not finking of running off to the EU, were you, sir? 
_Ha ha ha. 
_ God, no, laughed Marley overloudly. 
_Not Welsh or Scots, are you, sir? 
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_No, God. 
_It’s just, some Taffs and Jocks want to hang on to their old UK EU passports. Dunno 
why. Fink they can appeal to the European Court of Human Rights or somefink. 
_Ha ha ha. 
_No, no, said Marley, _ I just, you know, haven’t, got round to swapping it yet. I’m 
English. Completely English. I’ve been meaning to get an ID card, I’ll do it 
tomorrow.357 
 
Ironically, Brian again affirms to be English, even ‘completely’ English in a situation 
where he believes himself in danger. But the fact that he still does not have his own English ID, 
a dear symbol, for the patrols, of a proud national identity, seems to declare the contrary and let 
them wonder if Brian is doing ‘his bit’ for the country, an expression that comes directly from 
one of the new National Government’s slogans. 
It is exactly ‘his bit’ that the Headmaster comes to ask Brian, offering him a job (Second 
Secretary to the Committee for the Special Relationship) and a wife (George is pregnant and 
her good name must be protected) to force him to fully become «one of us»358 and not to bleat 
about what was happening in the Colony, ready to become a tourist destination (the England, 
England of Hawes’ novel). After Brian’s decision to sign for the job – or rather, to trade his 
freedom for the Englishman’s dream – the Headmaster explains to him what the Committee for 
the Special Relationship is, which is already quite a telling name. In the Headmaster’s plan, 
now that England is leaving the EU the nation will find its proper ‘place in the world’ becoming 
part of the USA: 
We’ll be called Old England, you see. [...] We’ll be the biggest single State in the 
Union, so we’ll get at least as many Senators and what have you as New York and 
California, and then they’ll have to chuck money at us before every election, which 
is pretty well all the time, the way they run things over there. I know it sounds a bit 
iffy at first, Marley, but I mean to say, it’s not as if we ever do anything much anyway 
without checking it out with them first, as things stand, is it? […] You see, Marley, 
if you think about it, you’ll find we’ll be a damn sight freer and have a lot more clout 
as a state in America than in a United Europe. And this way, at least we’ll be dealing 
with our own sort in our own language, not with the ruddy Frogs through wop 
interpreters. In fact, I think that this whole EU business was a pretty narrow squeak, 
don’t you? 1805 and 1940 all over again, rather. So yes, we’re going the whole hog 
with the Americans now. Just as Winston always wanted it, really. The Scots and 
Welsh will be desperate to follow suit, of course, and very welcome as far as I’m 
concerned provided they toe the line. Good chaps, so long as they don’t forget who’s 
in charge when push comes to shove.359 
 
 
In the passage above, the Headmaster again compares the EU to Napoleon and Hitler’s 
plans, implying that the European Union was actually ‘chaining’ the country and reducing her 
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influence. Freedom and influence are, instead, only to be gained from a hypothetical union with 
the United States that, differently from the ‘Frogs’ and the other Europeans, are ‘our own sort’ 
and speak the same language. The Headmaster defines this union as exactly what ‘Winston 
always wanted’, referring again to Churchill’s idea of a special relationship with the Americans, 
and does not rule out the option of Scots and Welsh coming on board, ‘so long as they don’t 
forget who’s in charge’: so long as they do respect the natural superiority of the English and 
their role as rulers. The Headmaster has also already thought about all the details: the Queen 
will maintain her symbolical role; the English would get American ‘gadgets’ and « the same 
immigration and asylum laws as the Yanks, which is to say, taking none of the buggers at all as 
far as I can tell»360; and the Americans, on the other hand, will «like the notion of another thirty-
odd million white-skinned, English-speaking voters. Might help them to win America back, the 
President said»361. Immigration too was, as we know, a prominent topic in the Brexit 
referendum and, from the Windrush arrival onwards, generally a tough one to deal with, 
especially in England where whiteness is considered an essential attribute of Englishness. 
Having the same laws as the USA and no longer having to oblige the Dublin Convention would 
mean not only less economic migrants (especially European ones free to move in an England 
part of the EU), but also less refugees, and since the novel was published before the migrant 
and refugee crisis reached its peak, this reference to opposition towards asylum seekers dated 
it well before the crisis and the spread of a similar opposition in the other European countries. 
Also of relevance to the present is the slogan which the American President would have used 
with the Headmaster, ‘win America back’, which implies the question ‘back from whom?’ and 
already conveys the growing hostility towards immigrants and ethnic minorities that Donald 
Trump has capitalised on more than ten years later. 
According to the Headmaster, it will be like «the good old days», meaning «the whole 
tribe pulling together again»362, and it will not be difficult to convince people: in the end, 
democratic politics is just treating people «the way we used to treat the locals in the Empire: 
nothing too complicated, put on a bit of a show, never let them see you blink»363 and if it does 
not work, let just do like this «Thatcher woman»364 and declare a war to distract the attention.  
The colonists’ rule is finally revealed for what it really is: a big show, a pretence of ‘listening’ 
and ‘caring’ about the ‘poor buggers’ or, using a more contemporary terminology, ‘the ordinary 
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people’, only to carry on their own purposes, exactly as they did in the Colony with the natives. 
There is no much difference, ultimately, between the Labour Prime Minister and the 
Headmaster taking his place, apart from the ‘version’ of national identity they decide to ‘brand’:  
the one borrowing from Blair’s Cool Britannia, the other a dubious retrenching to a 
Powellite and Thatcherite mindset - are shown to be deeply flawed. One prioritises 
a marketable Britain at the expense of England; the other one sees nothing but a 
white, upper-middle-class Englishness rooted in the past. Both run the risk of turning 
the country into a theme park, designed around mythical markers of national identity 
geared towards tourists365 
 
Thus, from the Colony to the mother country, the colonists’ ultimate purpose is now not 
surviving but transforming ‘real England’ into something more in line with its traditional 
representation: an exclusive Anglo-Saxon nation based on an idea of Englishness where 
whiteness, heterosexuality and an upper-class status are the desired characteristics. As Brian’s 
mother tells his son, trying to make him open his own eyes, the Headmaster is 
 just another bloody-minded old upper-class bugger with a heart as black as 
Newgate’s knocker. I’ve always said that what this country needs is a proper 
bourgeois revolution at last. Karl Marx was right about that, though of course he was 
quite wrong about everything else.366 
 
While the Headmaster depicts his government as an expression of popular will, Brian’s 
mother outlines, in contrast, that he is only ‘another bloody-minded old upper-class bugger’ 
pretending to be part of ‘the people’ and to be endorsing their vision of what England should 
be, but actually manipulating while carrying out his own plan for the country. Brian’s mother 
is here acknowledging that «the ideological content of the nation is always part of a contested 
process, reflecting the different class interest of those who identify with it»367, and consequently 
that the ‘bourgeois revolution’  that she thinks could really ‘save’ the country is clearly not this 
‘upper-class’ pastiche. In a similar fashion to the Headmaster, Nigel Farage, Boris Johnson, 
Michael Gove and many other Brexiteers whose «backgrounds and the policies  […] place them 
clearly within the establishment»368 have described the Brexit vote as «proof of a populist will 
cast by the unfairly excluded and forgotten»369, referring to those ‘poor buggers’ who they 
especially identify with the ‘white working class’. But, as the Ashcroft polls (2016) referenced 
by Shilliam show, while it is true that 41 per cent of the Leave vote came from C2DE voters 
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(working class), 59 per cent of it was cast by ABC1, voters from the same economic class as 
Farage and Johnson themselves, who certainly are not ordinary people. What C2DE and ABC1 
voters have in common are not, clearly, economic or political interests, but the appeal the image 
of the country at the core of both the Headmaster’s and the Brexiteers’ campaigns has on them.  
 It is indeed the very possibility of coming back to the image of a great, homogenous 
England to be proud of and to belong to, along with the reference to old values that, in the end, 
‘buy’ the people, convincing them to believe in the Headmaster’s project: the same nostalgic 
dream that has guided the Brexit vote. As Brian affirms at the end of the novel, there is nothing 
as powerful as the past,   
because the past is all we know, the future is always obscured by cloud, we hack our 
way through it towards nowhere we know, and whenever we tire of the endless 
exploration, as well we might, whenever life seems absurdly short and the horizon 
no closer than when we set out all those years ago, it is the past that is always lying 
in wait for us, tempting us with the infallible promise of the trusted, the explored, 
the warm and the safe, the only real home we shall ever have. Waiting to tuck us up 
tight.370 
 
Hawes’s ending offers no answer to the question of identity except for this: when we 
look for identity in the past and let it win, what we obtain is a familiar image that is, ultimately, 
pretty much of the same thing we had before. An image that, lying in the past and generated 
from the events of the past, has nothing in common with present realities and, instead of offering 
solutions, ends up being another unsettling element. Thus, being always a ‘selective’ image 
with a defined political agenda, it can never represent the nation as a whole. In the Brexit case 
as in Hawes’ novel, escaping in the past and trying to restore it in present day following the 
‘snapshot’ selected according to one’s own political agenda and ‘taste’ ultimately triggers a 
return to tribalism, strengthening both racial and social hierarchies linked to the selected past 
and drawing even more deeply the line between ‘our tribe’ and ‘your tribe’, ‘our lot’ and ‘your 
lot’, ‘us’ and ‘them’.  
 
From Nostalgic Dreams to Paranoid Nightmares: The White Family under Siege 
Like the Headmaster’s appeal, that of the Brexiteers’ is «entirely emotive» and especially rooted 
in the «hymns of nostalgia peddled by the nationalist right». The «imperially nostalgic 
nationalism»371 at the core of Hawes’ text and the Brexit narrative would be the only element 
underpinning the choices of C2DE and ABC1 voters, and it is important to notice that «[t]he 
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principal ingredient in this structure of feeling is race»372. This has already been hinted in Speak 
for England, in which the mark of inferiority, assigned both to the natives in Papua New Guinea 
and to the black inspector in the mother country, comes directly from the racial hierarchy 
embedded in the imperial narrative of identity.  
According to Mondal, affirming that race is at the centre of the nostalgic dream shaped 
by the Brexiteers does not imply that Leave voters were all, necessarily, racists; rather, that 
«racialized imaginaries»373 linked to the imperial era have played a central role in the Brexit 
campaign, influencing (consciously or not) people’s vote. The strategies to recall these 
‘racialised imaginaries’ during the campaign were multiple. One was the release of the 
‘Breaking Point’ poster by Farage’s party, which reproduces, not by chance, a photograph 
representing African and Middle Eastern refugees. The poster aimed at emphasizing the race-
factor, both to trigger traditional fears regarding a possible invasion and to reinforce fantasies 
about a colonisation already under way. Another strategy was the rhetoric adopted by the right-
wing press, which referred to migrants and refugees using a traditional «highly emotive 
language» in relation to the issue, «in particular metaphors of natural phenomena capable of 
causing enormous damage - flood, tidal wave, even tsunami - or terms from the semantic fields 
of military operations - invasion, army of immigrants - and great numbers - hordes, swarms and 
the like»374. In particular, the lexicon linked to war and invasion was typical of Conservative 
politician Enoch Powell’s speeches on immigration and was very present in British politics 
during the referendum. Another politician who exploited Powell’s martial register and 
emphasised the issue of immigration was none other than the Conservative Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher, who famously claimed that  
[if] we went on as we are then, by the end of the century, there would be four million 
people of the new Commonwealth or Pakistan here. Now, that is an awful lot and I 
think it means that people are really rather afraid that this country might be rather 
swamped by people with a different culture.375 
 
The word ‘swamped’ has been repeated other times in the context of immigration, for 
instance by Defence Secretary Michael Fallon in 2014 under David Cameron’s first mandate. 
In both cases, Conservative politicians advertised their opposition to immigration in order to 
win the votes of those ordinary people who felt themselves to be ‘under attack’. Unsurprisingly, 
the word has also been frequently used by the press, both in the leadup to Brexit and in the years 
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following the referendum results.  In the end, even the most famous slogan of the campaign, 
‘take back control’, exploited well-known racial imaginaries, playing with the fear that «behind 
every Pole was a Muslim and/or African waiting to invade the heartlands»376. The erroneous 
association between European and non-European migrants, found also in Hawes’ novel when 
the Headmaster talks about the benefits of being part of the USA in relation to immigration 
laws, is in both cases misleading because it implies an EU responsibility in non-European 
immigration, while the free movement of citizens only applies to Europeans, leaving UK laws 
still responsible for immigration from other countries. 
Recalling the ‘racial imaginaries’ of the imperial era is a way to implicitly refer to the 
racial hierarchy developed alongside the British Empire, and consequently to racialize, in a 
negative way, European immigrants. As Mondal highlights, «[o]ne should not be distracted by 
the fact that anti-EU immigration sentiment appears to be principally directed at obtrusively 
white migrants from eastern Europe»377 since pointing at the whiteness of European immigrants 
to dismiss accusations regarding a racialization of the issue is just a «cast-iron alibi»378. Thus, 
even though the immigrants physically representing the EU on British soil are actually ‘white’, 
their negative racialization through the imperial racial hierarchy should not be ruled out for a 
significant historical reason: the only whiteness that has always mattered in this structure of 
feeling is the Anglo-Saxon one. An example of this is the way the Irish were viewed, having 
been labelled as chimpanzees and defined as more disturbing than the Black and Asian 
Colonised precisely for their whiteness; or the racial epithets forced upon Southern European 
migrants, which are still used today; or again, when many Poles settled in the UK after WWII, 
they were perceived as being «too “Eastern”, incapable of undertaking high quality work, 
partial to “dubious” methods of earning their living, and unable to properly assimilate into 
British society», with the women coming from the Polish countryside particularly criticised for 
their «uncleanliness» and «propensity to “drift into undesirable ways of life”»379.  
It follows that whiteness alone is not enough to place immigrants on the same level of 
the racial hierarchy as the native English and that any white migrant can be racialised in either 
a positive or negative way, depending on the circumstances. In the Polish case, for instance, 
although some pundits were against their immigration –  the Royal Commission appointed to 
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address the lack of workers during post-war reconstruction, encouraged their recruitment380, 
considering them preferable to migrants coming from the Commonwealth and even 
emphasizing alleged commonalities between  the ‘European Volunteer Workers’ and the British 
population to ease their integration in British society. As Shilliam points out, their «deserving 
nature was adjudicated according to the degree that they were racialized as compatible or 
incompatible with the English genus –  in terms of their characteristics and genes»381 –  and, it 
could be argued, that they were also considered a lesser evil: after all, a bunch of white Poles 
was better than an army of black migrants, and it is, in the end, this comparison that contributed 
to their positive racialisation. But when the line to stress is between white Anglo-Saxon and 
other shades of white, the racialisation is easily turned to negative to re-establish, on the basis 
of the racial hierarchy, who is deserving of housing accommodation, benefits, bursaries –  due 
to belonging to the designated group –  and who is not because ‘racially’ different.  
This kind of discourse, originally the basis for the far right’s opposition to the recent 
influx of Eastern European migrants382, has been easily appropriated by the Brexiteers, who 
have presented Brexit as a way to re-establish the distinction between the deserving Anglo-
Saxon and the undeserving Other (black or white). Along with the skin colour, religion has also 
been exploited for the negative racialization of immigrants, given that the Poles, the major 
Eastern European minority in the UK, are generally Catholic; that the migrants and refugees 
from Africa and Middle East are usually Muslims; and that «other “white” (racially speaking) 
peoples at the margins of Europe, most notably the Turks, immediately invoke a repository of 
anti-Muslim antipathies»383. The Leave campaign has cunningly exploited this repository, 
insinuating more than once that 
the EU would soon be “swamped” by nearly 80 million Muslims when (not if) 
Turkey joined, thereby bringing into play a cluster of associations surrounding 
“terrorism”, violence, fanaticism, barbarism and so on that all play their part in the 
kind of othering on which racialized imaginaries feed and thrive (Erlanger, 2016).384 
 
Given the roots of this narrative in the imperial racial hierarchy, it is quite obvious that 
the ‘kind of othering’ the Brexiteers have applied to negatively connote European migrants has 
been taken directly from the representation of the colonial Other, and especially from its 
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representation in post-war immigration debates, where, as the European migrant, the Colonised 
is to be found in the mother country and depicted as an alien and unsettling presence invading 
– following a kind of revenge plot – the nation.  
A consequence of the imperial enterprise, immigration from the colonies and ex-
colonies of the British Empire during the post-war decades saw great numbers of non-white 
people landing (and settling) in Britain, many of whom had even fought for the mother country 
during the Second World War. In the beginning, this immigration was even made easier by 
British authorities through the passing of the 1948 British Nationality Act, which granted British 
citizenship to any citizen of the Commonwealth. But after the arrival of many immigrants of 
Asian and African descent, which contrasted with the existing post-imperial image of a racial 
community of Britons – built around a shared whiteness and featuring white Australians, 
Canadians and New Zealanders385 –  their presence in the mother country became immediately 
problematic as it clashed with the white image of the national community. On paper, at least, 
there should have been no formal difference between those colonials and the aforementioned 
white immigrants. All should have been welcomed and assimilated. This, however, did not 
correspond with their reality. In the same way, immigration from Eastern Europe was not 
initially obstructed – as demonstrated by the fact that the UK was one of the few countries 
which did not put a limit on the number of immigrants from the area – and only after the 
numbers of those arriving started vastly exceeding their expectations did fears of invasion and 
colonization become an issue. Fears of invasion, racial contamination and racial degeneration 
have their roots precisely in the post-war period and in the immigration of the colonised. Thus, 
already in 1947, Eva Hubback suggested the possibility that the white indigenous population 
would have soon been outnumbered and substituted by the newcomers. Hostility and panic even 
led to the institution of a Royal Commission on Population to deal with the matter.386 It is in 
this light that we should consider the subsequent 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act, which 
permitted entry into the UK only to Commonwealth citizens to whom the British government 
had issued an employment voucher. In the end, to re-establish the racial hierarchy of the 
colonies and integrate a deserving/undeserving distinction that could grant more privileges to 
the Anglo-Saxon group, «an informal colour bar that ran the length of society, and especially 
through work and welfare» was adopted. This informal colour bar enabled the «“white working 
 
385For further analysis on the matter, see Ward S., op. cit., and Webster, W., op. cit. 
386Cfr. Robbins, K., Great Britain. Identities, Institutions and the Idea of Britishness, London & New York, 
Longman, 1998  
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class” to gain traction as a constituency»387 and allowed discriminations according to race to 
flourish. As Shilliam stresses, 
[t]hose who contributed to this re-racialization of the deserving/undeserving 
distinction included Conservative and Labour politicians as well as trade unions. 
Their policies and rhetoric moulded the “white working class” into a viable 
constituency. This constituency defined itself […] in the opposition between 
deserving whites and undeserving Black and Asian Commonwealth immigrants.388 
 
Workers who were racialised as ‘white’ were, therefore, more likely to get well-paid 
and secure jobs, while Black and Asian workers were destined to work low-wage and more 
precarious ones.  As Paul Thomas observes, the daily reality for these immigrants in UK  
was racial discrimination and prejudice, with outbursts of violence such as the 1958 
Notting Hill and Nottingham riots (Solomos, 2003). In the face of rising racial 
tension, the 1964-70 Labour government accepted that assimilation had not worked 
and ushered in the policy of ‘multiculturalism’ whereby ethnic diversity was 
tolerated and a partial anti-discrimination legal framework provided. Whilst 
representing progress, much of the popular discourse continued to see ethnic 
minorities as ‘alien’, ‘others’, with media and police racism making it difficult to be 
black and British (Gilroy, 2002).389 
 
The racial tension was and is particularly acute in England, considering that this is where 
the majority of migrants settled As Perryman reminds, the significant ethnic diversity that 
characterises England’s larger cities, with white English as the largest ethnic group, means that 
«[t]o a much greater extent than arguments over Scottish, Welsh or Northern Irish identity 
debates about Englishness are dominated by the question of race»390. As race is crucial to the 
to the question of English identity, it should not come as a surprise that ethnic minorities in 
England, as many analyses show, find it more difficult to identify with an English identity than, 
for instance, ethnic minorities in Scotland find it to engage with a Scottish identity. For 
migrants, Englishness represents a white identity from which, because of their skin colour, they 
are inevitably excluded. This perception derives directly from the ‘indigenous’ idea of 
Englishness: a white collective identity developed in opposition to the multiracial character 
Britishness has acquired with the enlargement of the Commonwealth and the spread of  
multiculturalism.  According to Shilliam, after British entry in the EEC and the Commonwealth 
starting to be composed by white and non-white members, the nation  
was […] defined by the prospect of either European incorporation and/or affiliation 
with an independent and multi-coloured Commonwealth. A poll taken in September 
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1961 provides a sample of popular opinion in this quandary. When asked which 
international association was the most important, a significant majority (48%) 
identified the Commonwealth, while 19 per cent cleaved to the United States and 
only 18 per cent to Europe (May 2001: 90). But support for the Commonwealth was 
qualified by the racialized distinction made between the “old” members - white, 
Anglo-Saxon settler-colonies - and “new” members - previously non-white colonies 
and dependencies (Webster 2010:174). In the same year, another national poll 
indicated that 73 per cent of the public supported population controls for, 
specifically, “coloured colonial immigrants” (Small & Solomos 93race 2006: 243). 
So much was the expansion of Commonwealth membership an issue that by this 
point in time Englishness was steadily being defined in opposition to the 
Commonwealth per se (Webster 2010: 152).391 
 
The polls quoted by Shilliam show the impact of race on perceptions of and attachment 
to the Commonwealth, whose new composition – which included many non-white members – 
made problematic the conception of the organisation as an enlarged Anglo-Saxon family. 
Moreover, they support Christine Berberich’s definition of Englishness as a recent concept 
developed in light of the end of empire, «devised and constructed in an attempt to demarcate 
the boundaries between England and all “others”»392. This is the reason why Andrew Mycock 
talks about a ‘postcolonial’ Englishness, acknowledging «the centrality of ethnic and racial 
ideologies in shaping historical and contemporary formations of English culture and identity»393 
and the impact of decolonization. 
Fundamental in the construction of this postcolonial identity in opposition to the 
colonial Other has been the racist rhetoric that flourished from the 50s onwards in the bosom 
of the Conservative party. One of the most famous representatives of this kind of rhetoric is, as 
stressed before, Enoch Powell, who was one of the first to refer to the ‘ordinary man’ and to 
convey fears of invasion and subjugation at the hands of the Colonised. In his famous 1968 
Birmingham Speech, written against the second anti-discriminatory Race Relations Act and re-
named by the press the Rivers of Blood speech, Powell referred to conversations with and letters 
from his constituents, people he describes as ordinary fellow Englishmen, disappointed, scared 
and outnumbered in their own neighbourhoods. According to Powell, the never-ending arrival 
of migrants was responsible for «[t]he discrimination and the deprivation, the sense of alarm 
and of resentment» felt by those ordinary English people whose perception of being a 
«persecuted minority» and «strangers in their own country»394 was, in Powell’s opinion, rightly 
growing as jobs, hospital beds, housing and benefits were constantly going to the immigrants 
 
391Shilliam, R., Race and the Undeserving Poor cit., pp.93-94  
392Berberich, C., «Bursting the Bubble» cit., p.162  
393Mycock, A., «Understanding the Post British English Nation State», in Gardiner, M., Westall, c. (eds.), op. cit., 
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394Powell, E., Rivers of Blood, The Telegraph, 6 November 2007, 
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over the native population. Mycock defines this English sense of victimhood a kind of 
‘postcolonial revisionism’, with members of the previous imperial core considering themselves 
victims of the colonised. Powell’s anger, more than towards the alleged ‘invader’, was directed 
towards the political elite of his time, who had let the country «[heat] up its own funeral pyre» 
allowing – in an act that could only be, in his opinion, an expression of madness – «the annual 
inflow of some 50,000 dependants»395 to happen. 
 Through his political stance, Powell gave voice to that ‘white working-class 
constituency’ ready to become one of the main characters of the Brexit vote. These were «white 
workers who wished to defend the racialized division of labour against Commonwealth 
immigration, interests that were threatened to the extent that race equalities legislation targeted 
the integrity of informal colour bars»396, deleting the distinction between deserving (Anglo-
Saxon white) and undeserving (the others) poor. This would be the perfect definition also for 
those white workers that, almost fifty years later, saw in Brexit a chance to protect their 
interests, having been threatened by the EU pillar of the free movement of people and the 
consequent competitive force represented by European migration. A Brexit vote to reject the 
EU and, most importantly, to reinforce the racial hierarchy in their favour would assuage all of 
their concerns. Rupa Huq has indeed linked this contemporary English sense of victimhood to 
Powellism, especially to Powell’s idea that «the working classes have been betrayed, forced 
against their will and without consultation to live in an alien and dangerous multi-racial 
environment»397. Unsurprisingly, looking at 1969 and 1970 surveys, Shilliam has noticed that 
«those respondents who most strongly perceived their socio-economic position to have declined 
since their childhood»398 and those with lower educational degrees were the ones most likely 
to feel left behind and to vote for Powell – the same characteristics that Ford and Goodwin’s 
research highlighted in relation to the ‘left behind’ thesis in Brexit. In both cases, the ‘left 
behind’ are white because it is the loss of the benefits that (Anglo-Saxon) whiteness granted 
that made them feel this way and, subsequently, vote for a restoration of the racial hierarchy. It 
follows that the rhetoric of the ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech would have perfectly fit in the Brexit 
campaign, considering that the issues raised by Powell were the same with only one difference: 
the whiteness of the present immigrants. Ultimately, the identification of the enemy in the figure 
of the migrant and the division of the working class between white constituency and non-white 
working-class members ended up damaging the very white workers Powell wanted to protect, 
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preventing the class from achieving a common stance against the real enemy: neoliberalism in 
the form of deregulation of labour as the very factor making migrants a competitive force 
against indigenous workers. 
According to Shilliam, the making, breaking and eventual re-making of the white 
working class as a constituency is – even if other factors have been involved – definitely an 
elite affair, meaning that this selected group was sketched out, drawn up, put aside, and again 
claimed ‘deserving’ by the then current political elite in order to be exploited for a precise 
political agenda. It is not by chance that the «re-entry of “class” into the political grammar of 
mainstream media and debate» is to be found in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, when 
polls suggested a diffuse sense of unfairness and victimhood «among the white members of the 
working class in contrast to positive discriminations purportedly enjoyed by Britain’s Black 
and minority ethnic populations»399, and especially following the 2011 uprising, in which the 
percentage of white people involved is quite telling. Not by chance, it is from then onwards that 
many politicians, from both sides, started referring more often to the ‘white working-class’, 
presented as a «forgotten indigenous constituency»400. The victims of deindustrialisation, 
immigration and social inequality, these people viewed themselves as being ‘left behind' as they 
felt that the government had abandoned their concerns in order to focus on the needs of ethnic 
minorities and women. Connected to this, O’ Toole has affirmed that Brexit «came to the boil 
in the midst of a wider turmoil of far-right nationalism» which had as crucial ingredient «the 
transference of victimhood» describing the phenomenon, ironically, as a sort of «white man’s 
#MeToo movement. Not only am I not guilty, but I am in fact a victim»401. 
In the end, the most successful party in conveying English sense of victimhood has been 
UKIP, which is «not a worker’s party, but for those who looked backwards it was their party in 
so far as it articulated a racialized - rather than purely classed - grievance»402. Thus, Farage has 
been able, as Powell before, to weaponize the white working-class, holding immigration 
responsible for the loss of social security (resulting, in actuality, from the government’s 
neoliberal policies) and for the gradual dismantlement of the welfare system (which actually 
stemmed from the government’s austerity policies), connecting racial imaginaries and class 
interest. Following again Powell’s footprints,  
Farage confidently claimed that the Westminster elite, who were busy sacrificing 
public provisions on the altar of austerity, were also betraying the forgotten people 
of England by encouraging even more immigration. It did not so much matter that 
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these migrants were increasingly “white”. What mattered was that central and 
eastern Europeans were not white English.403  
 
Considering how the class interests of the white working class are underpinned with 
race, it seems a natural consequence that a portrayal of the typical ‘left behind’ worker, 
perceiving himself as having been ‘victimised’ for being white and English, is to be found in 
the novel The White Family (2002) by Maggie Gee, which is a work of fiction that deals 
primarily with racism and racial hierarchies in contemporary Britain. The novel takes place in 
a Britain trying to re-shape its identity after the loss of empire, the joining of the European 
Union and the shift towards neoliberalism. This ‘re-shaping’ seems particularly difficult for the 
English, nostalgic for their glorious past and hostile towards Black and Asian migrants, who do 
not fit in the ideal image of the nation and are therefore the designated scapegoats for present 
grievances. Not by chance, the work has taken inspiration from the murder of a Black British 
teenager, Stephen Lawrence404, killed by a gang of white youths with for no other reason than 
his skin colour.405 
The novel focuses on one single family, significantly called the Whites, who are 
gathered back together by the patriarch, Alfred, forced to lay in a hospital bed following a 
medical ‘event’ that is later discovered to be cancer. It is divided into four sections, which, apart 
from ‘the beginning’, represent places, ‘the shop’, ‘the park’ and ‘the church’, where – despite 
the generally segregated nature of British (English) society – encounters between black and 
white are more possible. Through multiple points of view and flashbacks, the history of the 
family is displayed: the love story between Alfred and his wife May, the abusive childhood 
experienced by their children (their sons Darren and Dirk and their daughter Shirley), their 
many misunderstandings precluding dialogue and reciprocal healing both in the family and in 
the society. 
Central in the novel is Albion Park, which is a hundred years old, with gates that are 
«magnificent nottering fairy-tale things, Victorian curlicues of iron-work»406 and a «solidly 
impressive Victorian pile, two-storey, detached, with fine large windows»407. Besides being a 
stunning and peaceful place, the park is described as the very «focal point to which all paths 
led»408. This is a reference to the park standing for England itself, given the fact that, in the 
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imperial narrative of identity, the nation is considered ‘the heart of the Empire’ to which any 
road, from any remote corner of the imperial possessions, should lead. Even its name, Albion 
Park, immediately recalls the myth of Albion and suggests the reading of the park as England.  
To protect and preserve this thing of beauty, the park and the England it represents, stands 
Alfred White, a park keeper with nearly fifty years of service. White’s name recalls the 
homonymous Anglo-Saxon King and contributes to create a «thematic link between national 
identity, the sense of belonging and landscape»409. This thematic link is reinforced by another 
homonymity, that between Alfred and Lord Alfred Tennyson, the favourite poet of Alfred’s 
wife May. According to Kiliç, the reference in the novel to Tennyson’s words such as ‘idyll’ 
and ‘ambergris’ especially recall Tennyson’s Idylls of the King and allow Gee to evoke another 
legendary king, Arthur, and to juxtapose «King Arthur’s failure to set up an ideal kingdom with 
the image of failure and recession in contemporary Britain» that is at the core of her narrative.410 
Alfred, once a soldier in Palestine, is on a mission: holding «the fort»411 now that «the ideals 
are fading» and «the cash is nearly gone»412, as Thomas, a family friend, comments thinking 
about the park and the current state of the nation. Thus, the park was built «when the money 
from the empire was used for public works»413, that is to say when the nation was flourishing, 
the British Empire was in its prime, and ‘the ideals’ (patriotism, sacrifice for the country, sense 
of community, the civilising mission, duty) were part of people’s everyday life: a creed to 
believe in. In a nation completely changed, Alfred appears to be the last recipient of these ideals 
as well as the representation of English nostalgia par excellence. Thus, he is constantly 
mourning for «[t]he good old days», when «[t]here weren’t any coloureds» and people «were 
all the same. We were all one. No one was rich. We stuck together»414. The past over which 
Alfred lingers is, clearly, the wartime (when they all stuck together) and its aftermath, before 
the end of the Empire, the arrival of many non-white immigrants, and the spread of the very 
Thatcherite idea that society (‘we were all one’) does not actually exist. Alfred depicts this 
period as a perfect one, when the people were ‘all the same’, meaning that there was no racial 
difference (and this evokes the myth of a homogenous indigenous population); when it was still 
possible to hope in a «golden future»415; when there was a sense of belonging and common 
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destiny keeping the nation together. Alfred is stuck in the past, constantly wondering what went 
wrong, how could all their expectations be disappointed by the present:  
 
Where did it go? What happened to our future, the one so many people suffered and 
died for? There was something wonderful we all meant to share, after going through 
so much together. But it just … evaporated. That was it. The free orange juice, the 
milk, the ration-books, the things we had in the nineteen fifties. The National Health 
spectacles; they were free, little round wonky ones that sat on people’s noses. Pale 
blue and pink ones for the kids. The National Health. It was for everybody. That was 
a miracle, we all thought so. Nit shampoo and aspirin when you needed them. And 
then they began to charge for prescriptions, pennies, at first, then just a few bob, and 
now they come asking for paper money, and most people just do without.416 
 
Very strong in Alfred is the feeling of societal betrayal coming from the perception that 
Britain has failed to live up to its obligations towards the people after the war.  This has led to 
a feeling of disconnection from the present that could be compared to what he feels towards his 
cancer: something «he couldn’t understand, something that happened behind his back, as if life 
went on, but he was left out»417. Thus, winning the war should have meant, more than anything, 
enjoying the fruits of victory: ‘welfare’ in its double sense, wellbeing and welfare system. As 
O’ Toole points out,   
The creation of an institution like the National Health Service was a novel kind of 
conquest, a turning of British energy inwards to face the great enemies of squalor 
and disease. It was indeed a new world that was won, and one that made more 
positive difference to British lives than the grabbing of colonies had ever done.418 
 
Therefore, the slow dismantlement of the welfare system, started by Margaret Thatcher 
is one of the factors that has deeply interfered with a positive imagining of the future. Thus,  
A welfare state is about the future - it gives young people a sense that they have one 
and older people the confidence not to fear their own. It created a positive trajectory 
- my kids’ lives will be better than mine. But when the welfare states starts to slip 
away, it becomes part of the past. It is regarded nostalgically, as an aspect of a lost 
golden age. This shift in time is one of the key reasons why there could after the end 
of the Seventies be no future in England’s dreaming. England began to be viewed in 
the rear-view mirror.419 
 
It is not by chance that one of the books Thomas, who is a librarian, has to get rid of to 
make room in the library is entitled Into the Future with Hope: The Welfare-State in Post-War 
Britain: the title hints at the present situation regarding the vision of a ‘welfare-state’ and marks 
the end of hopeful expectations about the future that had characterised the development of that 
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national project. The link between a nostalgic attitude and the faults of the welfare system was 
well evident in Brexit, where arguments (true or false) about the NHS and benefits have been 
particularly powerful in affecting people’s support. Moreover, the link between this issue 
(foreign pressure on the national welfare system) and the rise of English nationalism in its most 
xenophobic form is to be found way before Brexit, as demonstrated by the letters of Enoch 
Powell’s supporters, who mostly speak of shortages of hospital beds and public housing and 
hold immigration responsible for the inadequacies of welfare provisions.  It follows that the 
vision of the future that kept Alfred and his generation going during the war could be said to 
have slowly ‘evaporated’ in the years after: the composition of the nation has changed, with 
‘aliens’ settling in and even acquiring the same rights of the indigenous population; the welfare 
system has been gradually weakened; the rhythms of life have changed and precariousness has 
become the only norm. This is what Alfred believes that happens, comparing again the nation 
to the park, when nobody looks after the country and its moral character: «it goes back to 
jungle»420. The term ‘jungle’ is not a casual choice: it evokes the empire, and especially the 
civilising mission and the white man’s burden, narratives that legitimised the British rule 
through the mark of inferiority and barbarism assigned to the Colonised, spreading a redeeming 
vision of the country as a civilising force having the duty to ‘upgrade’ other populations and 
saving them from their own ‘darkness’. Moreover, the term also conveys Alfred’s opinion on 
what England is becoming due to the settlement of the Colonised: a colony on its own, 
transformed by the migrants in the ‘jungle’ the British Empire had tried to save them from, in 
an ironic reversal of destiny.  
Although less negative, Alfred’s wife May agrees with her husband’s nostalgic views. 
Thus, while in the hospital and scared for her husband’s conditions, May reminds herself that 
she shouldn’t be frightened of this place. It must be one of the last good places. May 
told herself, this is here for us. We fought the last war for places like this. Hospitals 
and parks and schools. Not concentration camps, like the other lot had. 
A hospital was a place to share. Where all could come in their hour of trouble. The 
light was harsh, but it shone for all. (Some of the bulbs were dead, she had noticed. 
Broken glass was replaced with hardboard.)421 
 
As with Alfred, May recalls the Second World War and defines ‘schools’, ‘parks’, 
‘hospitals’ as ‘good places’ for which they have fought, putting them in comparison with the 
dreadful alternative of the Nazi concentration camps. But the dead bulbs and the hardboard 
gives the hospital a decayed look, conveying a general sense of decline. Interestingly, the local 
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hospital was built in the same period as the library and Albion Park, which are all, using May’s 
own words, ‘places to share’, where people from different backgrounds can meet in order to 
feel part of a community. This is the reason why she is so proud of her husband being the park 
keeper, because the park is one of the last places where people can be together, a place, May 
thinks, that matters more than them, a statement that reinforces the idea of the park as a symbol 
of the nation.  
From May’s point of view, the park is the very heart of Hillesden Rise, where they live, 
and a refuge to escape to from a London that is getting «dirtier, and more frightening»422 every 
day. It is evident that London represents modern England and, in particular, its multicultural 
aspect. Describing London as ‘dirty’ is a way to immediately put the city in contrast with the 
cleanliness and tidiness of Albion Park, implying the same parallel between the present reality 
and the nation’s past. Also London’s ‘frightening’ character put the Park in opposition to the 
city: while the park is an oasis to escape reality, London is a place where the foreignness of the 
present, due to the many changes that have characterised the last decades and revolutionised 
people’s lives as well as the overwhelming presence of the Other, cannot be ignored.  
The park is situated in the urban centre of Hillesden Rise (which is, probably, a reference 
to Willesden Rise, in the London area) where, May realises, «more than half the shops were 
boarded up, or had their fronts covered with aluminium shutters, which rattled coldly in the 
winter winds». After the war, when Alfred and May moved there, Hillesden Rise was their «El 
Dorado»; now that «[i]t was over», that time seems almost a lost fairy-tale, an irretrievable 
«[o]nce upon a time»423 clashing with the reality of failure and decay. May knows that this is 
not the way it looks for everyone: just walking back up the road, she notices that there is «a 
whole new world coming into existence» with «a half-caste youth setting up small tables»424 in 
a French café like the ones they have in Paris and other shops and restaurants far away from her 
usual reality: 
There was a Sushi Bar - imagine it! - with narrow windows and queer blue light, and 
a girl peering out had half-moon eyes, but the boy she was with was very black. 
There were three Indian restaurants, side by side, which made you wonder how they 
could survive. The Star of the East, just fancy, in Hillesden! There were two shops 
advertising ‘Cheap International Phone Calls’, and another one selling those 
uncomfortable beds with wooden bases and thin flat mattresses. But lovely colours: 
bright blue, bright green, and as life and hope ran through May’s veins she thought, 
If only Alfred were here, if only Alfred was home again. We’d come for a stroll, the 
two of us. May patted the bag with his whiskies for comfort. 
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Hillesden isn’t dying. It’s coming up.425 
 
 
While the first description of Hillesden Rise parallels Alfred and May’s life conditions, 
their old age, their own economic situation, their outdated views and sense of displacement in 
this new England, the second description of the place mirrors the newcomers’ life and unveils 
the gentrification of the area. As Kiliç highlights, «[w]hile shop closures resulting from the 
recession erase the culture of the lower classes, the opening of new businesses addresses the 
middle-class occupiers’ need for luxury»426. Consequently, the process of gentrification makes 
evident social inequalities, increasing both social divisions and the sense of displacement the 
Whites, or better the Whites still entrapped in working class status, are experiencing. Thus, 
while Alfred, May and their son Dirk, who still lives with them, are definitely working class, 
Darren and Shirley, the elder ones, are now clinging to middle class status: Darren thanks to his 
profession (he is a journalist based in the USA), and Shirley thanks to the money inherited from 
her dead husband Kojo. Furthermore, one should not forget that gentrification is a form of 
colonialism on its own, which consequently strengthens the Whites’ idea of a colonization of 
the nation through the settlement of ethnic minorities (references to them are the Internet Point 
with international phone calls, the ethnic restaurants, as well as the Asian girl and the Black 
boy visible through the window of the Sushi restaurant and the ‘half-caste’ waiter of the French 
café). May’s outdated and offensive use of language – particularly her use of the phrases ‘half-
moon eyes’ and ‘half-caste youth’ – highlights the antiquated way she has of looking at the 
world around her. 
To restore order, preventing the people from going native and the country from 
completing its metamorphosis into a nightmarish colony dominated by the inferior Other, men 
like Alfred must keep a look out, «be tough»427, remain strong. According to Alfred, this is 
«how the British got their empire» and probably also the reason why they have lost it: «by going 
soft» and ending up, like the Romans when they lost their own empire, outnumbered by «great 
dark hordes pouring over the walls»428. According to Alfred, the generation of his son Darren 
and Darren’s friend Thomas embodies this ‘soft’ character: «Darren and Thomas are boys, not 
men. They’ve never had a chance to find out what matters. Never been tested. Had it too easy. 
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Nothing was easy for me and May»429. This is what his wife thinks too, as she reflects upon the 
new generation going to the post office in her neighbourhood: 
The young ones seemed to view it as a cash dispenser, going in to collect their weekly 
wage, though all they were doing to earn it was breeding – May caught herself back. 
She disapproved of envy. But she and Alfred had always worked for their money, 
and she had cleaned floors when the kids were little, taking them with her, which 
was miserable in houses where they weren’t allowed to make a noise. She didn’t 
wish hardship on other people. But she sometimes wondered how Nimit felt, handing 
out thousands of the government’s money, seeing the same faces year after year, 
when he, as he had once told her proudly, had ‘tried to take nothing from this 
country’ – he paid for the children to be born in private hospitals, sent them to 
expensive private schools. He put a lot in and took nothing out. Nimit served the 
community, didn’t he, as she once pointed out to Alfred. ‘I know you don’t like him, 
but he’s just like you. Both of you serve the community, Alfred.’430 
 
Work, sacrifice and duty are the three pillars that have characterised May’s life, which 
she puts in contrast with the present attitude (‘all they were doing to earn it was breeding’). This 
kind of discourse seems to be modelled on Enoch Powell’s rhetoric, or rather, on that part of it 
which was against the welfare system (except for the NHS that he considered, as his supporters 
did, a fundamental institution). Powell was indeed persuaded that the welfare system was 
responsible for the degeneration of the English character, given the fact that in his opinion it 
abrogates «the principle of self-help and orderly independence»431 at the basis of English moral 
fibre. Self-help and orderly independence are indeed what May and Alfred are proud of, and 
what the young ones are supposed to be missing, relying on the ‘government’s money’ to make 
ends meet. Ultimately, the elite in charge is held responsible for the current state of the nation, 
both for letting the ‘dark hordes’ in and for contributing to the degeneration of national 
character. Thus, as the Council has both cut their funding for the maintenance of Albion Park 
and limited the powers of the park keepers, in order to make them less off-putting to park 
visitors, national governments are viewed as having forgotten the old values of Conservative 
control, unwilling to enforce order «[f]or fear of upsetting the coloured people»432 and ready to 
change the way they used to portray the nation to assuage them. Obviously, Alfred’s belief in 
the imperial national narrative prevents him from engaging with any new narrative of identity 
including the ‘coloured’ people. This is fundamentally the reason why he does not like the 
postmaster Nimit even if, as May stresses multiple times, he is an immigrant who has served 
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the community and taken nothing back: in his eyes, non-white people are always an unsettling 
presence and a constant reminder of national decline.  
A first example of Alfred’s attitude towards the Other is to be found at the very 
beginning of the novel, in what Kiliç defines as a «scene of dispute over place»433. While Alfred 
is patrolling the park, he catches a black girl walking on the flowerbed. Although her mother 
tries to explain to him that the girl was just looking for her brother’s new plane, fallen just 
where the flowers are, Alfred seems not to listen, continuing to admonish her for walking on 
the flowerbed. When the father of the two children reaches them, both Alfred and Thomas,  who 
arrived while Alfred was arguing with the mother, perceive him as ‘threatening’, being tall and 
obviously (Thomas realises this is the real reason behind his ‘threatening’ feature) black.  After 
his wife tells him what happened, the black man informs Alfred, who is now looking pale, that 
«[t]his Park belongs to everyone»434. Enraged, as if touched on a sore point, Alfred replies that 
this is just his reason for rebuking them: «[s]ame rules for everyone, as well. I’m just asking 
you lot to get off the grass’»435. At his reply,  
The woman’s face changes. Is it rage, or glee? ‘“You lot”!’ she shrieks. ‘That’s 
racist, innit!’ 
A pause. The two men avoid each other’s eyes. The word lies between them like an 
unexploded bomb.436 
 
Alfred is trying to persuade the family that the dispute between him and them is just a 
matter of rules and respecting them: that it is forbidden to walk on the grass and that he, in the 
capacity of park keeper, is only asking them to abide by the rules. But this is far too simple. As 
soon as the father of the child arrives on the scene, he immediately understands that there is a 
racial component to this scolding, feeling obliged to remind Alfred that ‘the park belongs to 
everyone’, that it is a place of the community for the community, which they have every right 
to be in, with or without Alfred’s approval. Thus, the misunderstanding between Alfred and the 
family is clearly due to Alfred’s racism, as the mother acknowledges when she recognises the 
segregating shade of Alfred’s words ‘your lot’. Not by chance, talking with Thomas he stresses 
that «English people know not to go on the grass» and this, added to the insincere «I’m not 
against them, don’t get me wrong»437, only confirms the woman’s impression: his attitude 
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unveils a desire to reject both their claim to the shared ownership of the park and their implied 
claim to be part of the community and have a bond with the land.  
The same attitude is adopted by Alfred both towards the foreign birds that are included 
in the park and his daughter’s non-white partners, first her husband Kojo and then, after his 
death, her boyfriend Elroy. According to Alfred, the foreign birds are «too bright», they do not 
«look right in an English park» and – most importantly, he does not trust them: 
 [t]hey put their heads down and look at me and I think they’re going to rush me. So 
now I always use my broom. I open the door of their shelter at the back and the little 
ones fly up into the enclosure and then I get my broom and bash on the door and the 
big ones scuttle out pretty quick. You have to show them who’s boss.’ Something 
about Thomas’s face stopped him. He felt less certain. He thought about it. Why did 
he hate those big yellow birds? At first it was only because they were foreign. But 
now it was worse, somehow worse. I hate them because they’re afraid of me.438 
 
The reason why Alfred does not like and trust the birds is because of their foreignness. 
Not that the other birds in the park are English, the budgies or the pheasants certainly are not, 
but in Alfred’s opinion «[o]f course they’re British. They’ve always been here. My mum and 
dad kept budgerigars. It’s natural, having budgerigars»; while the yellow birds, never seen 
before, are clearly out of place and, as he sentences, they will «be goners»439 at the first touch 
of frost. But he is found to be mistaken: the birds are still there, as are the coloured people he 
similarly dislikes. The way he behaves, playing the tough man, showing the birds who the boss 
is, being aggressive, resembles how he behaves towards people he marks as foreigners: people 
he thinks are ‘going to rush’ him only because they are not white. When he sees Thomas’ 
reaction about his behaviour towards the birds, Alfred is forced to think upon the reason why 
he dislikes them and, apart their foreignness, he also recognises that what he hates about them 
now is the fear they show of him. But this is none other than a consequence of his own doing. 
The bird’s fear could be also a reference to the cautious behaviour characterising members of 
ethnic minorities who wish to avoid being considered as threatening and violent individuals.  
The perception of ethnic minorities as the threatening Other has already been hinted at 
in the dispute between Alfred and the family in Albion Park, but it appears again in two other 
central episodes of the novel, one concerning Thomas and the other Alfred’s wife. As noted 
previously, Thomas is a family friend. Having grown up in Hillesden Rise with the White’s 
elder son Darren, he has published a book and is currently writing another one on 
Postmodernism and the loss of meaning while working as a librarian to pay the bills. At work, 
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a black youth approaches the Inquiry Desk when he is on duty. The young man has a familiar 
face, although Thomas is aware that he could be mistaken: «there were so many black students 
in the library. He sometimes thought the readers were mostly black, until he made himself 
count, one day. Funny how your mind played tricks on you»440. The fact that Thomas thinks 
that the readers ‘are mostly black’ until he counts them already shows his prejudices: it is his 
perception of the black readers as ‘something Other’ that makes him feel surrounded, 
outnumbered. Furthermore, not being sure if he has already seen the youth because ‘there were 
so many black students’ means that he does not really look at them. The same happens to May 
in the hospital, where the majority of the nurses are black and she realises she cannot distinguish 
one from the other. Now that he is really looking at him, Thomas describes the youth as being 
«memorable», with fine features, golden-brown eyes and a steady gaze. But then he 
began to feel vaguely threatened, for W King, having reclaimed his notes, proceeded 
to eyeball Thomas closely as he read him a wish-list of titles, including two books 
by Eldridge Cleaver, and One Hundred Years of Lynchings. As the boy pronounced 
the titles, he had given a curious half-smile, half-laugh, at Thomas, and Thomas was 
aware of the boy’s height, and youth, and his long strong fingers, playing with a 
pen.441  
 
The reason why Thomas feels threatened is that he mistakes what we will later discover 
to be academic interest (and maybe homosexual attraction) for a desire to take revenge over the 
white men. His misconception immediately transforms the ‘memorable’ young man into a 
threatening black one, who could, as Thomas’ gaze on the boy’s ‘long strong fingers’ seems to 
suggest, easily strangle him. Yet, the element of threat in this scene does not come from the 
boy, but from Thomas’s imagination and his own latent prejudices.  
The second episode occurs when May, going to the post office, wonders if she has 
forgotten the three hundred pounds in cash she is supposed to be carrying. After opening the 
bag in order to make sure, the contents begin to tumble onto the ground, including the bank 
notes. In her desperate attempt to catch the falling items, May also falls. While she is scrabbling 
for her things on the pavement,  
she looked up to see an enormous black man looming out of the rain, panting, 
gasping, his golden eyes boring into hers, and she shrank back, covering the money 
with her skirt, as the pantherish face swooped down towards her.  
‘Help,’ she cried feebly […]442 
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Seeing a black man coming to her, May is convinced she is going to die and even prays 
to God to take care of her family. The man is described as ‘black’, which we know, from 
Thomas’ previous remark about the father in the park, is enough to label someone as a ‘threat’. 
He is also described as ‘enormous’, though this may be a matter of perspective (she is on the 
floor, he is standing) or she may also be influenced by fear. His ‘pantherish’ face is then also a 
reference to his exoticism and to May’s assumption that he is dangerous and predatory. Thus, 
she is already primed to expect an assault of some kind, likely resulting in the theft of her 
money. When May understands that the man is just a youth,  
Relief and shame washed over her in hot waves, and her voice rushed on. ‘Are you 
local? I’ve lived here all my life. It’s not what it was, Hillesden Rise. I don’t mean 
because of the foreigners. I’m not saying you’re a foreigner - ‘ 
‘I’m not a foreigner. Now, are you OK? He was putting her brush back into her 
handbag, and her mirror, and her shamefully hair-clotted comb. [...] 
‘What’s your name?’ she said, suddenly. [...] 
‘Winston,’ he said. His smile was self-mocking. ‘That’s not a foreigner’s name, is 
it?’ But it looked as though it embarassed him. She thought about Dirk, suddenly. 
Maybe kids never liked the names we give them.443 
 
Her first reaction is clearly caused by her own biases: the boy is revealed to have «an 
intelligent, a humorous face, not frightening at all»444and, to cover her shame, May starts 
chatting about the foreigners she knows, such as Mr Varsani at the post office, or Shirley’s 
boyfriend Elroy. But she makes a second mistake, given that the youth is not a foreigner. As a 
kind of proof, he tells May his name, Winston, stressing that this is ‘not a foreigner’s name’, 
which is a reference to the name being the same as Churchill’s. According to May, he looks 
‘embarrassed’ by his own name, which could be a true impression or, again, one filtered through 
her own biases. Thus, May thinks that «no English people called their sons Winston, though 
Winnie himself was English»445 and that the choice of this name, albeit apparently patriotic, is 
actually a sign of his foreignness. 
Whether it is projected onto birds or people, foreignness always is a mark of distinction, 
a line between ‘us’ and ‘them’, a ‘seal of infamy’ that prevents full acceptance. It is foreignness 
indeed that makes inconceivable to Alfred any relationship with his daughter’s partners, 
although –  to be accurate –  only one of the two, Shirley’s husband Kojo, is foreign. A man of 
culture, Kojo is a rich Ghanaian Reader of Contemporary Literature, who acknowledges that 
the hostility he experiences in dealing with Shirley’s parents is due to their fear and ignorance: 
«‘It’s because they have no education,’ he said. ‘They’re afraid of us because they know nothing 
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about us. I’ll ask them out to Ghana as my guests, and then they will see another world’»446. As 
Shirley tells us, this never happened, not because of Kojo’s early death, but because his parents 
would never have agreed. For Alfred, Kojo is nothing more than a «‘performing monkey […] 
in a suit’»447, less than a human being, as inferior as the imperial racial hierarchy defines Kojo 
to be. The same comparison is forced upon Elroy too, even though he is not foreign. Less 
confident and less rich than Kojo, with a job for the National Health Service (he is a Patient 
Care Officer), Elroy is from a Jamaican family, but born and bred in England. Nonetheless, his 
skin colour and his Caribbean ascent still make him foreign to Alfred. Thus, as Shirley 
comments on her father’s ‘event’, describing it as a possible stroke and admitting she is making 
a hypothesis based on what she knows about medicine from Elroy, her father is quick to reply 
he does not care about anything she could have picked up from Elroy, since he only wants «‘ 
English medicine from English doctors’»448. Shirley’s first response is to state that Elroy is, as 
a matter of fact, English, but then she corrects herself defining him «Well - British. Elroy is as 
British as me or you’»449. Rephrasing her reply, Shirley is acknowledging the discrepancy 
between Englishness and Britishness, and the impossibility for Elroy of being identified with 
Englishness: even though he was born in England, it remains a white identity from which he is 
inevitably excluded. Britishness, meanwhile, has been rebranded as a multiracial identity and 
represents the only collective identity between the two that he can identify and be identified 
with. This mirrors social analyses, which have highlighted that «some white people do not 
accept ethnic minorities as ‘English’».  According to Thomas,  
The problem here is that experiences of multiculturalism in England are very uneven, 
with cities highly diverse, but many suburban and rural areas remaining largely 
monocultural. In significant part of urban areas, the experience is a duo cultural one, 
rather than multicultural, with segregated and suspicious working-class Asian and 
white communities not feeling that they have shared identities (Cantle, 2001).450 
 
Both the segregating character of life in suburban areas, such as the fictional Hillesden 
Rise, or in rural areas (which are also usually almost exclusively ‘white’),  and the perception 
of Englishness as a white identity due to its re-shaping in opposition to the multicoloured 
Commonwealth and to the rebranding of Britishness as a multiracial identity, are, in the end, 
responsible for the ethnic minorities’ difficulty in identifying with Englishness and being 
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accepted as English. Gee tries to insert this perspective also through her depiction of Elroy and 
his family, showing how the Kings are used to being surrounded by other people of Caribbean 
descent (Shirley appears to be the only white person with whom they are in contact), especially 
after the mother, Sophie, had felt disappointed and unwelcome in the land she thought to be her 
mother country too. The perception of being unwelcome, as well as constantly mocked and 
rejected by the native English, is quite acute for Elroy, who immediately gets offended when 
Shirley’s mother reads the booklet of Elroy’s church and laughs at the language used there. 
Enraged, Elroy shouts at Shirley that «‘You people think you own the language-’»451, showing 
that he too distinguishes between a ‘white English lot’ and his own tribe.  
For Shirley’s father, linking Elroy with Britishness is as problematic as accepting him 
as English. Thus, in Alfred’s opinion Elroy is «about as British as bananas»452, which is a way 
of acknowledging the bond between Elroy and the British Empire (bananas are a product the 
country used to import from its colonies) and, through that bond, a way to reject him, re-
establishing the imperial racial hierarchy that is at the core of this structure of feeling (the 
empire) and that confines Elroy at the margins of the national community as the Other.  
Alfred’s attitude clearly embodies the exclusive character of Englishness. As Kiliç 
states, already «[by] showing Alfred White, the ‘park keeper’, protecting the land from the 
black ‘invaders’, the novel becomes a representation of Englishness in a multicultural world 
juxtaposed with the upsurge of nationalism»453. English exclusiveness is also openly 
acknowledged by Thomas commenting, again, on the park. Thus, reading the warning signs at 
the entrance of Albion park which states that «No Littering, No Soiling, No Golfing: No 
Motorcycles, No Camping, No Caravans» are allowed, he asked himself, ironically, if the 
Council is also afraid of «Hell’s angels and gypsies» before finally concluding that «[t]his was 
England. If in doubt, keep them out»454. The rejection of the Other, embodied in the negative 
imperatives used in the signs, also summarises the «simplistic solutions the state finds to deal 
with problems»455.  
In addition, Alfred’s hostility towards both Kojo and Elroy is also due to fear of 
miscegenation. Even if miscegenation would seem to be a word from the past, linked to the 
empire and to an outdated vision of the world, racial contamination and racial degeneration are 
still very common concerns, as shown by the prominence of these themes in contemporary 
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literature and especially in novels such as Gee’s, that is to say literary works that deal with 
national narratives of identity and seek to challenge the idea of a homogeneous and immutable 
nation. Examples of this include Andrea Levy’s Small Island (2004), where the outcome of a 
sexual encounter between a white woman and a black man, a bi-racial baby, is given to a black 
couple for fears of social exclusion. One may also mention Julian Barnes’ Arthur & George 
(2005), where George Edalji, the son of an Indian father and an English mother, is accused – 
seemingly due to his Indian features and ‘mixed blood’ – of a crime that, due to its perversity, 
is considered too ‘foreign’ to have been committed by someone who is really English. Jonathan 
Coe’s Expo 58 (2013) is another case in point. The novel’s main character, Thomas Foley, is 
perceived as being disadvantaged both by his social background (his father, as a pub owner, is 
labelled as working class) and his Belgian mother, with racial degeneration extended to 
European offspring. The centrality of this fear in Albert’s subconscious is made evident in a 
flashback regarding young Shirley, when she confesses to be pregnant and Alfred’s first thought 
is that the father of the baby could be a «darkie»456, a possibility that fills him both with rage 
and disgust. Ultimately, As Kiliç writes, «[t]he allegorical structure of the novel suggests a 
reading of Alfred’s hospitalisation as King Alfred’s defeat in battle»457, a defeat that, in Alfred’s 
case, concerns precisely his inability to protect the national space (the park) and the private one 
(his family) from the invaders (the blacks). 
Interestingly, rage and disgust are the same feelings Alfred experiences looking at the 
gift his daughter has bought to cheer him up during his hospitalisation. This is  
a defiant little figure of John Bull with a squat glass bulldog beside him. The man’s 
face was a cross between a baby’s and a butcher’s, made rounder by his low flat 
topper, his waistcoat an engraved Union Jack, straining across a sturdy pot-belly. 
[…] The thing had a small square pedestal, engraved at the front with ‘Land of Hope 
and Glory’ and at the back ‘John Bull Esq.’ 458  
 
Shirley does not think that the figure of John Bull is «nice», but it is small enough for a 
bedside table; besides, it looks quite English, which is the first and only requirement she is 
looking for, knowing her father’s taste and nationalism. She actually struggles with the task, 
since it is difficult to establish «what is there that’s English, these days?»459. The question seems 
to be asked to the reader, and it refers both to the multicultural aspect of contemporary societies 
and to the question of identity around Englishness itself. Ironically, even her nationalist brother 
Dirk has difficulties in distinguishing English things from foreign ones, as shown by the fact 
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that he orders spaghetti alla Bolognese and is really convinced that it is an English dish. The 
difficulty to identify what is English and what is not is also exemplified by a dialogue between 
Thomas and Darren. The two meet in an Italian café, which for Thomas «couldn’t be more 
English, with its salty, fatty, stewed-tea smell»460 even if the owner is actually an Italian, named 
Mario. This is the perception Darren has too, affirming that «‘It stinks of smoke in here. That’s 
so English.’»461. Sitting in the café and talking animatedly about his personal problems, Darren 
defines Thomas as being «bloody English» for the way he reacts («’Can’t you handle 
anger?’»462), but we already know that Thomas may hardly be defined as such according to the 
usual selection criteria of the Whites: «I’m never quite certain where I come from (with a rugby 
team of genes on my father’s side - Jewish, Scottish, Italian, Spanish? There was even a 
rumoured great-grandma from Barbados)» 463. Racial contamination is what characterised 
Thomas, who even possibly had a non-white immigrant as great-grandmother. Nonetheless, 
Darren, as his parents who are fond of Thomas, considering him English due to his education, 
posture and attitude. This method of categorisation may remind readers of Brian Marley in 
Speak for England. Not by chance, Thomas also seems to be unsure regarding his national 
identity (‘I’m never quite certain where I come from’) and he does not define himself as English 
(a white, and now clearly Anglo-Saxon identity) but British, a certainty he gets when entering 
in places like the Italian café.   
The figure of John Bull is, at least, very English, considering that Bull has become, 
inside and outside the UK, a sort of representative of the nation. As Parrinder stresses, Bull is 
a «boozing, corpulent, cudgelwielding figure» that looks like a plebeian, but makes his money 
by trade and spends it like a lord»464, who »personifies the first four of the ‘British beatitudes’ 
recited at a drunken moment two centuries later in James Joyce’s Ulysses (beer, beef, business, 
bulldogs, Bibles, battleships, buggery, and bishops)»465 and is an undisputed national symbol. 
According to Shirley, 
Although Dad looked nothing like him, of course, there was something about the 
way John Bull stood, braced to the world, feet splayed, shoulders back, jaw pushed 
out towards the foreigners - Shirley had seen Alfred stand like that, back to the 
flower-beds, arms sternly folded, glaring across at some Asian children wondering 
whether to play ball on the grass.466 
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The fact that John Bull resembles her father’s posture, and in particular the connection 
between it and a xenophobic attitude, is an acknowledgement of the kind of national identity 
her father represents. Paradoxically, when he opens the gift, Alfred thinks that John Bull is an 
«[u]gly little bugger», a «nonsense, really. Expensive rubbish» and even that «[t]here never was 
a John Bull, that he knew of. And I know my history. Most of it»467. Not recognising John Bull 
as John Arbuthnot’s personification of Great Britain is ironical and hints at the many things 
people expunge or ignore about their national history, among which is, as Gee highlights in the 
novel, the violent and shameful aspects connected to the empire. Not by chance, one of the 
books Winston King requires in the library is One Hundred Years of Lynchings by Ralph 
Ginzburg, whose title later becomes ‘One Thousand Years of Lynchings’ to acknowledge that 
racism and violence are still going on. The book also anticipates the ending of Gee’s novel 
itself, with the killing of Winston. 
 Moreover, Alfred’s repulsion for the John Bull gift has also a lot to do with the 
inscription and his sense of national and personal failure:  
‘Land of Hope and Glory.’ Stuff and nonsense. We had it once. Hope, and glory. 
Now the British Empire doesn’t exist. I never thought that day would come. In my 
own lifetime, the end of the empire. 
He reached out fretfully to push the thing away, but his arm was tired, his hand was 
heavy. He closed his eyes so he wouldn’t see it. Just go to sleep and leave it be …468 
 
To Alfred, Shirley’s gift seems to be mocking at him, reminding him that the England 
he has known, the country the imperial narrative of identity depicts and has taught him to be 
proud of, does not exist anymore in the present: it has been lost in the past and from that past it 
remains irretrievable. The impossibility of recovering the country’s glory from the past has 
already been hinted at by the author through the books that Thomas is forced to put away. 
Among the quoted titles, there is also a History of the Empire. Part One: Expansion: this seems 
to suggest to the reader that, as Thomas’ colleague Suneeta told him, «Death is part of life, my 
darling»469, meaning that the imperial era is over and it is time to accept it and put that narrative 
aside, like the book itself. Interestingly, the remark comes from Suneeta, who, being a member 
of an ethnic minority, is an outsider to that narrative and, consequently, is not under its charm.  
In the end, the fragility of the gift mirrors Alfred’s own insecurities: old, sick, abusive 
towards his family, persuaded that his wife and everyone else around him view themselves as 
being more clever and cultured than him, Alfred knows he is not that model of ‘patriarchal 
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authority’ he wants to be, and this makes him, more than a symbol of the nation at its splendour, 
a symbol of national weakness and failure. Ultimately, Alfred’s racism is a reaction against a 
lost sense of national superiority and individual confidence, which feeds an urge for revenge 
that will be passed on to his youngest son, with extreme consequences. 
Thus, the only other person in the family that feels the same way towards Shirley’s 
partners and identifies completely with Alfred’s xenophobic attitude is Dirk, who has got a job 
in a newsagent’s shop of one of his father’s friends –  George Millington –  and still lives with 
his parents. Between father and son, George is nicknamed ‘Saint George’ as the saint patron of 
England, an «old joke»470, his father thinks, that actually hints ironically at the increasing 
discrepancy between ideal and real England, given that, quoting Dirk, «St fucking George» is 
«a sack of lard»471, an old man suffering from asthma, always smoking and coughing, having 
nothing in common with a fighter of dragons. The repulsion Dirk feels for George parallels the 
same repulsion he feels for the job and, especially, for himself. The main reason underneath his 
self-repulsion are his homosexual urges, which, paradoxically, are directed towards black men, 
as shown by the «strange magazine» his mother found in his room with «photographs of black 
men without any clothes»472 and by the sexual fantasies he confesses to the reader:  
One day he’d travel. He’d like to travel. To parts of the world where things were still 
all right. Not that there were so many of them left. South Africa had fallen. Had been 
sold out. It was a black day for whites, when they sold out. It used to be paradise. 
He’d read about it. He tried to imagine it. Fucking paradise. He closed his eyes. 
Lions, tigers. Sort of pink blossoms, lots of them. Boogie-something. Boogie 
blossoms. And - swimming pools. And strong white men. Muscular. Toned. 
Working out in the sunlight. Short haircuts and - brick-hard buttocks. Press-ups 
flipping over into sit-ups, and fuck, they all had enormous hardons, and most of the 
men round the pool were black … 473 
 
Although his daydreaming about travelling starts with mentioning South African 
apartheid as a ‘paradise’ for whites, which implies a desire to avoid any contact with non-white 
people, when the fantasy becomes a sexual one Dirk’s thoughts go, almost unconsciously, from 
white men to black ones who are, ultimately, the very object of his sexual desire. This makes 
his racism more problematic than Alfred’s, given that the anger and hatred that he usually 
directs towards immigrants, especially black ones, could be a way to mask his true desires or a 
consequence of his lack of self-acceptance. 
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 The disgust he feels for his own homosexuality is not the only factor diminishing his 
confidence and self-esteem: marked by an abusive childhood (due to his father’s constant 
outbursts and beating), convinced that his mother merely ‘tolerated’ him (she considers him 
dull, ugly, and he has even heard her described his birth as «a mistake»474), ignored by his much 
older brother, no longer on speaking terms with the only woman he has ever liked (his sister) 
and aware that he is his father’s second-favourite (the «other one»475forever in Darren’s 
shadow), Dirk has a multitude of issues. Nonetheless, striving for a positive identification, Dirk 
ends up worshipping his father, whom he idealises and from whom he derives all his opinions, 
becoming, in Shirley’s words, «even worse than her Dad»476 but without his excuses. According 
to Shirley, Alfred’s views are ‘justifiable’ given that he belongs to an older generation, born 
into the empire, immersed in the imperial narrative of identity and that of the Second World 
War. What she cannot understand is that Alfred’s England represents for Dirk, more than 
anything else, an escape from his own reality of rejection and alienation, a way to retrieve an 
identity to be proud of and to feel legitimised in his own sense of victimhood. Thus, in a world 
where connections among people are everyday more imaginary (facebook, twitter, whatsapp 
groups), and where people feel lonely, displaced and hopeless, «Englishness offers one 
opportunity to become a collective noun once again - a ‘we’ where most of the time ‘me’ is our 
lot»477, an opportunity to be part of a ‘tribe’, to feel accepted and find others to identify with. It 
is for this very reason, his longing for acceptance, reassurance and belonging, that Dirk joins a 
fascist gang, whose sense of group cohesion is cemented around ideas of cultural and racial 
purity and expressed through a ‘skinhead’ crewcut and the occasional displaying of national 
symbols. Even for his mother, Dirk and his friends «look like Nazis»478, which is the impression 
most of the people get, as shown by the fact that one of Dirk’s friends, Ozzie, is allegedly fired 
for the crewcut and the occasional wearing of a Union Jack t-shirt in the workplace.  
Consequently, Dirk keeps wondering, «[w]hy should it be racist to get a haircut? Why should 
it be racist to show the flag? What’s bloody wrong with being pro-British? You had to be pro-
British, in the last war. Then it was OK to be patriotic»479. Here the author is subtly hinting at 
the post-war debate about the Union Jack summarised by the sentence ‘there ain’t no black in 
 
474Ivi, p.106 
475Ivi, p.80  
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477Perryman, M., «Becoming England» cit., p.14  
478Gee, M., op. cit., p.71  
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the Union Jack’480, which exposes the flag as a symbol of division and the will to ignore the 
question of race in the traditional narrative(s) of identity. Dirk’s choice to refer to the Union 
Jack rather than to the even more exclusive English Cross of St George is only due to the topic 
being linked to Ozzie. Thus, Ozzie is a white Australian who certainly cannot identify with (and 
therefore wear) the St George Cross, given that his origins determine his exclusion from 
Englishness. On the other hand, he can easily identify with the Union Jack as a member of the 
‘British stock’, that ‘white community of Britons’ glorified by the post-war imperial narrative 
of identity. The subtle reference to the image of a white community of Britons, the Union Jack 
and the fact that Dirk talks about being ‘pro-British’ would all point to an association between 
his fascist gang and the British National Party. This is not in contrast with the idea of Dirk as a 
representative of English nationalism and as an embryonic version of a Brexit voter; rather, a 
possible link between Dirk and BNP is consistent with it, considering that great numbers of 
BNP supporters appear to be white English, impoverished or struggling to maintain their usual 
life-style, and consequently distrustful in regards to the establishment and hostile towards 
immigrants, whom they consider the main cause of their grievances. As Christopher Bryant 
reports,   
 
[i]n recent years polls have also suggested that a majority of respondents, whether 
English or British, think there have been too many immigrants taking too many jobs 
from British workers, that some parts of Britain no longer feel British because of 
immigration, and that Britain is losing its culture as a consequence of both 
immigration and European Union policies and directives.481 
 
Dirk is indeed persuaded that his economic conditions, the lack of job opportunities and 
his sense of displacement in his own nation are all due to immigrants and ethnic minorities, 
who have invaded the country and are now the ones that «own most things. They’ve taken over 
the buses, and the trains. And the bloody streets. You can’t get away from them»482. As o’ Toole 
notes, «‘Invasion’ is thus a structure of feeling that unites the two great neurosis», the Second 
World War and the end of the Empire, with the immigrants represented as «the Empire striking 
back by occupying England’s own streets»483,  or even as the Nazis who have actually won the 
war: in both scenarios, the country is ultimately transformed into a colony. This structure of 
feeling, as we know, has been deeply exploited in the Brexit discourse, with the EU described 
 
480The sentence refers to the title of Paul Gilroy’s work There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural 
Politics of Race and Nation, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991, which focuses on racial politics in 
England. 
481Bryant, C., «Towards a Cosmopolitan England», in Aughey, A., Berberich, C. (eds.), op. cit., p.106  
482Gee, M., op. cit., pp.30-31  
483O’Toole, F., op. cit., p.92  
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as a Nazi super-state carrying out an unarmed invasion and Europeanisation of the nation, and 
it also dominates the post-Brexit discourse around the negotiations for the actual exit from the 
union. The link between the two paranoiac fantasies, the ‘Empire striking back’ and the 
European Nazi super-state, is visible in the White Family too, and specifically through Dirk’s 
observations. Looking for his friends in a local pub, Dirk realises that he is surrounded by 
foreigners, who are not ‘actual blacks’ but  
 
Spanish or French or whatever they were, fucking Europeans, fucking dagos, 
shooting their mouths off in foreign languages, hooting and tooting loud as lords -  
And soon they’d be ruling over these isles. There wouldn’t be a government, it 
wouldn’t be Britain, they’d just be some piddling little county of Europe, 
Englandshire, or Englandstein, or whatever disgusting bit of lingo they chose, and 
everyone would lord it over us … They’ll come to Londonburg for their hols! 
Londonburg! he laughed aloud. It was a fucking good joke against the Krautz, but 
there was no one here to share it, and they looked at him funny, when he laughed on 
his own.484 
 
Even though Dirk is described as a kind of lunatic, laughing on his own at jokes that 
nobody would appreciate except from his fanatic friends, the fantasy of a Britain transformed 
in a European ‘little county’ (called, not by chance, ‘Englandstein’ with a German intonation) 
is not his own personal nightmare, but a national psychosis, made possible by the loss of a sense 
of superiority and identity. If the country is not the super power it used to be, it is therefore 
possible to imagine it as the underdog, defeated and even invaded by non-Europeans and 
Europeans (who are even ‘blackened’ in the association), attempting at the freedom of the 
country and conspiring against its ‘resurrection’. The mechanism through which Dirk racialises 
people in a positive or negative way according to circumstances parallels the national one we 
have focused on talking about Polish immigrants and works both ways. Thus, through May’s 
memories the reader comes to know that at a certain point in time Dirk started going to his 
sister’s house and even enjoying Kojo’s company. Knowing him and having a ‘not threatening’ 
relationship with Kojo meant, as May stresses, «[b]ecause Dirk liked Kojo, Kojo stopped being 
black»485. In the same way, white people can stop ‘being white’ and perceived as the ‘black 
invader’ once they are marked in any way by the taint of foreignness. This occurs, for instance, 
when Dirk goes to his usual pub and discovers that the English barman has been substituted by 
a man named Paolo. Even though Paolo affirms he was «[b]orn just around the corner, mate», 
Dirk continues to feel «confused, disgusted»486, unable to accept Paolo’s claim to belong. 
 
484Gee, M., op. cit., p.300  
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 It is the perception of being under attack, invaded, surrounded by conspiring enemies, 
that makes Dirk long for the homogenous nation of his father’s memories, when 
all the kids were normal then. Normal white. And there wasn’t any crime. Not 
everyone beating the shit out of each other. Not everyone hating everyone else. There 
was brotherhood then. We were all English.  
Hillesden was a village, in those days. I sometimes think I was born out of my time. 
It’s just my luck to be born now, with no opportunities for native English. And 
prejudice against us just because we’re white.487 
 
Being ‘normal white’ means, of course, ‘white Anglo-Saxon’, including in the 
undesirable Others both the ‘actual blacks’ and the other blackened shades of white, who are 
all together scapegoats in Dirk’s present reality.  According to Dirk, if the golden past of his 
father was a ‘brotherhood’ with no crime and hatred, what is wrong with England is exactly its 
acquired heterogeneity: this conclusion fuels both his desire to restore a homeland he has never 
actually experienced (what we have already defined a ‘nostalgia without memory’) and his urge 
for revenge against those whose very existence interferes with this recovery. In this way, the 
author also points out the link between restorative nostalgia and conspiracy theories: according 
to the nostalgic, the nation is «forever under siege» and the recovering of the dreamish 
homeland the past portrays is precluded by those who conspire against it, meaning by those 
who do not fit in it and are, consequently, opposed to the recover. As Svetlana Boym explains,   
the mechanism of this kind of conspiracy theory is based on the inversion of cause 
and effect and personal pronouns. “We” (the conspiracy theorists) for whatever 
reasons feel insecure in the modern world and find a scapegoat for our misfortunes, 
somebody different from us whom we don’t like. We project our dislike on them and 
begin to believe that they dislike us and wish to persecute us. “They” conspire against 
“our” homecoming, hence “we” have to conspire against “them” in order to restore 
“our” imagined community.488 
 
Thus, the same mechanism is traceable in Dirk’s own fantasy of persecution: after 
projecting his own dislike onto immigrants, the designated scapegoat for his individual 
misfortunes and the national ones, he starts believing that the immigrants, as well as pro-
immigrant politicians and intellectuals, dislike people like him (English, white and working-
class) and conspire against his possibilities to succeed, leaving him with no opportunities to 
improve his standing and discriminating against him for his whiteness. Here it is also possible 
to recognise the roots of contemporary political discourse around the forgotten constituency, 
the ‘white working-class’, and especially ‘white working-class boys’, who feel they are 
discriminated against in favour of those coming from ethnic minorities. Dirk’s delusional 
 
487Ivi, p.188  
488Boym, S., op cit., p.43  
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theories are particularly evident when he talks about the newsagent’s shop. Although he 
acknowledges that the economic losses of the newsagent’s are probably due to the opening of 
bigger shops and due to the way George runs it, he still stresses that theirs is «an English shop», 
wondering «what have they got against us» to instead prefer «flashing their cards for the wops 
and the Jews»489. In addition, he believes that their biggest competitor, the Asian Patels, have 
«opened their shop, on purpose, less than a hundred yards down the road»490 in order to ruin 
their affairs.  
Ultimately, Dirk’s sense of victimhood and his belief in a conspiracy against white 
English is reinforced every time his sense of superiority, based on the imperial racial hierarchy, 
is challenged by present reality. An example comes from an argument that occurs when Dirk is 
on his way to visit his father:   
The driver had looked at Dirk as if he was rubbish. ‘What’s this?’ he had said. ‘I 
don’t want this. Haven’t you read the notices? Can you read? It says “Tender exact 
money please.” In plain English.’ 
And so on and so on, blah blah blah, while Dirk tore his pockets searching for 
change, and there wasn’t any, not even ten pee, and the whole bus was glaring and 
muttering as if it was Dirk’s fault the driver was a tosser. 
They’re all in it together, of course. Look around this bus and you can see it. Ninety 
per cent coloureds. Well, fifty, at least. And the driver’s coloured, so they’re on his 
side. And he has the fucking cheek to talk about English. As if they owned it. Our 
speech. Our language. (Tender exact money … that’s not proper English. Does a 
normal bloke use a word like ‘tender’?)491 
 
While the bus driver is only asking for the precise amount of money as he would have 
done with any other passenger, Dirk’s own prejudices transform a simple exchange into a 
racialised one. Thus, Dirk affirms that no ‘normal bloke’ uses the word ‘tender’ (which is 
actually written on the official notice) implying that the bus driver is not ‘normal’, and he 
actually is not if ‘normality’ means white given that the driver is ‘coloured’. Consequently, 
Dirk considers him a ‘tosser’ who thinks to ‘own’ his language, which is a reversal of Elroj’s 
accusation to Dirk’s mother May. Furthermore, Dirk thinks ‘the whole bus’ is blaming him for 
no other reason than his whiteness, since ninety per cent of the people on the bus (he then 
corrects himself to ‘at least, fifty’) are coloured (‘they are all in it together’). Dirk thinks that a 
similar persecution is under way when he goes to the stadium with his friends and the guards 
do not let them in. Even though one of the guards explains that nowadays you need a photocard 
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and a pre-paid ticket to watch a match, Dirk is firmly convinced that they have been 
discriminated against and comments that the stadium is just 
another thing I couldn’t get in to. Every fucking thing has been closed to us. Jobs, 
football games, everything that matters. […] We need money or photocards or 
qualifications or pass-words that we can never learn. We need skills or languages or 
posh bloody accents or cars or computers or ties or suits - 
Or a black face. The two niggers got in. They said they had tickets, but I don’t believe 
it.492 
 
The passage above is quite telling, given that it perfectly expresses Dirk’s sense of 
victimhood (‘another thing I couldn’t get in to’, another thing ‘closed to us’) and the reasons-
why he thinks to be ‘victimised’: his working class status ( ‘posh bloody accents’, ‘cars’ and 
‘ties and suits’); his education (‘we need skills or languages or computers’); and his whiteness 
(or we need a ‘black face’ because the ‘two niggers’ got in). Dirk’s anger is here clearly directed 
both towards people he labelled as the ‘Other’ in opposition, and people who think to be better 
than him (members of the middle-class, the cultural and political elites). This is made clear by 
Dirk himself when he criticises one of the shop’s clients, Melissa, who he puts among the 
 
[m]iddle-class people, who fancy themselves. They go down the end where the slums 
used to be. They ponce around in jeeps and things, I see them, couples, laughing 
together, talking in loud stupid voices, and fucking queers, fucking arse-bandits - I 
know they look down their noses at us. They’re only here till they can afford to get 
out. 
I shan’t do that. I’ll stay here and - prosper. That is the word. Be prosperous.493 
 
Part of Dirk’s hatred comes directly from envy, the desire to be, like them, ‘prosperous’, 
to afford to go wherever he wants to go, in whatever kind of cars he wants. What he also envies 
about them, clearly, is their freedom, as well as their social status as ‘cultured’ people. This is, 
for instance, the reason why he also dislikes Thomas, who he defines a «Guardian-reader! 
Gobbler! Pansy!»494, stressing that he hates, especially, what he perceived to be self-confidence 
or trust in one’s own knowledge, which is something Dirk totally lacks: using Shirley’s words, 
Dirk feels that «they owned the world, people like him, with degrees, and good jobs»495 and 
that they live in a completely different reality from his own. Shirley too believes that, in 
comparison to other families, the Whites are underprivileged and, thinking about her pregnancy 
and leaving college, she stresses that «[p]eople from our class don’t get two chances»496.  
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While Shirley is resigned, Dirk is constantly enraged by his encounters with people like 
Thomas and Melissa, who intensify, using a sociological concept, Dirk’s sense of deprivation. 
Developed by scholars such as Runciman, Merton and Moore, the concept refers to the fact that 
people tend to evaluate their present conditions not according to an abstract sense of justice, but 
in comparison with the conditions of the people who surround them.497 The perception of being 
‘deprived’ would then be triggered not by people’s present conditions per se, but by «the 
deviation of the volume or intensity of the hardships they are forced to put up with from the 
distribution pattern of hardships between different sectors of society»498. Ultimately, it is the 
discrepancy between the habitual distribution pattern and the «new, sudden increments in the 
habitualized volume of hardship»499 that would be responsible for uprisings against the ruling 
system.  According to Bauman,  
[f]rom a time- and space-bound sense of deprivation triggered by the seen or 
imagined group ‘like us’ being endowed with advantages denied to ‘us’, we move to 
a permanent, and sort of ‘free-floating’, ambience of deprivation, no longer fixed 
once and for all to a specific ‘comparative group’. But instead casting anchors 
randomly in any of the infinite number of harbours encountered along our life’s 
itinerary. 
With all varieties of human habitat on the planet open to visits and scrutiny, every 
human being’s or human group’s success is likely to be perceived as another 
annoying and exasperating case of my own deprivation and so to add to the 
warehouse of my grievances.500 
 
The perception of an unfair increase in the volume of hardships suffered by the lower 
strata of society in comparison to the other classes has had a central role in Brexit, especially 
the feelings of anger and powerlessness following the 2007-2008 economic crisis and the 2009 
MPs’ expenses scandal. Disclosed just in the middle of the economic crisis, the MPs’ expenses 
scandal regarding, in particular, MPs’ second housing allowances, reinforced the idea of the 
contemporary political class as elitist and detached from the reality of the ordinary people. 
Together with the allegations following the Iraq war and the austerity cuts to welfare provisions, 
this increased distrust towards the establishment in favour of populist forms of political 
engagement.  
Another element that contributes to Dirk’s delusional fantasy of persecution is the 
newspaper Spearhead, through which the author highlights the influence the mass media have 
on our perception of the world. Dirk’s knowledge seems indeed to come completely from 
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trusting what he reads in Spearhead. For instance, he talks about a battle «being fought, on the 
streets of London, Liverpool, et cetera? - Bristol. That was the other one. The other spot where 
they’d gone in force», and criticises his mother for having always her «[h]ead in a book»501 and 
knowing nothing about the reality of the nation; however, he has never been to Bristol and the 
battle he believes to be going on there and in the other cities is just what Spearhead displays 
for its readers. Thus, the newspaper paints England as the invaded nation Dirk believes it to be, 
with a war going on between the native English and all of the other inhabitants. According to 
Spearhead, the English «shan’t lose» this war because «[t]he future of England»502 depends on 
their will to protect the nation and «free our streets of crime and fear»503, meaning freeing them 
from the immigrants and the ethnic minorities polluting the national soil: now that the older 
generation is on its way out, it is up to Dirk’s generation to «hold the pass» or, using a very 
typical expression in reference to immigrants, «dam the flood»504. The influence of Spearhead 
is also marked by the martial register that Dirk often uses, as «No more running. No more 
retreats» or «stand and fight, now. Stand and die»505, which is a way to convey through language 
the idea of war as present reality. Interestingly, a martial register is also the one used in the 
Church Shirley attends with the Kings, where she listens to Reverend Lack talking about a 
‘Battle of Britain’ and the need to be ready to fight (it is not clear against whom) and has a 
sudden vision of the Reverend as Adolf Hitler. In this way, the author hints at the role religious 
institutions may have in discrimination and cultural segregation, and at religion as another 
possible source of racial hatred.  
The use of a war-like register comes natural to Dirk, who links it to his father’s tales 
about the war and exploited it to nourish his fantasy about being a soldier himself, someone 
fighting the enemy and to be proud of. In the end, Spearhead’s narrative becomes so pervasive 
that it constantly emerges in Dirk’s thoughts, affecting the way he reacts to events: when he 
understands, for instance, that George is not leaving him the shop but selling it to Mr Patel, he 
describes the sale, using Spearhead’s own words, as a betrayal of his own «legitimate 
expectations», an example of how the English are «losing [their] birthright»506. This recalls 
another concept from the field of sociological studies, already hinted in the previous discussion 
concerning nostalgia and Koselleck’s definitions of ‘space of reference’ and ‘horizon of 
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expectations: the ‘revolutions of rising expectations’ or the ‘J-curve hypothesis’. This concept, 
associated mainly with James C. Davies’ 1969 conceptualisation, states that  
the likelihood of violent revolutions derives its impetus from a downturn following 
a long period of rising expectations accompanied by a parallel increase in their 
satisfaction: ‘When perceptions of need satisfaction decrease but expectations 
continue to rise, a widening gap is created between expectations and reality. That 
gap eventually becomes intolerable and sets the stage for rebellion against a social 
system that fails to fulfil its promises.’507 
 
The decrease in need satisfaction and the gap between expectations and reality are 
indeed main reasons for the sense of deprivation felt by the characters of the two novels 
referenced in this chapter: Speak for England’s main character Brian Marley highlights more 
than once that he is broke and that his life has turned out as a kind of failure compared to his 
own expectations and the ones his mother had for him, while Dirk’s expectations have their 
roots in the equally deluded expectations of his father, whose reality completely clashes with 
the alleged golden future he thought to be awaiting the nation after the war. Ultimately, losing 
his job is for Dirk an ultimate proof that «[e]verything’s going. Everything’s gone. There’s 
nothing left for me round here. Nothing left of what I had. Even Dad won’t be in the Park 
anymore. No one will know us. We won’t exist»508. This is what Dirk thinks of the nation too: 
now that the empire is gone, that immigrants are everywhere, that the country is a member of 
the European Union, ‘we’ are no more the super power ‘we’ used to be; therefore, ‘we’ do not 
matter anymore, ‘we’ are nothing. 
Drunk and shocked by his dad’s forthcoming death and the loss of his job, Dirk throws 
himself into a fight in Albion Park started by his mates against «the enemy»509, some «darkies» 
he describes as «black as the night»510 who, being already Dirk’s usual scapegoat, easily 
become the object of his rage. Interestingly, Dirk affirms that in the darkness it was impossible 
to distinguish «who was us, who was them»511and that, interrupted by a woman screaming and 
calling for the police, he could see that there was nobody except from them, as if «the lads had 
been fighting each other»512. The image of a racial fight transformed into a kind of ‘white riot’ 
with whites fighting against each other clearly has a symbolic meaning: apart from being a 
reference to the race riots, the fact that no black man appears to be into view unveils his role as 
the ‘scapegoat’, and points at  the need to look behind it.  
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For Dirk, who is completely embedded in the fantasy of persecution, recognising the 
‘Other’ represented by the immigrant, the foreigner, the member of an ethnic minority, as just 
a convenient scapegoat for his individual flaws and for those of the nation is, ultimately, an 
impossible act and this leads him, in the last acts of the novel, to kill the first black man he 
meets in the Park in the attempt to ‘clean’ it, meaning the nation, and, ultimately, himself. Not 
by chance, the man he kills is none other than Winston King, who is  
one of the few characters who does not think in the dichotomies of ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
He is one of the very few who question these concepts, probably because he has seen 
them fail. He cannot find his place in one of the categories on offer for him. It seems 
as if he was always part of ‘the others’: he is discriminated against by some English 
people because of his skin colour, and at the same time has to hide the fact that he is 
gay from his family because he fears they will cast him out.513 
 
Winston is also the perfect personification of the ‘invasion theme’: being Elroy’s 
brother, Winston is connected to the invasion of the Whites’ private space; being a black 
walking in Albion Park, he is a symbol of the immigrant ‘flood’ invading the nation; being 
homosexual, he also represents, according to the traditional views of the nostalgic, the 
degeneration of values. Moreover, his homosexuality is also what Dirk hates the most about 
himself; consequently, the act of killing also represents, symbolically, Dirk’s attempt to kill his 
own sexual identity. 
The death of Winston King in Albion Park gives the novel a cyclical structure, being a 
kind of reversal of Alfred’s collapse after the dispute with the ‘invading’ black family. But for 
Alfred, rather than being a representation of the white victory over the invaders, the murder 
ends up being a symbol of defeat. The kind of immoral act that has never happened before in 
the park, it destroys Alfred’s sense of pride and undermines his life’s work, making him realise 
the cost of hatred: the end of civilisation. Consequently, when his wife confesses that she 
believes Dirk to be the killer, Alfred decides to denounce his own son, rejecting May’s remark, 
made in a desperate attempt to save Dirk, that the murdered man «was black Alfred. You could 
never stand them»514. But this is not true anymore. Thus, the narrative shows how Alfred’s 
hospitalisation, causing a contact between him and the ethnic minorities (most of the nurses are 
black), starts to change his own perspective, pointing again at segregation as one of the main 
reasons of racial hatred. In the same way, going to the police station and meeting a group of 
black youth, Alfred recognises that his first impression of them –  as the enemy coming to kill 
him – was wrong: when the youth are fully in view and he has actual contact with them, Alfred 
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notices that they are just teenagers, not so different from his own sons and daughter, and that 
«he’d just got confused»515. Denouncing Dirk as a suspect in a murder investigation is, 
ultimately, an act of redemption and acknowledgement: Alfred understands that everything that 
happened is (also) his fault not simply because he has ‘left his post’, but because he has 
supported, perpetuated and indoctrinated his own son with a narrative of identity that, instead 
of strengthening the idea of a national community, has ended up undermining the very concept 
of interdependence (or solidarity) that holds a community together. The same narrative that is 
leading the country out from the European Union. 
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Beyond Brexit: BrexLit and English Identity 
From Denial to (Nearly) Acceptance: Cultural Responses and BrexLit  
Undermining the very concept of solidarity at the basis of any national community seems to be 
the principle (and maybe only) ‘achievement’ of the Brexit vote, providing «a lesson», as 
Jonathan Coe wrote three years after the referendum, «in how quickly a country can degenerate 
into division and factionalism, and how tenuous are the bonds that hold us together around the 
vexed issue of national identity»516. The Remain and Leave campaigns have indeed offered two 
competing representations of the country, one inclusive and supportive of the European project, 
another insular and linked to the traditional (and Eurosceptic) narratives of identity. Advertised 
as the salvific option that can restore the country’s glory and shelter the people from threatening 
invaders, impoverishment and hardships, Brexit soon stopped being a referendum about the 
European Union and British membership and became a vote for a certain imagining of the 
country and for solving its most pressing (national) issues. Unfortunately, the immediate 
consequences of the Brexit outcome are very different from what the Leave narrative had 
outlined. As journalist and novelist James Meek argues, the Brexit vote, ultimately, «didn’t 
settle any of the urgent problems facing the country» 517; on the contrary, it has contributed in 
increasing social tension and destabilising more than one ‘Union’. Thus, the Brexit vote has 
shaken both the European Union, threatening to trigger a domino effect in other member-states, 
and the United Kingdom itself, considering that half of the population did not vote for Brexit 
and that the gaps between the ‘elites and the people’, the ‘natives and the immigrants’, the ‘well-
off and the left-behind’, have never been felt so sharply. Consequently, as Jonathan Coe 
stresses, the ‘vision’ that has emerged from the referendum is actually neither the Leave nor the 
Remain campaign’s, but one that is «more truthful» about a 
country at war with itself. A country divided along lines of age, education, wealth 
and opportunity; a country seen quite differently by the old and the young; a prickly 
union in which provincial England had a very different sense of identity from 
metropolitan England, and felt little of the sense of “Europeanness” that Scotland, 
for instance, expressed strongly through its votes to stay in the E.U.518 
 
Three years before, writing in the aftermath of the Brexit vote, Zadie Smith defined the 
country coming out from the referendum debate in a similar manner, stating that «[o]ne useful 
consequence of Brexit» had been to   
 
516Coe, J., «How Brexit Broke Britain and Revealed a Country at War With Itself», Time, 6 June 2019, 
https://time.com/5601982/how-brexit-broke-britain/  (5 September 2019) 
517Meek, J., Dreams of Leaving and Remaining, London & New York, Verso, 2019, p.113  
518Coe, J., «How Brexit Broke Britain and Revealed a Country at War With Itself» cit.  
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finally and openly reveal a deep fracture in British society that has been thirty years 
in the making. The gaps between north and south, between the social classes, 
between Londoners and everyone else, between rich Londoners and poor Londoners, 
and between white and brown and black […].519 
 
A deep fracture that, although ‘thirty years in the making’ (and here Smith is clearly 
referring to the consequences of political choices marked by neoliberalism and individualism) 
has been constantly undermined by the cultural elite of the country, which, from the vote 
onwards, has defined Brexit as an «apparently troubling act of national self-harm»520; «a huge 
mistake […] reached at hysteria point» and an expression of «anger and revenge»521; «one of 
the worst political hangovers in history»522; «the most depressing, divisive, duplicitous political 
event of my lifetime»523; «[a] catastrophe»524; and even an outcome triggered by a «dark and 
dangerous stupidity, all the more pernicious for the way it is worn so lightly by its perpetrators 
and tolerated, sometimes even indulged, by the rest of us»525, who allegedly did not fight 
enough against the lies and the acts of manipulation that have characterised the Leave 
campaign. 
 It follows that the main response from many on the liberal Left soon after the vote, as 
Goodwin acknowledges, has been one marked by blind opposition and rejection526,  a response 
driven by the fact that, despite the early signs, the Brexit outcome has come to them completely 
unexpected. This is quite evident in many of the articles and essays published in the immediate 
aftermath of the referendum, where the most common reactions to the vote are disbelief, anger 
and astonishment. For instance, Zadie Smith, who has been one of the first writers to comment 
about Brexit, describes what she felt watching «England fence itself off from the rest of Europe» 
as «an enormous sense of shock»527, a word that comes back in Eva Aldea’s essay ‘The Lost 
Nomad of Europe’, where the Polish-Romanian-Swedish lecturer and writer states precisely 
that «for many of us the referendum result came as a shock»528, meaning as the sudden 
realisation that a great part of the country they were living in did support and believe in the 
 
519Smith, Z., op. cit.  
520Shaw, K., «Brexlit» cit., p.29  
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523Harris R, tweet on Twitter, 16 June 2016, 6:49, https://twitter.com/robert___harris/status/743440375981936640 
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Leave narrative of isolationism and scaremongering excluding people like her. Petra Rau, 
German senior lecturer at the University of East Anglia and, as Aldea, one of the contributors 
to Eaglestone’s collection Brexit and Literature, affirms to «have no recollection of what I read 
or wrote or even did in the weeks after the vote to leave the EU. I seem to have spent much of 
the summer in a paralysed state of fury and disbelief»529, a situation made worse by her status 
as an EU citizen in the UK. Northern Irish poet and children’s writer Shaun Traynor reported 
to have even signed for an Irish passport, a reaction to the vote similar to English poet and 
writer Blake Morrison’s wife, who, as they «sat there absorbing the terrible news» in a country 
they could recognise no more, proposed instead to «move to Ireland»530, hoping that Morrison’s 
Irish mother would have been enough to obtain an Irish passport. The Irish poet Vona Groarke 
has gone so far to consider Brexit similar to one of «[t]hose stories of youngsters slipping out 
of home because they’ve been groomed by men in dark rooms, who have no good in mind», 
affirming that she believes the UK to have «just been groomed»531 in the same way.  
Among the Remainers, we find also the English novelist Ian McEwan, who has 
commented on Brexit comparing the country to a «depressed teenage self-harmer» and declared 
himself to «belong to the smallest, saddest, most pessimistic faction» of those against a British 
exit: «I’m a denialist. Almost a year on, and I’m still shaking my head in disbelief – not a useful 
political act. I don’t accept this near mystical, emotionally charged decision to leave the EU. I 
don’t, I can’t, believe it. I reject it.». What immediately strikes the reader about McEwan’s 
speech is the use of the word ‘faction’, repeated in the sentence «[m]y faction lives in daily 
bafflement»532, which is, coming from a novelist of his stature, certainly not a casual choice. 
‘Faction’ perfectly describes how Brexit, as Freeman stresses, is «not so much a difference of 
opinion as a rupture»533 and recalls Coe’s image of a ‘country at war’ where «many of the most 
culturally enfranchised people in the country are currently, and unusually, experiencing what it 
feels like to be politically disenfranchised»534, being Remainers under a government which 
constantly claims to be following the ‘will of the people’ in pursuing its Brexit agenda, yet 
remains firmly opposed to a second public consultation and even inclined (especially with Boris 
 
529Rau, P., op. cit., pp.31-32  
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Johnson as Prime Minister) to pursue a ‘no deal’ Brexit. The feeling of being a politically 
disenfranchised minority is also at the core of James Meek’s account of his personal reaction 
to Brexit. According to Meek, Brexit is less an event and more a feeling, which he imagines 
very similar to learning that the mine or factory where you and your family have 
worked for a generation or two is closing, or that new people who look and talk and 
dress differently from your people are eligible for public benefits you’ve been 
queuing for. And now we Remainers were feeling it: people like me who had 
remotely observed others were experiencing it for ourselves. For Leavers the merit 
of voting to leave the EU wasn’t only in winning. It was in getting their opponents 
to feel like losers – to feel what they had felt, that deep unease at the shattering of 
their dreamscape. My bad feeling was somebody’s else catharsis.535 
 
It follows the idea of Brexit has a [p]sychic dislocation», more difficult to fix than an 
economic collapse or a natural disaster, given that «the very act which is, for some citizens, a 
horribly demoralising reconfiguration of their sense of themselves in the world is, for many 
others, a purgative act, restoring a psyche wounded by decades of communal defeat»536. The 
Brexit vote is here depicted as a kind of revenge act: putting those who perceive themselves as 
left-behind, left-out, and vulnerable, finally in the position to make the others, that is to say the 
open, cosmopolitan and liberal part of the nation, feel the same sense of vulnerability and 
displacement.  
The perception of having been, somehow, ‘detached’ or irresponsibly ‘unaware’ of the 
reality and feelings of one’s fellow citizens is well expressed by Zadie Smith, who describes 
her «Londoncentric solipsism» as being as dangerous as the political ambition moving Boris 
Johnson and the other politicians advocating for Brexit, adding that «the profound shock I felt 
at the result – and which so many other Londoners seem to have experienced – suggests at the 
very least that we must have been living behind a kind of veil, unable to see our own country 
for what it has become»537. The idea of Remainers living in a different nation and having no 
contact with the other side of the ‘front’, emerges clearly both in her already mentioned account 
of the vote, ‘Fences: A Brexit Diary’, as well as in Julian Barnes’s ‘Diary: People Will Hate Us 
Again’538, which provides the description of a very similar event. Thus, in both essays the 
writers describe Brexit talks taking place at the dinner table, involving dining companions who 
are all Remainers from the same social and political background – people who stand on the 
same side of the barricade, knowing nothing about life on the other side. 
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Lack of communication, contact and mutual understanding between McEwan’s faction 
and Farage’s ‘ordinary, decent’ squadrons of Leave voters has also been acknowledged by other 
writers. Thus, Amanda Craig has referred an episode that happened in Devon and «helped her 
realise, 10 years later, that the vote for Brexit would be a certainty and not a vain hope among 
Little Englanders»539. As reported by Danuta Kean, a local councillor came to Craig asking for 
a job for someone he knew, telling the writer that «“[p]eople don’t realise, but in this part of 
the country we are poorer than Romania”»540. This statement left the author astounded and 
shocked, and later became a source of inspiration for her last Brexit novel The Lie of the Land 
(2017). Anthony Cartwright, whose literary works, from Heartland (2009) to Iron Towns 
(2016) and the Brexit novel The Cut (2017), generally focus on working-class struggles, wrote 
in Granta that «[p]eople talk of the vote as a catastrophe, and they might be right, but what we 
must surely, finally, acknowledge is that for some places in our country the catastrophe has 
been going on for forty years or more and counting»541.  
Considering the prevailing reactions of the British cultural establishment, it is not hard 
to imagine that the first literary negotiations of Brexit tended to side with the Remain front and 
that the Brexit issue soon gained great relevance in the academic world. As Joe Jackson writes, 
the Brexit aftermath has been characterised by «an increasing array of Brexit-infused work»542 
or, using writer Sam Byers’s words, of works dominated by a doomed sort of ‘Brexit feeling’543, 
dealing, almost inevitably, with themes that have been at the core of the Brexit debate. Creative 
works related to the Brexit issue are, of course, not limited to the genre of the novel. We could 
mention, for instance, Carol Ann Duffy and Rufus Norris’s play My Country: A Work in 
Progress (2017), partly based on interviews with Leavers and Remainers and speeches from 
party leaders, or the mini-plays Brexit Shorts: Dramas for a Divided Nation (2017), which have 
been commissioned by The Guardian and written by nine British playwrights explicitly to make 
sense of the referendum, available also as videos on The Guardian website. With regard to film, 
Francis Lee’s movie God’s Own Country (2017), set in the Yorkshire countryside and centred 
on the romance between a young English shepherd and a Romanian immigrant hired to help 
 
539Kean, D., «Vanguard of Brexit fiction set to appear in 2017», The Guardian, 9 January 2017, 
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him with his livestock, has been described by the New Statesman as «a love story for the Brexit 
times»544. Satirical works mimicking or rewriting children’s literature in order to place them in 
a Brexit context are also flourishing. Examples include Bruno Vincent’s Five on Brexit Island 
(2016) and Five Escape Brexit Island (2017), with the first reproducing the division between 
Leavers and Remainers and the second depicting a possible post-Brexit dystopic scenarios. 
Lucien Young’s Alice in Brexitland (2017), similarly, engages directly with the Brexit 
campaign and transforms many of the characters of Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland into 
well-known politicians (Farage, Gove and Johnson are all present, as is Donald Trump). Finally, 
Brexit is surfacing in poems too, with the anthology of poetry Wretched Strangers (2018), 
edited by JT Welsch and Ágnes Lehóczky, having been published «to mark the vital 
contribution of non-UK-born writers»545 to British culture and as a counter against Brexit 
xenophobia and nationalism. However, given that this is a literary analysis focusing on 
contemporary fiction, the works that will be taken into consideration fall into the category of 
the novel-genre, where there is already a well-established trend dubbed ‘BrexLit’ or ‘Brexlit’ 
(meaning, simply, Brexit Literature).  
 Used by many literary critics, the tag ‘BrexLit’, as Kristian Shaw explains, refers to 
literature that reflects «the divided nature of the UK and the ramifications of the referendum», 
being composed of «fictions that either directly respond or imaginatively allude to Britain’s exit 
from the EU, or engage with the subsequent socio-cultural, economic, racial or cosmopolitical 
consequences of Britain’s withdrawal»546. Soon after the referendum, many novels have been 
immediately defined as Brexit fictions following these criteria, starting from the early examples 
of Ali Smith’s Autumn (2016) and Anthony Cartwright’s The Cut (2016), both published in the 
very same year as the Brexit outcome, and flourishing into a distinct sub-genre in the subsequent 
years. This also includes political thrillers and dystopian fictions such as Stanley Johnson’s 
Kompromat (2017), Mark Billingham’s Love like Blood (2017), Michael Paraskos’s Rabbitman 
(2017), Douglas Board’s Time of Lies (2017), Sam Byers’s Perfidious Albion (2018) and John 
Lanchester’s The Wall (2019); state-of-the-nation novels, such as Amanda Craig’s previously 
mentioned The Lie of the Land (2017), Adam Thorpe’s Missing Fay (2017), Jonathan Coe’s 
Middle England (2018) and Linda Grant’s A Stranger City (2019); and fictionalised 
autobiographies such as Olivia Laing’s Crudo (2018) and Rachel Cusk’s Kudos (2018).  
 
544Gilbey, R., «God’s Own Country is a love story for the Brexit times», New Statesman America, 31 August 2017,  
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It follows that novels that tackle Brexit belong to different genres, ranging from political 
thrillers to autofiction and from crime to state-of-the-nation novels. However, they can easily 
be distinguished into two categories: on one hand more ‘political’ fictions, meaning novels that 
focus on the way the political campaign has been conducted, dealing with themes such as post-
truth, the danger of nostalgia, political mendaciousness, awareness and responsibility, and 
usually depicting dystopian post-Brexit scenarios; on the other hand are the more ‘intimate’, 
‘psychological’ fictions, meaning novels that attempt to represent, instead, the people across 
the divide and to better understand the reasons underneath the attitude towards the Leave vote. 
This way of categorising Brexit fictions, which is to be found, for instance, both in John Day’s 
and in Kristian Shaw’s critical approaches, well defines the two major tendencies that 
characterise the sub-genre and is, therefore, the one that will be applied also in this brief 
introduction to Brexit Literature. 
Challenging Brexit Narrative: Brexit ‘Political’ Novels 
Generally speaking, the novels that belong to the ‘political’ category are mainly characterised, 
as John Day stresses, by «a kind of gleeful, frenzied dystopianism»547. The prominence of just 
dystopic traits is clearly due to the characteristics of the dystopian genre, which is traditionally 
deployed to uncover and push the limits of the dangerous tendencies that are present in 
contemporary societies and, consequently, tend to flourish in parallel with national turmoil as 
a reaction to controversial political landscapes. In relation to BrexLit, these novels usually mix 
the issues at the core of the Brexit debate with other, global concerns – in primis climate change 
and the pervasiveness of technology – and tend to also refer, to a greater or lesser extent, to 
Donald Trump’s presidential campaign. Typical examples of this trend are, for instance, 
Michael Paraskos’ Rabbitman (2017), Douglas Board’s Time of Lies (2017) and John 
Lanchester’s The Wall (2019). A very peculiar dystopian fiction, Michael Paraskos’s 
Rabbitman is a novel where an eight-year-old child stages together with her animated toys two 
parallel and interconnected plays that have got a lot in common with our contemporary reality. 
The first of these plays, entitled ‘The Federacy of Freedonia’, takes place in the USA and is 
concerned with a rabbit puppet named President Rabbitman, who clearly stands in for Donald 
Trump. Recalling Christopher Marlowe’s The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus (1590), the 
play starts with President Rabbitman receiving the unexpected and unpleasant visit of a 
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«devilishly handsome creature»548, Titivillus, who has come to collect the soul Rabbitman has 
pledged to him in exchange for power. Among the many crimes President Rabbitman is guilty 
of, he has played a role in the breaking up of the United Kingdom as well as in England’s 
subsequent decision to leave the so-called European League. This political process, here 
«dubbed Fuxit by the press»549, was fully supported by English politician Balloonhead, the lead 
campaigner for ‘Fuxit’, who stands in for Nigel Farage. England – renamed Englandshire and 
fallen under the control of Freedonians – is the setting for the second play, a story about 
«[o]rdinary people»550 tricked into voting against their own interests and now facing the 
consequences of that decision. Even though politicians and the mass media, represented in the 
act of simplifying reality for their own purposes, openly lying to the people and duly punished 
in the course of the narrative, are the main target of the novel, the ‘ordinary people’ are not at 
all considered any less guilty. Thus, Remainers are described as «the silent majority» who said 
nothing or «anything loudly enough»551, letting self-centred and greedy politicians such as 
Ballonhead get away with their crazy plans for the country, while Leavers are portrayed as 
«sinners» that have eaten from «the forbidden fruit of the Tree of Hatred»552 and are 
unconcerned about where the truth lies, which is something people appear to be «not interested 
[…] any more» now that «[w]e live in a post-truth age»553: an age where facts and expert 
opinions are less important than the emotions that certain fabricated narratives are able to stir 
up. 
Similarly, Douglas Board’s dystopia Time of Lies, described by Chris Mullin as the 
«first post-truth, post-Brexit novel»554, has been inspired by both Brexit and Trump’s campaign, 
focusing, more than on the act of lying in itself that the title suggests, on the rise of populism 
and the response to it by the liberal elites. Set in a post-Brexit Britain and revolving around the 
general election of 2020, the narrative is focused on the political rise of an ex-football hooligan, 
Bob Grant, who runs on, quoting Shaw, «a Trumpesque platform opposed to both the EU’s 
bureaucratic machinations and the sickly influence of generic foreigners»555. Interestingly, one 
of the few pieces of personal information we learn about Bob is that he has always been 
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«interested in the Second World War, Churchill and all that»556. References to Winston 
Churchill, as stressed before, have been central in the Brexit campaign and Bob’s fascination 
with him could also be an implicit reference to Boris Johnson, who has published a book about 
the former British Prime Minister entitled The Churchill Factor: How One Man Made History 
(2014). Another important reference to a politician, this time to Donald Trump, would be, 
instead, the very name of Bob’s party, ‘Britain’s Great’, which recalls Trump’s slogan ‘Make 
America Great Again’. The character of Bob Grant results from a combination of different 
current politicians – who have been melded together in order to create the ultimate right-wing 
demagogue for the current age – and defines himself as a spokesman of the ‘ordinary people’ 
as well as a member of their ‘tribe’. Not by chance, BG slogans describe him as «a prime 
minister you can have a drink with and he’ll buy his round»557, while Bob’s own speeches 
constantly stress a line between himself and those politicians that «went to posh schools here, 
went to university here» and think themselves to be, as his own brother Zach does (who has 
gone to college and is a leftist Guardian reader) better than the ‘ordinary people’. According to 
Bob, these political and cultural elites «wouldn’t know why Britain’s great»558 and therefore do 
not deserve to be in charge of the nation. It follows that Bob Grant’s campaign leverages not 
only on patriotism (he is even the author of a ghost-written book entitled Getting Britain Back), 
but also on people’s anger towards the elites. Thus, as Zach states while impersonating his 
brother Bob in front of a crowd of BG supporters, ‘Britain’s Great’ is a party born out of anger: 
people were angry about «not being listened to», about «being treated as stupid, foul-mannered, 
selfish and generally full of shit» and being considered never  
good enough to run Britain, but only to work for it, to play the Lottery, to pay taxes, 
waiting for housing which never came, waiting for healthcare which only came too 
late (shouts of ‘Tell them!’). Meanwhile the doing-nicelys were too busy dialling 
Uber and telling the rest of us to jump […] to notice their boots pressed against our 
necks (silence).559 
 
As we know, anger towards the elites, class conflict and resentment are indeed major 
factors in the rise of populist movements as they have been in the Brexit outcome, considering 
that the Leave vote was – at least partially – a response to austerity policies and growing distrust 
towards mainstream political parties. Distrust towards the current political establishment and 
anger for the constant impoverishment of the lower strata of society are well expressed in 
Board’s novel, where a local BG councillor implies that the Conservative and Labour 
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politicians, who have «both sold Britain to foreigners, when we have had a housing crisis for 
three decades»560, are substantially the same thing, and that they have been helped in selling 
Britain off by the financial elite (‘the bankers’), whose «shameless»561 greed would have 
created the perfect conditions for the country’s collapse and loss of prestige. Not by chance, 
bankers are, together with foreigners, one of the first targets of the BG government after the 
elections. Thus, «[b]ankers and former bankers - to improve […] safety and community 
relations» are compelled to «always wear [a] B»562in public places, while any foreigner that 
wants to remain in the UK under the new BG government, as well as any British citizen who 
wants to remain in Europe, must register on the Fair Immigration website. Both decisions recall 
the Second World War or, more precisely, the treatment the Jews received under the Nuremberg 
Race Laws. References to the war and to the Nazi regime appear multiple times in the course 
of the narrative, often in the shape of passing thoughts, and are part of a strategy to show the 
pervasiveness of the memory of the war both in the Brexit campaign and in the British cultural 
consciousness, as well as a way to stress a parallel between the present time and the nationalistic 
fervour that led to the war. Ultimately, another central element of the Brexiteer’s storytelling 
that comes back in Time of Lies is the fear of being invaded, with the depiction of «four hundred 
motley figures», among whom women and children, «corralled behind makeshift barriers in a 
freight marshalling yard»563. What the newspapers define as the «FIRST INVASION OF 
BRITAIN SINCE 1066»564 is actually the desperate attempt of some refugees from the Calais 
Jungle to reach Britain. In this regard, Board’s representation of the immigration situation is 
true to life, as certain real-world elements are literally replicated in his text: the many attempts 
of the Calais refugee and migrant community to cross the channel; the attitude of rejection and 
outrage demonstrated by the British media (and public) towards these attempts, and the deep-
rooted fear of invasion in the English national psyche, already demonstrated in the analysis of 
previous texts throughout this study. 
Trumpism, Brexit and fear of invasion are again source of inspiration in John 
Lanchester’s The Wall, whose title recalls, first and foremost, Donald Trump’s proposition to 
extend the current barriers along the border between USA and Mexico in order to stop Mexican 
illegal immigration into the USA. In the novel, the Wall is simply the ‘National Coastal Defence 
Structure’ built after ‘the Change’, an environmental catastrophe that has led Britain to lose 
 
560Ivi, p.48  
561Ivi, p.98  
562Ivi, p.153  
563Ivi, p.225  
564Ivi, p.230  
150 
 
miles and miles of its coastline and even to forget what sandy beaches look like. The Change is 
«not a single solitary event»565, meaning a one-time natural disaster as it may appear at the 
beginning of the novel, but a slow change in sea levels and weather that has, nonetheless, 
completely re-shaped the country and the way of living. For this reason, the event is felt more 
as «a defined moment in time with a before and an after. There was our parents’ world, and 
now there is our world»566. This definition of the Change could also apply to the way many 
people feel about the Brexit vote: something built up over a long period of time but causing a 
fissure that makes their perception of the country completely different from what it has been 
before.  
Albeit primarily an ecological dystopia, Lanchester’s new novel carries out many 
themes that could lead to define it as part of the Brexit trend. One of these, as anticipated, is 
fear of invasion. The main function of the Wall is certainly not protecting the country from 
further rise of the sea, but preventing the arrival of ‘the Others’, those unfortunate people that 
are escaping from countries that have been deeply affected by the Change. As Holland567 and 
Nevala-Lee have already stressed, both the image of the Wall and expressions such as «[t]he 
Others are coming»568 evoke the ‘Night Watch’ of George R. R. Martin’s fantasy saga Game 
of Thrones, «except that the country is recognizably Britain, and the enemies on the other side 
aren’t supernatural White Walkers, but human beings in rowboats and dinghies»569, who clearly 
stand for actual refugees escaping from wars and starvation in the real world. The incomers that 
are captured by those patrolling the Wall are put back in the sea or put to death, unless they 
accept to serve as Help, which is defined as «a form of providing welfare and shelter and refuge 
to the wretched of the world»570 but actually is, as Thomas-Corr highlights, nothing else than a 
«state-coordinated slavery whereby any citizen can “borrow” useful refugees»571.  
Another central theme of the narrative is intergenerational conflict, with the older 
citizens depicted as the ones responsible for the environmental catastrophe. Putting aside the 
warning the novel is sending to the current ruling establishment about climate change, the theme 
 
565Lanchester, J., The Wall, London, Faber & Faber, 2019, p.110  
566Ibidem  
567The reference is to  Holland, T., «The Wall by John Lanchester review - ‘The Others are coming’», The 
Guardian, 19 January 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/jan/19/the-wall-john-lanchester-review (5 
September 2019) 
568Ivi, p.111  
569Nevala-Lee, A., «Rising Seas, Migrants, War: A Timely Novel From John Lanchester», The New York Times, 
5 March 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/05/books/review/john-lanchester-wall.html (5 September 2019) 
570Lanchester, J., The Wall cit., p.148  
571Thomas-Corr, J., «The Wall by John Lanchester review – dystopian fable for our time», The Guardian, 15 
January 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/jan/15/the-wall-by-john-lanchester-review (5 September 
2019) 
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in question is also linked to Brexit, and especially to the idea that the referendum outcome has 
been ‘diverted’ by middle-aged and old people, leaving the young, who are the ones going to 
live in the future shaped by the vote, to suffer from its long-term consequences. The same sort 
of ‘generational divide’ is portrayed in the Wall, where the ‘olds’ responsible for the Change 
do not have to cope with its consequence and serve on the Wall as ‘Defenders’. Service on the 
wall is, instead, compulsory for the young, who live in constant terror since service can be 
prolonged (if they misbehave) and even condemn them to exile (if the Others breach under their 
watch). The only way to avoid Wall-duty is to choose to have children and become ‘Breeders’. 
The slogan «Breed to Leave»572 certainly has got a certain ‘Brexit vibe’, as well as being clearly 
inspired by typical fascist policies to increase birth rate.  
Other thematic threads connected to Brexit are the idea of ‘enemies of the people’ 
conspiring against the country and the dichotomy between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. The idea 
of a kind of conspiracy, against Britain’s recovery of former greatness and, after the vote, 
against the implementation of the referendum outcome, is indeed hinted at in Lanchester’s 
novel, where Defenders are informed about some «deluded people» who are not taking the side 
of the ordinary decent people of this country, the people you Defenders guard and 
protect, the people for whom you spend your long nights and days on the Wall, the 
people whose security is the meaning and purpose of what you do - no, they don’t 
take their side. […] They take the side of the Others!573  
 
Taking the side of the ‘Others’, meaning Europeans and immigrants in general, instead 
of protecting the interest of their own fellow citizens is exactly what Remainers have been 
accused of, depicted as traitors to their country and quislings.  
For what concerns, instead, the populist discourse that contrasts the elite with the people, 
we see that, on the one hand, ‘Defenders’ like the main character Kavanagh are stuck with the 
Wall, having no power of choice over their own lives, and «should share things, so that they 
understand they’re all in it together»574; on the other hand, members of the elite enjoy a kind of 
freedom that is unknown to the common people, going anywhere on planes (even if fuel is 
scarce) «to talk to other members of the elite about the Change and the Others» or «[a]t least 
that’s what they say they do»575. The meaning of this passage is made apparent by the ironical 
reference to George Osborne’s sentence ‘we’re all in this together’ in relation to the economic 
crisis and the subsequent period of austerity. While ‘ordinary people’ suffer from the current 
 
572Lanchester, J., The Wall cit., p.35  
573Ivi, p.112  
574Ivi, pp.41-42  
575Ivi, p.28  
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economic and political situation, the elites continue to go on with their lives as before, only 
pretending to be focused on solving it. Kavanagh, who secretly aspires to become a member of 
the elite too, is aware of the deep divide between the lower strata of society and the ruling class, 
who «have to let in some outsiders» like him now and then to «spread just enough benefits 
around to stop disorder from below» and to understand, through the newly arrived, «how the 
rest of the population are thinking»576. The very fact that the elites need new members to 
understand the way the rest of the population think, or ‘the mood’ of the people, is a 
demonstration of the detachment of the ruling class from everyday reality, a theme that is to be 
found in many other Brexit fictions.  
Other novels share with The Wall the same concern about the way both climate change 
and the migrant and refugee crisis are dealt with, mixing it with a strong criticism of Brexit and 
Trump’s politics. These are Crudo by Olivia Laing and the novels that constitute Ali Smith’s 
seasonal cycle (the already mentioned Autumn and the subsequent publications Winter [2017] 
and Spring [2019]577), which are also similar in the way they focus on how social media reports 
the news, portrays reality and intrudes into people’s lives. Crudo, as anticipated, is a 
fictionalised autobiography whose main character, the 40-year-old writer Kathy, is based on 
Olivia Laing herself and on Kathy Acker, an American artist who died in 1997. According to 
Ayres, the title Crudo, which is the Italian word for ‘raw’, would indicate the main aim of the 
novel, that is to say «offering a raw impression»578 of Brexit and of the globalised political 
context in which it is inserted. Set in 2017, the novel takes place between Italy and England, 
following Kathy as she prepares for her wedding and adjusts to married life while 
simultaneously complaining about the state of the world. The constant influx of news stories 
that dominated the late 2010s – Trump and North Korea, the Grenfell Tower, Charlottesville, 
the death of John Ashbury and the post-Brexit fate of Europeans living within the United 
Kingdom – shakes Kathy deeply, upsets her faith in the present and creates the desire to return 
to her past. According to Kathy,  
[s]ome sort of cord between action and consequence had been severed. Things still 
happened, but not in any sensible order, it was hard to talk about truth because some 
bits were hidden, the result or maybe the cause, and anyway the space between them 
was full of misleading data, nonsense and lies. It was very dizzying, you wasted a 
lot of time figuring it out. Had decisions really once led plainly to things happening, 
 
576Ivi, p.73  
577The last instalment of the seasonal quartet, Summer, is due to be published in 2020 and therefore will not be part 
of this analysis.  
578Ayres, J., «Whose England? Whose Brexit?», Public Books, 3 November 2019, 
https://www.publicbooks.org/whose-england-whose-brexit/ (5 September 2019) 
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in a way you could report on? She remembered it but distantly. A lot had changed 
this year.579  
 
Making sense of what is going on and distinguishing the truth from the lies among the 
more ‘misleading data’ is fundamental, given that one’s knowledge of the facts influences their 
attitudes towards the events in question. In relation to Brexit, the different attitudes at play, with 
some people supporting it, some opposing to it and others refusing to engage, are compared 
with the different reactions people had under the Nazi regime according to their level of 
understanding of the available facts. Even if Kathy does not know «what she would do if it 
came down to it», meaning if history repeats itself, the fact that she «sees two books out of the 
corner of her eye. Mother Country and Cruel Optimism»580 and thinks of reading them is a plea 
for the reader to get informed and to avoid being manipulated. Furthermore, Kathy’s choice of 
books is also quite telling. Both books are works of non-fiction about the British welfare 
system581 and reflect Kathy’s own considerations about what has happened to England, now 
«unrecognizable, officially racist»582. Thus, while reading the news that Jeremy Hunt is 
allegedly going to sell off the NHS to private corporations, Kathy realises that «the public 
silver» is all that is left of the country, meaning the schools, the parks, the railway tracks, the 
Royal Mail, the NHS, while «[t]he gold had [already] gone», which refers not to the country’s 
glory or the empire, but to «electric power and other utilities»583, to the idea of common wealth 
and of the state as a shelter. The image of the world that comes out from the novel is of a scary 
place where there is «nowhere to hide»584 and what prevails, more than anything, is a sense of 
general vulnerability. 
In the same way as Laing’s Crudo, Ali Smith’s novels focus on Brexit from a global 
point of view and aim to depict contemporary reality in its very making. As Smith writes in 
Autumn, people reading her seasonal cycle find themselves faced with «an old story so new that 
it’s still in the middle of happening, writing itself right now with no knowledge of where or 
how it’ll end»585, a statement that refers also to the moment in time of which her novel is trying 
to make sense, which is new and simultaneously old as the past resurfacing and rebranded. For 
 
579Laing, O., Crudo, London, Picador, 2018, pp.62-63 
580Ivi, p.63  
581Considering the first title a reference to Marylinne Robinson’s Mother Country (1989) and the second one a 
reference to Lauren Berlant’s Cruel Optimism, op. cit.  
582Laing., O., Crudo cit., p.132  
583Ivi, p.89  
584Ivi, p.133  
585Smith, A, Autumn, Hamish Hamilton, 2016, p.181  
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what concerns literary genres, the novels resist «any facile categorization»586, constantly 
experimenting with style and language. The seasonal cycle is also unique insofar as the 
publication of subsequent novels is giving Smith the chance to use different approaches to 
challenge Brexit, following both the political process and the response to it in their parallel 
development through time. It is indeed possible to acknowledge a sort of ‘crescendo’ of the 
Brexit theme, with Summer, the last novel of the seasonal quartet, probably going to reach the 
climax. Thus, while Autumn is a first response to the referendum, and one that focuses on the 
Remain point of view, Winter gives more space to the representation of the social divide, with 
two sisters personifying the Remain and Leave sides, whereas Spring even takes what could be 
defined a fully-fledged ‘dystopian turn’, depicting a post-Brexit reality of concentration camps. 
While it is true that the novels cannot be defined as straight sequels to one another, focusing on 
different characters and developing different plots, they do share themes and strategies, creating 
an extraordinary interplay of ideas and images. Thus, all three novels are deeply concerned, 
beyond the Brexit issue and the themes already mentioned above, with post-truth and political 
mendaciousness, displacement and alienation, the concept of community over individualism, 
and the need to see what unites more than what divides us. Each of them also has what Garner 
defines as an «elastic structure» and, especially, a «combination of dreaminess and acuity»587, 
which is functional to the smooth passage from one theme to another and from present to past 
and vice-versa. Furthermore, it is also a way to stage the blur between reality and representation 
that characterises our hyper-technological age, causing a constant confusion between what is 
real and what is not, and a feeling of detachment that deeply influences how we experience, 
understand, and react to any kind of event. All Smith’s Brexit novels also refer, implicitly and 
explicitly, to previous literary works, from T.S. Eliot’s Four Quartets (also written in a similar 
time of national turmoil), to Ovid’s Metamorphoses and Shakespeare’s Pericles, The Tempest 
and Cymbeline, Dicken’s A Tale of Two Cities and A Christmas Carol, and Aldous Huxley’s 
Brave New World. These references to other famous works of literature, more than an exercise 
in intertextuality, are a way to highlight, as Lyall acknowledges, major themes the cycle share 
with these particular works588, as well as to stress the idea of an unavoidable interconnection –  
among things, places and, most importantly, human beings. Moreover, each of the novels is 
 
586Pittel, H., «Fiction in Dark Times: the Brexit Novel and Ali Smith», Hard Times, Vol 101, N.1, pp.58-67, 2018, 
p.61 (Harald Pittel’s quote actually  refers specifically to Autumn, but I do believe his statement also applies to the 
other novels of the cycle).   
587Garner, D., «Ali Smith’s Seasonal Cycle Turns to a Dreamy ‘Winter’», The New York Times, 8 January 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/08/books/review-winter-ali-smith.html (5 September 2019) 
588Cfr.Lyall, S., «From Ali Smith, It’s the First Great Brexit Novel», The New York Times, 17 February 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/books/review/autumn-ali-smith.html (5 September 2019) 
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linked to a female artist: in the case of Autumn, the featured artist is Pauline Boty, the only 
female painter in the British Pop Art movement; in Winter’s case, it is the sculptress Barbara 
Hepworth; in Spring, the link is to the visual artist Tacita Dean. Lastly, the three novels 
published so far are all characterised by a profound engagement with the political context and 
are the very ‘physical’ manifestation of Smith’s idea of art as an instrument, which not only 
depicts but also shapes reality through imagination. As Smith writes in Autumn referring to 
Pauline Boty’s work,  
art like this examines and makes possible a reassessment of the outer appearances of 
things by transforming them into something other than themselves. An image of an 
image means the image can be seen with new objectivity, with liberation from the 
original.589 
 
Art is therefore represented as a way to better understand the momentum, stripping it of 
previous assessments and looking at it through different perspectives. In order to do this, the 
artist must develop a form of «narrative hospitality sensitive to the tensions of globalized 
life»590 in contrast with the hostility triggered by the revival of xenophobic nationalism. It is 
exactly to this idea of ‘narrative hospitality’ and of the role of art that Daniel Gluck, one of the 
main characters of Autumn, refers to, stating the need to «always try to welcome people into 
the home of your story» because «whoever makes up the story makes up the world»591. The 
ability to imagine things other than the reality we are living in is, therefore, represented as the 
first step to believe in and create an alternative. In this way, Smith acknowledges the power 
literature (and art in general) has as counternarrative, as a sort of portal to alternative 
representations of reality and imagining of the future. 
Counternarrative is an apt description for Autumn itself. Written during the Brexit debate 
and published soon after, the novel clearly sides with the Remain front, offering no Leave-
perspective of the vote and showing «Smith’s own festering authorial anger. at the political 
elite»592. Defined by Preston as a «novel of ideas»593, Autumn begins with a misquote of 
Dicken’s A Tale of Two Cities: «It was the worst of times, it was the worst of times. Again»594, 
which, according to Petra Rau, «suggests that this ‘now’, however strange it may feel to us, 
 
589Smith, A., Autumn cit., p.226 
590Shaw, K., «Globalization», in O’Gorman, D., Eaglestone, R.(eds), The Routledge Companion to Twenty-First 
Century Literary Fiction (Routledge Literature Companions), Taylor and Francis, Kindle Edition, p.34  
591Smith, A., Autumn cit., p.119  
592Shaw, K., «Brexlit» cit., p.21  
593Preston, A., «Autumn by Ali Smith — ‘the first serious Brexit novel’», Financial Times, 14 October 2016, 
https://www.ft.com/content/0e227666-8ef4-11e6-a72e-b428cb934b78 (5 September 2019) 
594Smith, A., Autumn cit., p.3  
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may only be yet another crisis in a long human history of conflicts and cataclysm […]»595. A 
similar suggestion would come from the decision to bring together the Brexit campaign and the 
Profumo Affair of 1963. The focus on Pauline Boty’s Scandal ’63 portraying Christine Keeler 
is indeed a way to talk about the «mass culture of lies»596 that is at the core of both events, as 
well as to place Brexit «within a wider historical panorama of UK governmental mendacity, 
making it clear that this should not be seen as exceptional in meaning or tenor»597. 
Even if it may be just another passing crisis, the post-Brexit landscape the novel depicts 
is not meant to be a reassuring one: the vote has opened a deep divide («All across the country, 
people felt it was the wrong thing. All across the country, people felt it was the right thing»598); 
foreigners, even if only holidaymakers, are constantly harassed («This isn’t Europe, they 
shouted at them. What they shouted was to go home»599); racist gangs hang around singing 
‘Rule Britannia’ and threatening anyone they think to be ‘different’ («Britannia rules the waves. 
First we’ll get the Poles. And then we’ll get the Muslims. Then we’ll get the gyppos, then the 
gays»600). The disruption the referendum has caused is «complemented by the collage-like, 
disjointed temporality of the narrative structure, with brief, fragmentary chapters shifting from 
Daniel’s youth in 1930s Europe to Elisabeth’s childhood in 1990s England»601. The 32-year-
old college lecturer Elisabeth and the 101-year-old Daniel are the main characters of the novel 
and their long-time friendship (Daniel being European) is clearly a direct response to the 
xenophobic Brexit narrative. Not by chance, Daniel is the only one to think that Elisabeth’s 
surname «comes from the French words de and monde, put together, which means, when you 
translate it, of the world»602, challenging British narrowmindedness (personified by the man 
behind the counter of the Post Office who jokes about her surname meaning she is a 
‘demanding’ person) and positioning the novel itself against Theresa May’s remark that «[i]f 
you believe to be a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere»603.  
It follows that, while post-Brexit culture aims to narrow the community, fencing the 
nation off in a golden isolationism, Smith’s narrative is about «history and being 
 
595Rau, P., op. cit., p.37  
596Laing, O., «Interview. Ali Smith: ‘It’s a pivotal moment… a question of what happens culturally when 
something is built on a lie’», The Guardian, 16 October 2016, 
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neighbours»604in which «common land» (the nation) being «by definition not private»605 is 
open to new arrivals and contaminations, and so should become home to a wider community. 
Thus, the love Elisabeth feels for her next-door neighbour and the tender care Daniel puts into 
their relationship, acting as both a father and a mentor to Elisabeth, introducing her into the 
world of art and teaching her how to think outside the box, are positioned against the «new kind 
of detachment»606 that characterises present-day Britain, the attitude towards isolation and the 
general indifference towards other people’s lives and troubles. The culture of individualism is 
blamed for the current lack of empathy found in British society (in particular since «Thatcher 
taught us to be selfish and not just to think but to believe that there’s no such thing as 
society»607). New technologies also account for a lack of engagement in society, with more 
people interacting impersonally through social media in the present. Mass media, also, is 
accused of making «things spectacular that aren’t, and deal[ing] so simplistically with what’s 
truly appalling»608. This last one is quite evident in relation to the Jo Cox’s murder, which, as 
Elisabeth points out, is already «old news», whereas «[o]nce it would have been a year’s 
worth»609.  
Indifference and detachment are pointed at from the very beginning of the narrative, 
when Daniel, who is in a sort of comatose state in a care facility, dreams of waking up on a 
shore, a scene very similar to Ulysses meeting Nausicaa except that along the shore there are 
no beautiful women but dead bodies. Further up the beach, Daniel notes that there are also other 
people, «human, like the ones on the shore», but alive, who are «under parasols […] holidaying 
up the shore from the dead»610. The scene recalls, with the stress on the bodies of small children, 
the discovery of Alan Kurdi’s body on a beach in Turkey, which made global headlines in 2015, 
while the image of people ‘holidaying up’, careless of the dead bodies around them, could be a 
reference to David Cameron’s speech from Vietnam about the migrants’ attempt to get into the 
Eurotunnel, when the then prime minister reassuringly affirmed that «everything that can be 
done will be done to make sure our borders are secure and make sure that British holidaymakers 
are able to go on their holidays»611. The indifference the holidaymakers show for the dead 
bodies, going on with their holiday plans and insisting on watching their little screens, would 
then be a mirror of the way the political class itself deals with such issues, seeing the migrants 
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and refugees more as ‘something to fix’ or as ‘soon-to-be-invaders’ (as in Farage’s ‘Breaking 
Point’ poster) than as human beings. However, as Emily Horton writes, the dream-like status 
of the scene leaves «the passage […] open to multiple contextualizations»612, among which the 
possibility that the scene reproduces one of Daniel’s own memories of the Second World War 
and therefore is part of Smith’s strategy to counteract, as Petra Rau stresses, «the defiant 
‘splendid isolation’ rhetoric of Farage and Johnson»613 in the Brexit campaign. This strategy – 
which sees post-Brexit racism and bigotry constantly pinned against memories of WWII 
atrocities, from Hannah Gluck’s escape from the Nazi in Nice to Daniel’s family being interned 
in a concentration camp – is also allegorically represented in the novel, when Elisabeth’s mother 
decides to bombard an electrified fence «with people’s histories and with the artefacts of less 
cruel and more philantropic times»614. Referring to ‘more philanthropic times’ against 
contemporary attitude of exclusion and rejection is a strategy to remind readers that there was 
a time where the nation was ready to give help to people in need. A response to the news that 
children asking for asylum in Britain are going to be detained in the same facilities as adults, 
the scene of the ‘bombarded fence’ in Autumn is highly symbolic, considering the fenced 
landscape as the nation, the fence itself as the kind of xenophobic rhetoric surrounding Brexit 
and its proposed anti-immigration policies, and the objects thrown at the fence as memory itself, 
reminding us of the mistakes of the recent past and warning about the dangers inherent in the 
resurgence of nationalism.  
The themes Smith reflects upon in Autumn are further developed in the novel she 
published a year later, Winter, where the author explicitly attacks the British political class for 
the way the Brexit outcome is being handled, letting a character say that «the government […] 
is using people’s rage for its own political expediency»615. Those in charge, not only in Britain 
but also in the rest of the world, are described as «self-servers, who’d no idea about and felt no 
responsibility towards history»616and are creating, by turning people against one another, 
damage that will last for generations. The state of Britain after the referendum is even implicitly 
compared to the «kingdom subsumed in chaos, lies, powermongering, division and a great deal 
of poisoning and self-poisoning»617 in Shakespeare’s play Cymbeline. In a similar fashion to 
Shakespeare’s fictional kingdom, Britain would indeed be a place where people live separately, 
each person in his/her own bubble, apparently unable to «step out of themselves» and 
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acknowledge, beyond the divisions, their inherent interconnectedness: that «it’s the same play 
they’re all in, the same world, that they’re all part of the same story»618. Unsurprisingly, the last 
sentence comes from the Croatian immigrant Lux, who, being a migrant character, is an outsider 
to the national narrative of isolationism. Not by chance, Lux also represents a classic trope of 
Smith’s narrative: «the stranger who can reawaken characters’ dormant imaginations and 
emotions»619, in this case, those of the Cleve family. Thus, the novel focuses on a single family 
whose surname, as Pittel writes, immediately evokes the idea of «social cleavages against the 
deeper connections of kinship»620. The family in question stands for humanity itself, bound up 
together, despite everything, by the simple fact of all being humans. This idea of a global family, 
bound together by shared humanity, is exactly what the author pits against the idea of Brexit as 
«a vote to free our country from inheriting the troubles of other countries, as well as from having 
to have laws that weren’t made here for people like us by people like us», challenging the very 
significance of the ‘us vs them’ dichotomy «[g]iven that DNA’s let us know we’re all pretty 
much family»621.  
  The main characters of the novel are the two sisters Sophia and Iris, who find 
themselves on opposite sides (Sophia has voted for Leave, Iris for Remain) of Brexit, along 
with Sophia’s son Arthur, who is paying Lux to pretend to be his girlfriend in order to avoid 
telling his mother about the end of his relationship. Interestingly, the reason why Arthur, 
nicknamed ‘Art’, has broken up with his real girlfriend Charlotte is none other than a fight about 
politics. While Charlotte is constantly «moaning about the state of the world»622 and urging 
Arthur, a nature-blogger and a copyright infringement officer for the same society that patrolled 
the fence in Autumn, to acknowledge the state of the country, take responsibility and be 
politically proactive, Art thinks that there is nothing to be worried about. Not only do they have 
«good assured jobs»623, but he insists that they have no responsibility if people are drowning in 
the Mediterranean Sea or  if EU citizens do not know what is going to happen to them after 
Brexit: «[t]hey chose to come and live here. They ran that risk»624 much like the ‘drowning’ 
migrants, who would have chosen to risk their lives crossing the sea. 
Arthur’s selfishness, as made explicit by Charlotte, parallels the selfishness of the 
political establishment (with Brexit depicted as its visible, final consequence) as well as his 
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mother’s, Sophia, a now bankrupt former art student and entrepreneur. Sophia’s own situation, 
marked by economic, physical and mental decline (her decision to self-isolate is symbolically 
driving her mad), clearly contributes towards making her bitter, angry and indifferent. Sophia 
herself stresses that she thinks to have lost the ability to ‘feel’, meaning to empathise with other 
people’s troubles, be they «[r]efugees in the sea. Children in ambulances. […] People beaten 
up and tortured in cells» or just «ordinary people […] walking around in the streets of the 
country she’d grown up in, who looked ruined, Dickensian, like poverty ghosts from a hundred 
years ago»625. Not only is Sophia self-centred, but her attitude is typically one of exclusion. Not 
by chance, Sophia firmly believes that «there is no more room»626 in the country for economic 
migrants that only «want our lives»627, a narrative that Iris immediately associates to «[t]he 
ghost of old Enoch»628. Sophia also immediately recognises, and judges, Lux’s different accent, 
an ability she has inherited from her father, a veteran of the Second World War who lived the 
rest of his life hating certain accents and languages implicated in the conflict. Unlike her sister, 
who had spent most of her life minding her own business, Iris has always been involved in 
politics and considers the ‘health’ of the planet, as well as the living conditions of other human 
beings, something to fight for. Iris feels an urge for global inclusiveness, so much so that she 
claims to be «a citizen of the world who’s been working with all the other citizens of the world» 
and is enraged at being told to be «a citizen of nowhere, to hear that the world’s been equated 
with nowhere by a Prime Minister»629. 
Ultimately, despite their differences, the two sisters come to reconcile when they both 
agree on the fact that, differently from the new generations, they «knew not to want a world 
with war in it», which is, clearly, what the country seem to be heading towards. The scene of 
reconciliation is also highly symbolical, since «[t]hey fall together naturally into a song in 
another language» which happens to be German, the language their father hated most because 
of WWII. Furthermore, they do not only sing in German, but rather «swing in and out from»630 
it into English and vice-versa, creating a perfect vision of harmony between both themselves 
and, symbolically, England and Europe. The idea of creating harmony out of difference and 
working together is also stressed by the transformation of Art’s ‘unpolitical’ blog about nature 
into a politically engaged resource, which covers a variety of themes and features the voices of 
many disparate writers – including both Art himself and his ex-girlfriend, Charlotte.  
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Despite the conciliatory and hopeful tone of Winter’s conclusion, with the Cleves 
coming back to be a real family, in the last published instalment of the cycle, Spring, the future 
Smith imagines is, nonetheless, a bleak one. As Jordan notes, it is «more explicit, […], more 
proselytising and polemical, than the playful, riddling Smith we’re used to»631, with sections 
that are disconnected from the main narrative and are meant to denounce contemporary 
dangerous tendencies. Some of these sections focus on populist discourse, denouncing the 
exploitation of patriotism («We need all that patriotic stuff. […] a good old slogan Britain no 
England/America/Italy/France/Germany/Hungary/Poland/Brazil/ [insert name of country] 
First»632) and xenophobia (in the voice of a nameless refugee whose face is, tellingly «a 
breaking point»633). Others focus, instead, on more general themes, such as  climate change, 
with a warning coming from the voice of the earth itself («Mess up with my climate, I’ll fuck 
with your lives»634), verbal abuse online and the pervasiveness of social media and phone apps. 
The open critique towards the state of the country, as well as of the world, is of course 
not limited to these sections, but features all throughout the novel, becoming at times more 
prominent than the story itself and transforming Spring into a fully-fledged political manifesto. 
This happens, for instance, when the film director Richard Lease, one of the main characters, 
remembers the last conversations he had with his friend, collaborator and onetime lover Paddy 
Heal (who has recently died from cancer), which appear to have been mostly about politics: 
namely, Donald Trump, climate change, the migrant crisis and, undoubtedly, Britain’s own 
political situation. Thus, Paddy seems to have spent her last months enraged and upset about 
the British government «[m]essing with the ancient hatreds»635 in relation to Brexit and the 
Irish border; about the fire of the Grenfell Tower; about Windrush636 and about people not 
reacting to these scandals. When Paddy asks «[w]hat’s happened to all the good people of this 
country?»637, Richard dutifully answers «[r]acism […]. Legitimized. Legitimized division 24/7 
on all the news and in all the papers, on so many screens, grace of the god of endless new 
 
631Jordan, J., op. cit.   
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beginnings, the god we call the internet»638. Paddy, an Irish person living in the UK, and 
therefore someone familiar with racism, considers this to be too easy an answer. 
The Windrush scandal is certainly a main source of inspiration for the novel, given that 
Smith has even inserted a brief story concerning a British citizen searched, arrested and 
deported to Ghana (a country he has actually never been to) simply because he stood «too close 
to a Porsche»639. The theme of detention in UK Immigration Removal Centres, which is not 
new to contemporary literature (it is a very prominent one, for instance, in Chris Cleave’s The 
Other Hand and John Lanchester’s Capital), is further developed through one of the main 
characters of the novel, Brittany ‘Brit’ Hall, who is a security guard for an IRC run by the SA4A 
(the same security firm we find in Autumn and Winter). In the IRC Brit works in, the security 
guards call the detaines ‘deets’ as in the insect repellent. Calling the detainees ‘deets’ implies 
that the guards themselves are the insects (enacting a reversal in relation to the linguistic register 
the press usually applies to immigrants), and that «[e]verything about the job is repellent»640, 
poisoning the guards’ own lives. The effect the job has on the guards («it’s a neurotoxin, under 
your skin going right into you. Numbness, coma»641) is underlined also by Brit’s boyfriend 
Josh, whose recent interest in a history book related to Nazism is, again, a way to stress the 
important role history has in raising awareness and understanding present reality. According to 
Josh, Brit is becoming «unreasonable self-righteous» due to her job, which is transforming her 
life into «the epitome of excrement»642, ‘numbing’ her ability to feel, think and empathise. 
When Brit replies that her job is just paying the bills and delivering security results, Josh 
stresses that what she calls ‘security’ is nothing else than «upholding the illusion» that «keeping 
people out is what it’s all about»643, acknowledging that the narrative of identity and the diffuse 
sense of national victimhood the Brexit discourse has exploited is only an expedient to avoid 
dealing with the real national issues (increasing poverty, growing inequality, dismantlement of 
the welfare system).  
Although Brit is outraged at Josh’s comments and seems to be fully caught up into the 
system (for instance, she tells a detained Kurd that the IRC «is not a prison» but a «purpose-
built Immigration Removal Centre with a prison design»644), she is too well aware of the 
deception and the role she is playing in it («does that makes me the machine?»645, she asks at 
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one point, hinting at her role as a cog or pawn in the system). Not by chance, she defines the 
IRC as «the place of the living dead»646, given that «[t]here were people […] in a place designed 
when it was first built for 72-hour detention at the most, who’d been here for years, years and 
years»647.  Her level of awareness is also shown by her answer to a BBC journalist about what 
she thinks of Brexit, when Brit undermines it stressing that «there’s a world out there bigger 
than Brexit» and what should matter is that people – meaning people like her as well as people 
detained in IRCs – are actually becoming more and more «meaningless»648, both for the media 
and the world of politics.  
Ultimately, the two stories that compose the main narrative, Richard’s mourning for 
Paddy and Brittany’s life as an IRC employee, end up smoothly intersecting, with the two 
characters meeting in Scotland where Richard, who has travelled up north out of impulse and 
grief, is attempting to commit suicide under a train. His plan is interrupted by Florence, a 12- 
year-old girl Brit met outside a train station and subsequently chose to travel with, suspecting 
her of playing a key role in many unbelievable stories she has heard. As both Jordan and Preston 
note, here the novel becomes «a refashioning of Pericles, Shakespeare’s co-written play of 
migration and family separation, with Florence as a modern-day Marina»649 able to enter 
anywhere and persuade anyone to do anything, even to unlock a unit in the Wood (a detention 
centre known to be rough on women) and free some of the detainees there. Like Lux in Winter, 
the mixed-race Florence (probably inspired, considering her young age, by the activist Greta 
Thunberg) is a catalyst, forcing people to behave as they should and to question their 
preconceived ideas. A typical example of this occurs, for instance, in the conversation between 
Brit and Florence on the train while crossing the border between Scotland and England. While 
Brit underlines that Scotland and England are two different countries, Florence stresses that she 
could not see the border or any difference at all between the two, which makes her wonder what 
would happen if borders were a symbol of unity instead of divisions, «if we declared border 
crossings places where, listen, when you crossed them, you yourself became doubly 
possible»650. It is quite telling that Florence says this to Brittany, whose name implies that she 
is a personification of the country itself. This association puts Florence’s consideration under a 
completely different light, stressing the necessity of re-thinking the way British politics depicts 
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the country, undermining the elements that unite the nations while exacerbating the existent 
elements of division.  
Florence acts as a catalyst also in the way she leads to the encounter between Richard 
and Alda, one of the volunteers creating a countrywide network to help people in need (illegal 
immigrants and escaped detainees) on which Richard will focus his new project, A Thousand 
Thousand People, to raise awareness on the living conditions of migrants and refugees in the 
country. Unfortunately, this is the only good thing that comes from the encounter. Thus, when 
Alda and Florence disappear to reach a secure area where escaped detainees are hiding from 
the authorities, Brit’s sense of betrayal at being left behind («it was never about her. […] She 
was the hired help»651) leads her to betray them, telling SA4A (which ironically could be read 
as ‘Safer’) where she believes the two are heading to. After that, Brit goes on with her life, 
working for the same IRC as she had been at the beginning of her story and isolating herself 
even more, which is also a warning, turning back to the idea of an association between Brittany 
and Britain, of the future that awaits the country once it has isolated itself and expunged anyone 
and anything considered to be ‘different’. 
Even if Brit never admits to having voted for Brexit, her desire to distance herself from 
her Scottish colleague, her uneasiness listening languages other than English («[d]ifferent 
languages shouldn’t be allowed in England»652), the impression she usually gets that people are 
making fun of her or thinking themselves to be cleverer than her, the job she does and the way 
she defends it would all seem to signal her sympathies for the Leave campaign. It follows that 
the characterisation of Leavers that comes out in Ali Smith’s seasonal cycle (Sophia in Winter 
is getting mad, the gang singing ‘Britannia Rule’ in Autumn is clearly a racist group) is negative, 
as with the characters featured in Paraskos’s and Board’s novels. The characterisation of 
Leavers as «a bad lot»653 is also to be found in Kudos by Rachel Cusk, another autofiction –  
the last instalment of a trilogy also featuring Outline (2015) and Transit (2016) –  whose main 
theme is none other than «the question of whether to leave or remain»654 both «in connection 
with families and marriages»655 and with Britain and Europe. Among the many people the main 
character, a writer named Faye, meets and talks to at a literary festival, there is a Welsh novelist 
who offers a description of the typical Brexit voter: 
 
651Ivi, p.317  
652Ivi, p.327  
653Freeman, L., op. cit.  
654Cusk, R., Kudos, London, Faber & Faber Limited, 2018, p.12  
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The day after the referendum, he said, he had been visiting his parents in 
Leicestershire and had stopped for petrol and a cup of coffee in a service station. It 
was a dismal place, and the man sitting next to him - a great pockmarked tattooed 
creature - was tucking into a huge plate of fried food and announcing to the whole 
room that at long last he could be an Englishman eating a full English breakfast in 
his own country.656 
 
This description of Leavers as ‘creatures’ whose decision to vote for Brexit is something 
that «makes you think democracy wasn’t such a good idea after all»657 perfectly exemplifies, 
as we have seen, the attitude a significant part of the cultural elite has adopted towards the 
Brexit vote, considering it, as the Welsh novelist in Kudos states talking about the vote in Wales, 
«a bit of a case of turkeys voting for Christmas»658, meaning a vote driven by ignorance. 
Precisely as Cusk’s Welsh novelist, who does not analyse the vote seriously even though he 
knows that the percentage of Leavers has been higher in the poorest neighbourhoods, many 
members of the cultural elite have only focused on ridiculing and caricaturing Leave voters, 
showing no intention to engage more deeply with the socio-economic and cultural contexts – 
leaving aside prejudices and misconceptions – that may have made Brexit appealing to a portion 
of the country. This is the same attitude that we have found in many of the novels mentioned 
and briefly analysed so far, where Leavers are depicted as sinners, racists, ignorant people easily 
manipulated by politicians and mass media, and where the Leave vote is only something to 
oppose, challenge and reject. 
Into a Leaver’s Mind: Brexit ‘Intimate’ Novels 
Understanding both of the perspectives underpinning Brexit, which includes taking time to 
comprehend the Leavers’ mindset, is precisely the aim of the secondary of BrexLit novels, 
which look to tackle «radical inequalities of access and socioeconomic imbalance» and the 
«fears surrounding national identity and cultural change in post-Brexit Britain»659. Novels that 
have these characteristics include Anthony Cartwright’s The Cut (2016), Amanda Craig’s The 
Lie of the Land (2017) and Adam Thorpe’s Missing Fay (2017), three Brexit fictions that focus 
on everyday life in Britain, giving voice to the most vulnerable fringes of contemporary society. 
According to Day, these are «intimate novels that have retreated to the margins in order to 
explore the putative divide between metropolitan liberal elitism and economically deprived 
provincial despair»660, setting their narratives, as Jackson stresses, «in parts of Britain often 
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ignored in literature»661 but deeply affected by de-industrialisation and unemployment. As 
Rachel Reeves writes, these are areas (the industrial towns, the coalfield and the rural districts) 
that have yet to recover from the economic crisis but that British politics seems to have 
forgotten, excluding them from policies that promotes economic growth and focusing, instead, 
on cities and regions (for instance, the South-East of England) that are already out of the Great 
Recession.662 It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that these are also the regions of Britain 
where the majority of people have voted for Leave: for instance, the English and Welsh 
coalfield districts, where a majority of 62 per cent voted to Leave, or the rural district containing 
Grimsby, Cleethorpes and Immingham, whose inhabitants were 70 per cent in favour of leaving 
the EU.663  
This is also the case of Dudley in Anthony Cartwright’s The Cut, an area (the Black 
Country) that once was the industrial heart of England and is now «a site of multiple socio-
economic deprivations», where the loss of industrial work has paved the way for low-paid, 
temporary jobs and precariousness and «the Leave vote was 67.6 per cent»664. Divided into 
chapters entitled ‘Before’ and After’, with the referendum standing as a sort of ‘temporal 
watershed’ among the sections, The Cut is unique in the way it has been specifically 
commissioned by Meike Ziervogel of Peirene Press to understand «[w]hat fears - and what 
hopes - drove my fellow citizens to vote for Brexit»665. To obtain such a result, the novel focuses 
on the ill-fated romance between the young documentary maker Grace Trevithick and the 
labourer and ex-boxer Cairo Jukes, whose first encounter is, not by chance, linked to the vote. 
Thus, Grace is in Dudley in order to «get the voice of ordinary people»666 about Brexit, trying 
to lift the «kind of veil» she perceives between «these people»667 and the cultural elite she 
herself is a member of. Grace’s attempt to depict the Leavers’ perspective, opening a space for 
dialogue beyond her own stereotypes and expectations, mirrors Cartwright’s attempt to mend 
the divide Brexit has uncovered (‘the cut’, as the title puts it), hoping his novel could serve as 
a kind of antidote to the massive generalisations all sorts of people were making after 
the referendum, that we had seventeen and a half million racists on one side and 
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sixteen million people who were happy with a kind of social apartheid based on class 
on the other.668 
 
Thus, the first exchange and then the romance that develops between Grace and Cairo, 
the only person who agrees to talk to her about his voting intentions, not only symbolises the 
‘awakening’ that the referendum has been in relation to the thoughts, the desires and the 
everyday reality of the «two distinct nations»669, but the characters also personify a willingness 
to go beyond the ‘easy’ generalisations Cartwright referenced. Grace, in particular, is constantly 
forced to re-negotiate her own preconceived ideas about Leavers, in primis the idea of them as 
ignorant people (her surprise for the way Cairo is able to articulate his thoughts hints at this) 
and the belief that the Leave vote is all «about immigration»670, racism and UKIP’s appealing 
storytelling. As Cairo states, the Leave vote actually has nothing to do with these issues, but 
rather is a reaction to years of economic decline and cultural isolation. According to Cairo, 
working class people voting for Leave are simply 
[t]ired of change, tired of the world passing by, tired of other people getting things 
that you and people like you had made for them, tired of being told you were no 
good, tired of being told that what you believed to be true was wrong, tired of being 
told to stop complaining, tired of being told what to eat, what to throw away, what 
to do and what not to do, what was right and wrong when you were always in the 
wrong. Tired of supermarket jobs and warehouse jobs and jobs guarding shopping 
centres. Work had always worn people out, the heat of furnaces, the clang of iron, 
but this is tiredness of a different order, tiredness that a rest will not cure, like a 
plague, eating away at them all.671 
 
As Cartwright himself explains, the sense of tiredness that Cairo refers to in the story 
comes from the realisation that one is living «on what seems to be the wrong side of a historical 
divide»672. Cairo views the working classes as having always been trapped producing the goods 
and materials that fuel the country, contributing to the wealth of the rich. They, however, never 
stand to experience this wealth themselves, remaining «neglected, forgotten»673 and now, in the 
present, experience the «actual loss» of «[j]obs, houses, security»674. The tiredness he speaks 
of, therefore, comes from the weight of centuries of being overlooked. 
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It follows that for people like Cairo the vote represents a chance to make their «invisible, 
mute»675 world visible again, and their voices finally heard. Consequently, Cairo dismisses 
Grace’s  allusions to the influence of UKIP’s narrative in his voting intentions, implying that 
he is not a pawn: he knows that, for most of the politicians and the newspapers advocating for 
Brexit, this is just «a funny game»676 to play from their fancy houses and lives, but his vote, as 
an act of protest against the system itself, has no part in it. Ultimately, the structural violence 
Cairo’s community has been the victim of is exemplified by the way his interview is played on 
the news, with «subtitles under his words»677 as if he was not speaking English. Adding subtitles 
makes Cairo seem like a foreigner, someone that does not belong to the country or, to be more 
precise, someone that belongs to areas «[t]he rest of the country is ashamed of»678,while also 
making his opinion seem less valuable and more marginal. At the end of the novel, Cairo’s 
sense of invisibility and lack of power over both politics and his personal life lead him to set 
fire to himself, a violent and brutal concluding scene that reproduces the beginning of the 
narrative (where a woman is on fire amid general indifference), giving to it a cyclical structure. 
Setting fire to his own body is clearly a way to make himself visible again and to symbolically 
‘regain’ power in a world that makes people like him –  with no skills or qualifications, and 
having been born in the wrong part of the country –  think that they have no choice and no 
possibility of improvement. 
Like Anthony Cartwright’s novel, also Amanda Craig’s The Lie of the Land focuses on 
a part of Britain where the Leave vote has been higher than the national result – the rural areas 
of Devon – and aims to represent, as she explains, those «invisible people» (in this case, 
farmers) «too often forgotten or despised, especially by politicians»679. Defined by Angelini a 
«post-recession novel»680, The Lie of the Land is set after the economic crisis and before the 
referendum, depicting a country where «[b]anks have defaulted, businesses have gone bankrupt 
and millions have lost their belief in a better future» seeing «their income shrivel and their 
hopes fade»681. This is happening both in London, where Lottie and Quentin, a married couple 
in crisis, are experiencing «the great unmentionable fear of middle-class life, that a person can 
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be downwardly mobile, rather than upwardly»682 so, as well as in Devon, where they move the 
family to avoid ending up broke. Thus, after the dairy and other shops have been forced to close, 
many of the Devonians are forced to ask for work in a food factory called Humbles, constantly 
competing with immigrants who, being «young and single»683 and staying only for a few 
months, are willing to accept low wages and degrading work conditions. In this way, the novel 
perfectly represents the difference Zadie Smith outlines between London and «[e]lsewhere in 
Britain», where  
people really do live cheek-by-jowl with the recently migrated, and experience the 
undercutting of their wages by newcomers. They really do have to fight for resources 
under an austerity government that makes it all too easy to blame your unavailable 
hospital bed on the migrant family next door, or on an oblique bureaucracy across 
the Channel, which the nitwit demagogues on the TV keep telling you is the reason 
there’s not enough money in the NHS.684 
 
Moving the narrative from London to Devon, Craig has the chance not only to unveil 
the gulf that «lies between the urban and the rural»685 and the prejudices on both sides of the 
divide, but vitally to give voice to the rural perception of being a neglected community. Thus, 
although some of the locals show racist and prejudicial attitudes towards immigrants (one of 
the minor characters, Maddy, even warns Lottie’s son Xan to «take care with those girls» from 
Poland, stating that all they want is «a little British baby […] and benefits»686), their major 
problems are less related to migrants than to Britain’s own policies, which fail to create wealth 
for society as a whole and to respond to the needs of common people. Thus, while the 
community’s past was marked by a «cradle-to-grave socialism»687, now «[t]here’s nowhere for 
mothers and babies to go, apart from the church, which is bloody freezing»688;  there are endless 
waiting lists for school places and appointments with the doctor; the young who did not inherit 
a farm and have no skills or qualifications are not given a chance to be trained and employed; 
the farmers, dealing with «mountains of paperwork for the hated EU»689, are underfunded, 
exploited by or forced to compete with multinational corporations, and even growing weed to 
survive and Army veterans, even the disabled ones, are left without any allowances, their 
service to the country having been completely forgotten. If the countryside is, as the midwife 
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Sally thinks, a place «where, if something goes wrong, [people] can be pushed out of sight, and 
out of mind»690 by the ruling class, it should not come as a surprise that, again as a vote of 
protest against mainstream parties, most of the Devonians are going to vote for UKIP and for 
leaving Europe.  
Interestingly, Craig’s novel also gives space to the immigrant’s perspective. While in 
The Cut the immigrants that work with Cairo (the Romanians and the Albanians that are 
actually, respectively, from Moldova and from Kosovo) are only a ghostly presence, men that 
«disappear with the mist»691, in The Lie of The Land Polish, Lithuanian and Romanian workers 
are not only the source of local outbursts due to the competitive force they represent, but 
characters who express their point of view and defend themselves against the locals’ 
stereotyping. In the course of the narrative, they describe what reality in Britain, working both 
in farms and in factories such as Humbles, really looks like for people like them: «cramped and 
shoddy homes»692 or caravans to share with strangers; terrible work conditions; low wages and 
overt racism. Inserting the migrant perspective is clearly a way to challenge the Brexiteers’ 
storytelling about incomers «tak[ing] jobs and homes from English peoples»693, as well as to 
give them the dignity they were deprived of in the Brexit campaign, where they were not fellow 
human beings but faceless enemies and ‘swarms’ of invaders to be stopped or expelled.  
Similar strategies to challenge Brexit discourse and depict the multiple perspectives that 
were at play in the referendum are to be found in Adam Thorpe’s Missing Fay, another choral 
state-of-the-nation novel set in a Brexit area, the county of Lincolnshire. As Shaw reports, the 
area of Lincolnshire witnessed «the highest percentage of Leave votes in the UK»694, to the 
extent that it has even been defined by Day as «the Ground Zero of Brexit»695. Even if written 
mostly before the vote, the novel is marked by the same sense of hopelessness, powerlessness 
and abandonment that characterised Cartwright’s and Craig’s novels, staging a Lincoln, the city 
where most of the events occur, that is suffering due to both the recession and austerity policies. 
Set between 2011 and 2012, the novel is centred on the disappearance of a 14-year-old girl, the 
‘Fay’ the title refers to, who impacts in different ways the lives of the other six characters that 
are at the core of the narrative: the shop manager Sheena, who is also Fay’s supervisor for her 
Year 10 work experience; the Kiwi eco campaigner David, who is on holiday with his family 
and constantly worries about the environment; the survivor of the Kindertransport Howard, 
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struggling with old age and his wife’s mental illness and hospitalisation; the owner of a second-
hand bookshop, Mike, who is nostalgic for the ways of the past; the TV producer Chris, who is 
trying to leave behind his previous life by becoming a Trappist monk; and the Romanian 
Cosmina, who is working as a nurse in the care facility where Howard’s wife and Mike’s mother 
are, waiting to earn enough money to go to begin a class in journalism.  For most of them, the 
missing girl, usually an element of the crime genre, is only someone «half seen»696 – a brief 
encounter, a poster on the wall, a passer-by, a ghost from the past – whose fate, ultimately, 
remains unknown. While Fay’s disappearance partly represents in the course of the narrative, 
as Day writes, «a void […] about our prejudices and how we fail to communicate them to one 
another»697, her near invisibility and the little interest people and newspapers show for her case 
also symbolises the very invisibility of the lower strata of society. Thus, as Hurley stresses, the 
fact that Fay is on benefits, living in «the rougher half of the council estate»698 with her 
«damaged mother, the dodgy stepfather»699 and the son of the latter, her very living conditions, 
taking care of both herself and her mother despite her young age, makes her the perfect «symbol 
of the white working class overlooked by politicians for years»700 and also of those who have 
been crushed by the economic crisis and the austerity cuts that followed.  
Unsurprisingly, class prejudice towards the most vulnerable part of the society is evident 
all throughout the novel, with impoverishment being called a «myth»701 and people on benefits 
being referred to as «scroungers»702. This also appears in the form of xenophobia, which is a 
clear response to the city «[b]urgeoning with foreigners»703. Thus, although one of the main 
characters, Mike, states that «[w]e’re all as one in Europe: […] in less than two years – 
Romanians won’t even have to have a work permit. They’ll be a proper part of the family»704, 
his is clearly not the opinion of the majority. On the contrary, the majority of the minor 
characters shows explicit racist views, refusing to be visited by non-white doctors, making 
foreigners the scapegoats of everything bad going on in Lincoln, accusing them of being light-
fingered and, by virtue of being in England, of stealing «someone’s job. […] Someone 
 
696Hurley, A. M., «Missing Fay by Adam Thorpe review – a timely study of a restless nation», The Guardian, 22 
June 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2017/jun/22/missing-fay-by-adam-thorpe-review (5 September 
2019) 
697Day, J., op. cit.  
698Thorpe, A., Missing Fay, London, Jonathan Cape, 2017, p.133  
699Ivi, p.143  
700Hurley, A. M., op. cit.  
701Thorpe, A., op. cit., p.150  
702Ivi, p.143  
703Ivi, p.131  
704Ivi, p.193  
172 
 
native»705. Even the teenager Fay, caught shoplifting by the security guard Piotr, immediately 
associates his name with someone of «Polack or Latvi» origin and thinks to herself the soon-
to-be Brexit mantra «[g]o back home»706. In the end, it is telling that one of the few characters 
showing a non-xenophobic attitude is Howard, who, as a Jew escaped from Germany, knows 
well the dangers inherent in certain attitudes and narratives, reminding the reader, with his very 
presence, of a time where the nation was comparatively open to welcome refugees. This is a 
time Howard’s friends have clearly forgotten, as demonstrated by the fact that they do not care 
about National Holocaust Memorial Day and are forgetful of Howard’s own status as a survivor. 
Inserting a certain typology of characters (survivors of the Holocaust, refugees) to raise 
awareness, makes the reader empathise with their plight. Invoking welcoming image of the 
country is also a strategy that we have already found in Ali Smith’s Autumn, through the 
character of Daniel, and that is also present in Paraskos’ Rabbitman, where a minor character 
(tellingly named ‘Winston’ as Winston Churchill) confesses his family to be Huguenots, 
«[r]efugees from persecution who came to this country and found a home. They came a long 
time ago, of course, but they still came from somewhere else and asked for help, and they got 
help»707. As in Smith’s and Thorpe’s novels, the very reference to refugees that have ‘mingled’ 
and become British themselves is also a way to question the very idea of an indigenous core, 
implying instead that the actual British population is in fact the result of previous and on-going 
migrant flows. In Missing Fay, ultimately, the clash between the two attitudes (the ‘welcoming’ 
past and the ‘unwelcoming’ present) is highlighted by Howard’s reluctance in openly opposing 
his friend’s racist views («better to keep your head down»708). With the ‘natives’ under the spell 
of the Brexit narrative, Howard clearly fears standing out and being recognised as an outsider 
despite having spent his entire life in England, a fear that highlights the national attitude of 
exclusion and the rootedness of the narratives of identity that were exploited during the course 
of the Brexit campaign. 
After this brief investigation into the two different ‘paths’ composing Brexit Literature, 
it is already possible, even if only three years have passed since the referendum, to detect some 
common strategies, themes and characteristics that define the subgenre and are shared by the 
majority of the novels, both the ‘political’ and the ‘intimate’ ones. As emerged from the 
analysis, in fact, all of the texts refer, implicitly or explicitly, to the Brexit campaign, utilising 
the themes that were at its very core and, in most cases, even directly inserting its most popular 
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slogans and images into the narrative. In relation to this, many of works featured explicitly 
reference the Second World War, offering alternative narratives to the isolationist and 
xenophobic one exploited by Brexiteers, as well as to the ethnic and social cleavages at the core 
of Brexit discourse, summarised by the two dichotomies  ‘native versus foreigner’ and ‘people 
versus the elite’. Focusing on the latter of the two, in particular, authors tend to give space to 
self-criticism, analysing the extent to which the liberal Left and the cultural elite have become 
‘detached’ from the world of the ‘ordinary people’ and calling for a more active role of literature 
(and art in general) in social and political matters. Furthermore, as both Shaw and Pittel have 
underlined, all the Brexit fictions published so far share a similar approach in relation to the 
European Union, which is rarely a topic of conversation – there are just a few passing references 
to it, normally relating to EU regulation or EU-funded things –  and the narratives almost never 
take place within Europe itself (an exception is to be found, as we will soon see, in Jonathan 
Coe’s Middle England). Moreover, the novels in question are set specifically in England, mostly 
ignoring Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The choice of an English setting and, 
consequently, of an English perspective is in line with the major role England has played in the 
Brexit outcome, as well as being the most direct way to tackle one major factor that influenced 
the English vote: the question of English identity.  
It is indeed not by chance that in front of Howard’s xenophobic friend’s house in 
Missing Fay there is a St George’s flag, or that Brit in Ali Smith’s Spring has to remind herself 
that she should say Britain instead of England, in a similar fashion to the way the politicians in 
Hawes’ Speak for England make British their buzzword and try to avoid directly referencing 
England. Thus, leaving aside more general references to the question of identity and its 
constructedness – examples are Lanchester’s approach in The Wall, when the main character 
Kavanagh, after being expelled from his country, wonders about the possibility of being part of 
a new kind of ‘us’ and finds it confusing, or Smith’s one in Autumn, when the main character 
Elisabeth, talking about Daniel to her mother, stresses that «[h]e’s not just one thing or another. 
Nobody is. Not even you»709 – many Brexit fictions tend to focus directly on Englishness, 
especially on English feelings of victimhood and superiority and on traditional and progressive 
visions of the country and its people. In The Lie of the Land, for instance, the locals feel 
themselves to be forgotten and unfairly disadvantaged compared to the foreigners. Furthermore, 
Lottie and Quentin are embarrassed at having a housecleaner who is «English like them, rather 
than foreign»710 and are in shock when she is discovered to be a murderer, given that anyone 
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evil, like the anonymous torturer of pets in Missing Fay, is immediately labelled as someone 
«not from round here»711, meaning definitely not English. Ultimately, Englishness is also a 
synonym of whiteness for the locals, with Lottie’s son Xan, conceived after a brief fling with a 
black man, being requested to show his ID in order to prove he is English and being constantly 
reminded of his blackness as a characteristic that, in a «Devon […] full of white people»712, 
makes him forever an outsider. In this way, the novel highlights the link between the exclusive 
character of English national identity and the ‘native versus foreigner’ divide at the core of the 
Brexit campaign, showing it to be a dichotomy that actually pins the English Anglo-Saxon ideal 
against anybody that does not fit in it. 
Two novels that are particularly concerned with the notion of English identity and its 
relation to the Brexit narrative, and therefore require a more in-depth analysis, are Sam Byers’ 
hi-tech dystopia Perfidious Albion (2018) and Jonathan Coe’s Condition-of-England novel 
Middle England (2018). The focus on England and Englishness in both novels is already 
implied by their titles, given that ‘perfidious Albion’ is a traditional expression in relation to 
England, defining the nation as a treacherous and untrustworthy political and economic 
partner713, and ‘Middle England’ is a common socio-political term referring to middle-class and 
working-class people in England who traditionally hold conservative, right-wing opinions.714 
Both published in 2018, the novels reflect upon the way nostalgic images of the country have 
been deliberately contrasted with present-day England, unveiling the exploitation of England’s 
sense of victimhood, its feeling of loss and the persistence of a white Anglo-Saxon ideal in the 
traditional imagining of the community. Although at first glance good representatives of the 
two trends that characterise Brexit Literature (the political and the intimate one), the two 
fictions are actually quite hybrid, blending analyses and critiques of the most political aspects 
related to Brexit with the attempt to faithfully represent the different souls that compose the 
nation. Interestingly, both novels engage with the structures of feeling regarding nostalgia, class 
and racial hierarchies at the core of the Brexit vote in a very similar way to the two pre-Brexit 
fictions analysed in the previous chapter.  
 
711Ivi, p.190  
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https://www.theguardian.com/media/2007/aug/20/mondaymediasection.pressandpublishing (5 September 2019)  
 175 
 
Darkin Versus Trina: The Two Englands of Perfidious Albion 
Second novel by British author Sam Byers, Perfidious Albion is a hi-tech dystopia defined by 
Freeman as a «brilliant, twitchy satire on media manipulation, grievance oneupmanship and 
online echo chambers»715. In a similar fashion to the other Brexit novels belonging to the first 
category of BrexLit, which are usually set in England at the time of the vote or soon after, the 
novel takes place in an English town called Edmundsbury (a name that evokes, even if no 
association is made explicit in the novel, the Suffolk borough of St Edmundsbury) in an 
unspecified time after Brexit, which is mentioned only once in the course of the narrative. 
Although the vote in itself seems to have a marginal role, the themes on which the narrative 
focuses – the way that the media and politicians manipulate people’s affective response to 
certain events, the open criticism towards the cultural elite, the «divides along genre, race and 
culture lines»716 among the inhabitants, the contrasting visions of England it depicts – are 
certainly relevant to Brexit, leading to its identification as Brexit fiction. 
Guiding the reader in a destabilising «world of quickfire information»717, online 
harassment and ever-present, intruding social media similar to that depicted in Olivia Laing’s 
Crudo and Ali Smith’s seasonal cycle, the author portrays an England where «[t]he modern 
world can no longer be escaped»718 even in small and remote towns like Edmundsbury, where 
the «culture of expenditure»719 is reaching its peak, where there is no more sense of community, 
and where hyper-technological systems (such as those run by the local tech company Green) 
are flooding into every aspects of the town’s life to slowly remove the unproductiveness of 
choice and let ideas being generated only «by those whose position in the hierarchy allowed 
them to think»720. The future Byers depicts is indeed so bleak that a local company called 
Downton is planning to turn a council estate, the Larchwood, into a «grim social 
experiment»721: a network with tenants logging in to offer their services to neighbours and 
accumulate ‘community points’ while using different entrances to the building according to 
income and property value. It appears quite obvious, considering the diverse character of the 
Larchwood, its status as a council estate and the idea of communal care behind its original 
conception, that the place, like the town itself, stands for England, and that the way it is going 
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to be transformed. Vulnerable residents will be forcefully pushed out and gradually replaced 
with newer, richer prospects, gentrifying the area. The country, like the Larchwood, is moving 
away from the idea of the state as a shelter, designed to protect citizens, and moving towards a 
more corporate, individualistic, neoliberal future bent on making profits. Furthermore, the little 
interest that the ‘segregating’ project seems to arouse, with Downton’s plan being described by 
the director of the blog The Command Line Sylas as more «sad» than «evil»722, clearly hints at 
the careless attitude of the cultural elite, exclusively concerned with how to increase its 
platform, and of the liberal Left, whose «shift towards a politics of identity»723 would have 
caused it to be forgetful of other central questions on which its policies were previously based, 
meaning class divisions and social mobility. The detachment from the reality of the common 
people and the bubble in which the cultural and liberal elites of the country are living are made 
evident in the novel when one of the members of the Rogue Statement, «an anonymous 
collective of theorist poseurs» trying to «decode the encoded fascism of everyday life», declares 
increasing street-violence as being less important to analyse than the intrinsic fascism of «iced 
buns» or «falafel wraps»724. The self-centredness of the cultural elite is also openly pointed out 
when Jess, one of the main characters of the novel, uses the avatar of Julia Benjamin to criticise 
The Command Line article her own boyfriend, Robert Townsend, has written about the 
Larchwood case, accusing him of caring only «about the extent to which he’s seen to care about 
the people of the Larchwood», so much that «his every self-congratulatory intervention reads 
less like the cri de coeur he so clearly wants it to be and more like the shameless exercise in 
self-promotion and personal glorification it really is»725. The lack of real empathy and the 
substantial indifference Jess detects and denounces as a defining character of Robert and others 
in the cultural elite is also exemplified in the course of the narrative by the way she is personally 
treated both as a victim of online harassment, with Robert initially downplaying it, and as a 
guest at the gatherings of Edmundsbury’s leading intellectuals, where she is described as being 
«screened-off»726, during all social interactions, which is to say that she is consistently being 
spoken about or spoken for, «but never quite»727 spoken to. While this represents the novel’s 
«takedown of masculinity in the 21st century»728, it also reflects the way in which the cultural 
elites view  all those in the lower levels of society, whose members are never ‘someone’ to talk 
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with but always ‘someone’ to talk for and whose opinions, as with those of Cairo’s in The Cut, 
are to be constantly undermined or demeaned.  
Following this line of thought, the reader ends up finding it quite easy to understand 
why people, struggling to make ends meet and to feel at home in a constantly changing 
globalised world, would be attracted, as Sylas states, by «the new punk»729 movement that the 
populist right represents. Forgotten by the Left, ignored by the cultural elite, scared by «a future 
[…] rapid in its occurrence and uncertain in its shape», these people are represented as 
desperately clinging «to familiarity»730, embracing exactly the kind of nostalgia that is at the 
core of right-wing populism: a nostalgia «in which it was assumed that everything had been so 
much simpler before it all got so complicated»731.  
Looking for a politician who finally speaks to their views and beliefs – someone they 
view as being one of the ‘ordinary people’ rather than one of the «swindling careerists» inside 
of the «Westminster bubble»732 – many inhabitants of Edmundsbury are turning to the right-
wing columnist of The Record and «Farage-ish»733 politician Hugo Bennington. Defining 
himself as «a local lad, born and bred»734, Bennington has centred his rhetoric on plain 
«common sense»735, on «the idea that Britain was in a dreadful state», and on the cult of his 
own persona, projecting «an aura of invincibility»736 and simultaneously playing, as the 
Headmaster in Speak for England did, the role of «the man in the pub»737: someone ‘ordinary’ 
to trust and rely on. What the readers of The Record, represented in the novel by Bennington’s 
fan Alfred Darkin, find most appealing about him is his demonstration of those same qualities 
that have made populist politicians more appealing to certain kinds of voters in the present day: 
breaking and criticising the taboos of political correctness and doing it «in a language you didn’t 
need a master’s degree in bullshit to understand»738. Going against the taboos of political 
correctness means, for Hugo, openly saying things that «[p]eople […] in the liberally biased 
media refuse to report as they actually are»739: for instance, the way in which massive 
immigration (since the Second World War) has been responsible for the current crisis 
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concerning social housing; and how «equality run riot»740 would be damaging  to the future of 
white Englishmen, who would lose job opportunities because «companies must have quotas to 
ensure that for every white Englishman they employ they must also hire three foreigners, two 
women, and at least one homosexual. Doesn’t matter who’s more qualified for the job»741. The 
idea of white English people as victims of immigration and of a ‘distorted’ concept of equality, 
as well as the demonization of the immigrants considered to be the main cause of the country’s 
problems, clearly links Hugo’s politics to Powellism and to Brexit discourse.  
Eager to leave behind a legacy other than just a «handful of columns about waiting times 
in GP surgeries, the need for Muslims to conform to British values, the importance of wearing 
a poppy on Remembrance Day»742, Hugo decides to go into politics, becoming a member of 
none other than the anti-European and rather xenophobic ‘England Always’ party. Described 
as «making a surprising noise in parts of the country, such as Edmundsbury, hitherto ignored 
by the self-serving shitshow of London-centric political wheeler-dealing»743, England Always 
is the obvious literary doppelganger of the United Kingdom Independence Party, forced, now 
that «Brexit was over», to shift from «redefining England’s place in the world»744 to redefining 
England itself, redirecting people’s fears and trying to meet, with the party’s vision of the 
nation, their most inner fantasies.  
The vision of England the party conjures up perfectly coincides with the imaginary 
nation Hugo has always referred to in his columns, the nation he nostalgically defines «the 
England of his childhood, of his frustrated and bitter dreams, an England in which he once again 
felt at home»745. This definition of the England Hugo dreams of, which perfectly matches Brian 
Marley’s initial fantasy in Speak for England, directly evokes Svetlana Boym’s reference to 
nostalgia as «a yearning for […] the time of our childhood, [and]the slower rhythms of our 
dreams»746. In Hugo’s case, the nostalgic longing for the «historical England» that «had once 
made him proud and secure» - clearly the version of the country depicted in the national 
narrative of past glory, built around references to the Empire and the Second World War – is 
both a yearning for «reassurance»747 and an act of rebellion against an unsettling reality: the 
present England he is forced to live in, which is a nation full of foreigners, «prancing, marrying 
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queers» and «blaring, feral, feminist bitches»748 that «both disappointed and terrified»749 people 
like him, who have been ‘left behind’ economically, culturally or both. A vision that the author 
himself defines, in a sort of metafictional way, as being «near-dystopian». The present England 
that Bennington’s columns and speeches depict is indeed a nightmarish reality, a «country […] 
overrun, under threat, increasingly incapable», with «[h]ordes of immigrants massed at its 
borders» and «basic morality […] eroding at an alarming rate, worn down by tolerance, 
permissiveness, turpitude»750.  
The elements that contribute to his vision of the country and are central to his politics –
the fear of invasion in relation to the country’s borders, the image of a morally corrupted nation 
in decline, and the desire to return to the old values that once made the country great – are all, 
undoubtedly, derived from Brexit discourse. As a further proof, when asked by a journalist to 
list and explain the old values England should recover, Hugo even inserts among them some of 
the very milestones of the Brexit campaign, such as the idea that English people’s needs should 
come first, and the need to take back «[c]ontrol over our borders, our laws» and, ultimately, 
«our culture. We need to ensure we’re all, literally and hypothetically, speaking the same 
language»751. The emphasis on immigration, in particular, on the need to ‘speak the same 
language’ and share the same ideals, together with the depiction of ‘hordes of immigrants’ 
trying to invade the country, immediately expose Hugo’s own xenophobia, which is at the very 
core of his rejection of English contemporary reality. Not by chance, after being forced to step 
back following a sex scandal and reflecting upon what he hates most about England, Hugo 
focuses again on «its hordes of immigrants» and adds another reference to foreigners, listing 
England’s «filthy street markets of foreign tat that babbled with every language except the one 
Hugo himself spoke»752. It follows that, although Hugo distances himself from ideas of 
«segregation or ethnic cleansing or whatever it was»753 at the core of movements such as the  
«self-styled ‘militia’ […] Brute Force»754 (a sort of fictional English Defence League Hugo 
secretly collaborates with), his harsh criticism of an England he ultimately defines as «[e]roded» 
and «[b]esmeared»755 is actually deeply rooted in the feelings of «fear and revulsion» that he 
experienced every time  
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he stepped into a shop and was served by an inscrutable Indian, or listened to the 
babble of Middle Eastern and Middle European tongues as they clashed violently 
with the tribal boom-thud of rap from the open window of a passing car full of smug, 
grinning black men […].756 
 
The image of a country invaded, corrupted, and made unrecognisable by disgusting 
aliens exploiting its resources and profiting from its tolerance is also the one Bennington 
portrays in his stance against Downton’s redeveloping for the Larchwood estate, a project he is 
secretly supporting while openly criticising it. According to Bennington, the project would 
indeed be the perfect example of the extent to which «the ordinary white, working class people 
of Edmundsbury had been forgotten, and what should have been rightfully theirs – jobs, 
housing, benefits, and the like – was now all going to immigrants and scroungers»757. The white 
English residents of the Larchwood are, in this narrative, people forgotten and abandoned by 
the state, forced to live in a dangerous environment and surrounded by neighbours (‘immigrants 
and scroungers’) that are the very personification of the England Bennington would like to 
erase. 
Despite being a misrepresentation of the facts («Edmundsbury was home to fewer 
immigrants than anywhere else in the country»758), Hugo’s narrative easily succeeds in 
increasing both anti-immigration sentiment and his own approval rating, so much so as to make 
his final decision to stand look more like a response to people’s pleas than a planned political 
move. The power of Hugo’s narrative is easily explainable as it leverages two equally deep-
rooted feelings: fear concerning immigration and white English sense of victimhood, already 
exacerbated in the case of the Larchwood by Downton’s aggressive attitude towards the 
residents refusing to sell their flats. Among these vulnerable residents whom Downton is trying 
to force out of the area by every means possible, going so far as to worsen conditions in their 
council flats, we find the already mentioned Bennington supporter Alfred Darkin, the man 
whose point of view is also at the core of Robert Townsend’s article about the Larchwood 
situation.  
Constantly threatened by Downton’s man Jones, Darkin’s everyday life is an unbearable 
«agony»759: his wife has been forcefully hospitalised and has recently died (the scene where he 
is handcuffed as watches her being taken away is another element that contributes to his 
representation as a victim); his flat is slowly deteriorating, succumbing to time and neglect; his 
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aching and ageing body is continuously betraying him, making him lose control of his bodily 
functions while also confining him to his apartment.  The death of his wife, the loneliness that 
characterises his life (the only person that comes to check on Alfred is the taxi driver Geoff, 
who used to drive him to visit his wife), the state of his apartment and the lack of control on his 
own body, all contribute to Alfred’s sense of loss, which mirrors the national sense of loss in 
relation to the country’s status in the world and the safety-nets both the community around the 
individual and the welfare system once represented. Moreover, the unfamiliarity Alfred feels 
towards his own aging body, whose unpredictable reactions both disgust and frighten him, 
parallels the same feeling of unfamiliarity he experiences every time he reads about present 
England in The Record. Thus, his mind is «full of worrisome scenarios» picked up from the 
newspaper in question, where «[h]e pictured himself opening the door […] only for it to be 
forced back in his face, knocking him to the floor»760. Unsurprisingly, considering that the 
column written by the xenophobic Bennington is his favourite, the assailants he imagines 
knocking him down are «[m]en in balaclavas» whose «voices would be Polish or black»761: 
foreigners, immigrants and even, simply, ‘black’ people, whose blackness, beyond nationality, 
is enough to define them as dangerous Others ready to attack him. These are, indeed, the very 
categories to which Bennington applies his «blame-mongering»762, arguing that they are taking 
the houses, the jobs, the benefits and the protection that should be reserved for the ‘white’ 
English. Both the ‘worrisome scenarios’ which plague Alfred’s imagination and the deeply 
ingrained idea that «[n]o one gives a shit about people like»763 him – arguably going so far as 
to discriminate against people because of their whiteness– can be traced back to The Record. 
As Alfred puts it: «you want to get something out of this country? Change your colour»764. In 
the same way that Dirk’s hatred for the Other was intensified by the Spearhead newspaper in 
The White Family, The Record provides a similar narrative relating to alleged foreign invasion 
and the need for White English readers to reclaim their rights. The fact that Darkin never leaves 
his flat and that all his knowledge of England comes from the pages of The Record clearly 
deepens the influence the newspaper has on his perception of reality, which is made evident by 
Byers at the level of language with Darkin echoing, as Dirk in Gee’s novel, the same phrases 
and headlines he reads in the paper. Thus, when Darkin talks about the Larchwood situation 
with Robert Townsend, the words he uses – for instance «[q]uotas»765 or the question he asks 
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Robert about equality being a bad or good thing –  come directly from a Bennington’s article, 
which Darkin believes to be more trustworthy (and this, again, invokes the Brexit campaign) 
than the «statistics» Robert tries to mention to disprove the idea that «[t]he cities are full»766 of 
foreigners.  
With Darkin parroting Bennington, Byers introduces another of the novel’s main 
themes: specifically, the impact that the media and politicians may have on people’s responses 
to a given situation and their political views in general, as they both select which stories to tell 
and then report them with a particular political slant. The extent to which events can be 
effectively manipulated to obtain the desired reaction is highlighted in the course of the 
narrative when Bennington chooses to depict Darkin as the typical example of white English 
victimhood and the Larchwood as a failed, «inclusive» experiment symbolising the national 
failure of «the great politically correct, multicultural, multisexual, come-one-come-all melting 
pot of British culture we now find ourselves signed up to»767 –  an embodiment of the England 
Bennington despises. To make both the narratives work, Bennington deploys what seems to be 
the main strategy of contemporary politics: «creating an ‘other’ that is one’s nadir and that is 
‘wrong’»768. In the Larchwood case, this Other Bennington picks up to play Darkin’s ‘nadir’ is 
Trina, another resident of the council estate – a black woman –  who has become quite popular 
on Twitter after mocking one of Bennington’s interviews. Although clearly ironic, the tweet in 
question – «#whitemalegenocide. Lol»769 –  is purposefully misinterpreted by Bennington (and 
later by Townsend too) and transformed into a sort of national case, with Darkin described as 
«a vulnerable old man  […] stuck in his flat not knowing what’s happening, afraid to go out, 
afraid to speak his mind, afraid of his neighbours»770, and Trina depicted as a «dangerous 
extremist threatening the English way of life»771 Darkin represents. Her life investigated, her 
work in the tech-company Green threatened, her flat surrounded by an enraged crowd, Trina 
realises that soon «[h]er own words, and by extension her identity, her name, her very existence, 
had been appropriated, twisted, refashioned and repurposed until all recognition or ability to 
identify had been denied her»772. Thus, instead of being described as the loving partner, mother 
and hard worker she is, Trina  has become a sort of terrorist, a radical person that, using 
Bennington’s own words, is «spewing hatred and violence»773 while «soaking up the benefits 
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of the welfare state, able to live happily and freely in a tolerant society that turns a blind eye 
not only to her race but to her lifestyle choices, her beliefs»774. Bennington’s last remarks refer 
to the fact that Trina lives with other two adults and a baby (an unconventional family the Daily 
Report website will go so far to describe, disparagingly, a «[t]hreesome») and that one of the 
other adults is on benefits (and therefore referred to as a «Benefits Scrounge»775). Furthermore, 
the fact that she is a black woman makes her the perfect personification of «the swelling, 
imagined mass of everyone who was not like him»776, meaning, in primis, anyone who is not 
white English and, consequently, is excluded from the England of Bennington’s nostalgic 
fantasy. Thus, Hugo’s England, like the Headmaster’s in Speak for England or Alfred White’s 
version in The White Family, is first and foremost a homogeneous vision of the nation based on 
a white Anglo-Saxon ideal, which inevitably leads to the rejection of anything that does not fit 
this image. Interestingly, this is again the same vision of the nation promoted in British 
television, for instance in those popular TV programmes broadcast by the BBC and ITV. This 
would include programmes such as Downton Abbey (‘Downton’, the name chosen by Byers, 
is unlikely to be a coincidence) or, going back in time, to programmes such as Brideshead 
Revisited (1981) and The Jewel in the Crown (1984) – both of which have been analysed by 
Stephen Haseler in The English Tribe (1996) due to the conservative and nostalgic version of 
Englishness they project. Founded on what Trina sees as «whitewashed nostalgia and 
chocolate-box history»777, these programmes – like the one she happens to watch «set in the 
last days of the Raj in which glowing young Caucasians lay about on lawns wearing a uniform 
of pristine whites, picking at sandwiches handed to them by turbaned extras»778 – show a 
homogeneous, white and male-dominant reality that has nothing to do with the England she 
inhabits. Being an outsider to this narrative and consequently impervious to its charms, Trina 
is aware that the English future the mainstream media and Bennington’s rhetoric are trying to 
depict is, as she said talking about her new assignment at work, «nothing more than [the] past 
with a thin overlay»779. 
The ‘past’ that for Trina would be a nightmarish reality - the base material for a vision 
of the nation she could never identify with - is exactly the reassuring fantasy that the «Darkins 
of the world»780, deluded and scared by the present-day England Trina embodies, are looking 
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for. Reading Bennington’s article about himself and the possible ‘threat’ Trina represents, 
Darkin’s first reaction is one of fear, coming from the sudden realisation that the England he 
has been reading of in The Record is not «out there, far away, encroaching but never quite 
arriving»781; instead, it is only a few doors from him, «creeping in from every side and 
convening outside his door» in the shape of the «murderous black woman» that «was whipping 
up some kind of race war»782. But his second reaction in realising that he is front-page news, 
that there is finally a politician who cares about him – offering both the «support» and the 
«attention» he was lacking for years and talking about retrieving an England he thought he 
could only dream of – is described as «the unexpected glow of a long-forgotten pride»783: the 
perception of being important, that his needs dreams are finally being taken into consideration. 
Darkin’s feelings clearly mirrors the same feelings of pride and, especially, «hope»784 felt by 
the white working class itself, listening to politicians promising to protect the rights of the white 
Englishmen after years of policies promoting tolerance and multiculturalism at the expense of 
the idea of a ‘white Anglo-Saxon privilege’ inherited from the imperial racial hierarchy. 
Ironically, Darkin could not be more mistaken about Bennington and the very dangers 
waiting outside his door. Thus, paradoxically, those that should have been his champions, the 
Brute Force men that start patrolling his flat to protect him and talk about cleaning the country 
up, are the only ones that seem to be a threat to his own safety (even attacking Darkin’s only 
friend, Geoff), while Bennington, the voice of the people, ends up manipulating Darkin once 
more, making him believe that the possibility of him being attacked by Trina or one of her 
followers is real and persuading him to sell his flat to Downton.  
Ultimately, although a dystopia, the novel ends on a sparkle of hope. Thus, while Darkin 
selling his flat to Downton is symbolic of his fully-fledged surrender to the political and 
financial elite, Trina, helped by Jess and another minor character named Deepa, manages to re-
appropriate her own narrative, releasing the images that will cause Bennington’s downfall and 
even obtaining a better job at Green, secretly preparing herself to leak information and fight 
back at a system that aims to manipulate the individual through the gathering and analysis of 
their digital data. Through Trina’s act of rebellion, the author aims to remind the reader that 
«[n]othing had yet happened. Nothing was yet real. As long as it could only be imagined, it 
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could still conceivably be true»785. As long as we could imagine a way out, a different world, 
everything can be undone, everything can still happen. 
The Heart of Brexit is in Middle England 
Differently from Perfidious Albion, which is a dystopia set in post-Brexit Britain, Jonathan 
Coe’s Middle England is a state-of-the-nation novel whose main narrative starts before the 
referendum, covering a time frame that spans from 2010 to 2018, the year of its publication. 
Divided in three sections, ‘Merrie England’, ‘Deep England’ and ‘Old England’786, the novel 
can be regarded as the last chapter of a trilogy including two of Coe’s previous fictions: The 
Rotters’ Club (2001), a coming-of age novel set in Birmingham in the 70s and focusing on the 
political and economic turmoil that led to Margaret Thatcher’s election, and The Closed Circle 
(2004), which continues the story of the characters at the core of the previous novel, setting the 
narrative between Birmingham and London under Tony Blair’s government. The decision to 
revive characters from former novels is not new to Coe – the already mentioned Number 11  is 
an example of this ‘strategy’ as a ‘slippery sequel’ to What a Carve Up! – and could not be 
more convenient than in this case, considering the elements Middle England shares with the 
previous novels of the trilogy and the themes it focuses on. Thus, beyond having in common 
some of the main characters, caught in different moments of their lives, the three novels are all 
characterised by a perfect mixture between fictional elements, cultural references, and historical 
events to which the «fictional characters must respond»787. In The Rotters’ Club, the personal 
stories of the characters are entangled with a background narrative of economic decline, trade 
union activism, elitism, growing racial tension and terrorism, with one of the characters, Lois 
Trotter, even losing her boyfriend in an IRA terrorist attack (the Birmingham pub bombings). 
In The Closed Circle, the backdrop is composed by the dismantlement of factories, the power 
of market forces and the rise of the far-right in the post-industrial north of England, together 
with the impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the USA, the war in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and the debate about British intervention. In Middle England, ultimately, the 
events that powerfully intrude into the characters’ lives are multiple, as a number of the defining 
moments from the 2010s are included: to reference only the major ones, this includes the 2010 
coalition government between Conservatives and LibDems, the riots in 2011, the London 
Olympics in 2012, the 2015 general elections, the rise of Jeremy Corbyn, the murder of Jo Cox 
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and the Brexit outcome. Rather than being a pointless display of superficial factual knowledge, 
it is evident that the events – even the ones that may appear, at first glance, irrelevant, such as 
the murder of Jo Yeates in Bristol in 2010 or Trenton Oldfield’s disruption of the 2012 Boat 
Race between Cambridge and Oxford – are «intended to create a solid scaffolding against which 
the wholly fictional narrative of the characters’ private lives can rest securely»788 and to provide 
a general insight into the emerging political situation that gradually led to the eventual Brexit 
vote. Similarly to the other two novels of the trilogy, Middle England is indeed deeply 
concerned with the state of the nation (in particular in relation to social issues such as class 
divisions, elitism and inequality), critical of politics and the way it can, as Lois Trotter states in 
the course of the narrative, «tear people apart»789 – and especially concerned with English 
nostalgia and question of identity. As Derbyshire writes, «[t]he idea that there is a distinctively 
English melancholy that is the flipside of native violence and anger is one that runs through all 
three novels in Coe’s sequence» and particularly in Middle England, which is «saturated in the 
fraught and sometimes frightening politics of Englishness»790 that has been at the core of the 
Brexit campaign, showing the extent to which the Brexit vote, both for Remain and for Leave, 
has been influenced by one’s imagining of the nation. 
The novel’s concern with Englishness is made evident from the very beginning of 
‘Merrie England’, which is introduced by a quotation from Ian Jack stating that  
[i]n the century’s last decades, “British” as a self-description began to offer 
something else […] it had room for newcomers from abroad and for people like me 
who found its capaciousness and slackness attractive. Here was a civic nationalism 
that meandered pleasantly like and old river, its dangerous force spent far 
upstream.791 
 
Coming from a Guardian article about English nationalism and the Brexit outcome, the 
quote in question hints at the difference between Britishness and Englishness, considering the 
former an inclusive collective identity able to convey a sense of belonging beyond the blood-
and-soil mentality, and the latter an exclusive one whose ‘dangerous force’ – in the shape of 
growing English nationalism – would have finally found in the EU referendum its opportunity 
to emerge from Britishness – «a host body with a very large grub inside»792 – and to have its 
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say about the way the country should be. This involves, predictably, a return to England’s past 
glories as a leader of the world and the return of national pride. Not by chance, melancholy and 
nostalgia for a past considered to be better than the present and more reliable than the future, 
both on a personal and national level, grip many of the main characters of Middle England, so 
much so that Leith has described it as 
an autumnal novel, and a sad one: poignant about the passing of time, the wishing 
for what has vanished, the decades lost to obscure hatreds, misplaced loves and 
unsatisfactory marriages – and about what, washing up on the brink of old age, we’re 
left with and what we can or can’t make of it.793  
 
A character who perfectly encapsulates many of the traits defined by Leith is Benjamin 
Trotter – one of the main characters Middle England shares with the other two novels – as he 
is constantly ‘wishing for what has vanished’ and pondering what he has been left with and 
what to do with it. Thus, as we come to know from his friend, the left-wing political columnist 
Doug Alderton, «[m]elancholy […] is very much Benjamin’s thing. English melancholy in 
particular. With a side order of morbid nostalgia»794. An ex accountant who has done well in 
the property market, Benjamin is an aspiring novelist, working year after year on the same 
project: a novel entitled Unrest, which combines a musical soundtrack, events of his personal 
life and «a vast narrative of European history since Britain’s accession to the Common Market 
in 1973»795. Benjamin’s intention to mingle historical and personal events perfectly coincides 
with the narrative strategy Coe’s novels use and the historical period they cover, making Unrest 
a metafictional element standing for the trilogy itself and also implicitly hinting, considering its 
focus on Britain and Europe and its title, at the Brexit character of Middle England, centred on 
the ‘unrest’ that has led to the Leave vote. Furthermore, the fact that the fictional novel’s main 
core is constituted by Benjamin’s own past and that it is an ongoing work-in-progress is proof 
of Benjamin’s inability to move on from the past and his desire to revive in any way possible 
his most intense memories. Even his recent move into «a converted mill house on the banks of 
the River Severn» – an «absurdly remote and secluded spot»796 that also his father Colin, a man 
profoundly disgusted by England’s recent metamorphosis, defines ironically the «[m]iddle of 
nowhere»797 – is an example of his obsession for the past. His decision to buy such a house is 
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tokenistic of his «perverse effort to recapture the past»798, fulfilling a personal fantasy dating 
back to 1979. The fantasy in question portrays a future in which Benjamin is married to the 
woman he has always considered the love of his live (the Cicely Boyd he falls in love with in 
The Rotters’ Club) and living with her happily ever after in a converted watermill in Shropshire. 
Benjamin’s attempt to both ‘recapture the past’ and ‘fulfil a fantasy’ clearly hints at the Brexit 
campaign, considering Brexit itself an attempt to ‘recapture the past’ – reversing time and 
restoring the country the national narratives depict – and ‘fulfil a fantasy’ – the idea that the 
country could be again, outside the European Union, the super power it was before, and that its 
people could finally live that ‘golden future’ they have been promised after victory in the 
Second World War. The area Benjamin selects to realise his fantasy is also highly symbolic, 
considering that «[l]iminal Shropshire, wedged between the Black Country and the Welsh 
border»799, represents in all the three novels of the trilogy 
a kind of portal to another England, standing for something ancient and elusive, a 
counterpart to suburban Birmingham in the 1970s or to the exurban Middle England 
of the early 21st century, with its retail parks, Amazon fulfilment centres and coffee 
shop chains.800 
 
This ‘ancient’ and ‘elusive’ England, which appears to be, first and foremost, unspoilt 
by modern life and substantially monocultural, is based on a conservative vision of the country, 
as underlined in Middle England by the references to Tolkien’s literary works (Benjamin is 
even called «Bilbo»801 by Doug). Thus, given that J. R. R. Tolkien’s Middle Earth was inspired 
by the author’s own conservative imaginary of the nation, the references in question would 
implicitly associate Benjamin’s nostalgic fantasy of isolation – and the Brexit one it symbolises 
– to traditional ways of imagining England. 
Benjamin’s desire to isolate and lose himself in the past is triggered by both personal 
and national failure. Divorced, estranged from the daughter Cicely had and subsequently hid 
from him for many years, recently cheated on and left again by her, Benjamin is disappointed 
by the way his life has turned out as well as by what the nation has become, losing that sense 
of community that he felt in the 70s. Not by chance, Benjamin decides to buy his father a DVD 
of the 1977 Morecambe & Wise Christmas Specials, which reminds him of his family being all 
together and of the «incredible sense of oneness» he had experienced back then: «a sense that 
the entire nation was being briefly, fugitively drawn together in the divine act of laughter»802. 
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Consequently, his own affection for the 1977 Christmas Specials and his eagerness to play the 
DVD for his father is another rather desperate attempt to recapture the past, in this case to 
retrieve an idea of the country and the people rooted in his childhood. This is exactly the reason 
why his sister Lois’ «sarcastic comment about the dearth of TV channels in the 1970s» annoys 
him: it undermines not so much «one of his most cherished early memories», but his very belief 
that «Britain had been a more cohesive, united, consensual place during his childhood (all that 
had started to unravel with the election result of 1979) […]»803. It follows that the nostalgia 
Benjamin feels for that unique moment of his adolescence is a response to the changes that the 
nation has undergone, with the communitarian values at the basis of the formation of the welfare 
system slowly put aside and the simultaneous spread, especially from Thatcherism onwards, of 
policies based, instead, on individualism and competitiveness. It is indeed not a coincidence 
that Benjamin’s fantasy of a different future with Cicely is dated back to 1979, the year of 
Margaret Thatcher’s election to prime minister and the moment he believes Britain started to 
fall apart.  
This line of thought is reaffirmed later on in the novel by another character, Charlie, 
who is a childhood friend Benjamin has recently reunited with and a children entertainer deeply 
suffering from the economic crisis. Proof that the British school system is elitist and capable of 
dividing people and shaping their destiny – Benjamin and Charlie’s friendship was interrupted 
by Benjamin attending a public school and their economic situations are now diametrically 
opposed – Charlie also write and expresses his opinions beautifully, surprising Benjamin in the 
same way that Grace was surprised by Cairo’s articulacy in The Cut. In this way, Coe is not 
only opposing those stereotypes that depict ‘ordinary people’ – of whom Charlie is 
representative – as ignorant, but through Benjamin’s decision to help Charlie write his own 
novel he also «allegorizes the need to elevate and give space for lost, forgotten voices»804, 
something he also consciously attempts in his own novel making his «commentaries on Brexit 
Britain and the post-Brexit novel converge»805 precisely in Charlie’s words. Thus, talking about 
the vote in 2018, two years after Brexit, Charlie reveals that he thought seriously about voting 
for Leave just to «give Cameron a kick in the nuts»806 for the austerity policies and the cuts to 
the welfare system his government delivered, before stressing, however, that «Cameron’s only 
part of the story»:  
 
803Ivi, p.49  
804Ayres, J., op. cit. 
805Ibidem  
806Coe, J., Middle England cit., p.415  
190 
 
 [t]he way I see it, everything changed in Britain in May 1979. Forty years on, we’re 
still dealing with that. You see – me and Benjamin, we’re children of the seventies. 
We may have been only kids then, but that was the world we grew up in. Welfare 
state, NHS. Everything that was put in place after the war. Well, all that’s been 
unravelling since ’79. It’s still being unravelled. That’s the real story. I don’t know 
if Brexit is a symptom of that, or just a distraction. But the process is pretty much 
complete now. It’ll all be gone soon.807 
 
The «erosion of the broadly felt communitarian values and sensibilities of the postwar 
welfare state»808, which Charlie is complaining about, was, as we have seen, a major theme in 
Gee’s novel The White Family, where Alfred White’s personal mourning for the wartime was 
clearly linked to the same elements that are at the core of Benjamin and Charlie’s longing for 
the past of their childhood: the vanished sense of community, the slow dismantlement of the 
welfare system, the constant impoverishment of the lower strata of society. The themes in 
question have always been very prominent in Coe’s oeuvre, and especially in the Rotters’ Club 
and The Closed Circle that are, as Thomas-Corr writes, «abound in rose-tinted liberal hankering 
for a golden age of social democracy that perhaps never existed»809. The idea that the 70s where 
«a time when the English were at ease with each other»810 is however constantly challenged in 
Middle England, with characters ready to remind readers that the decade in question was 
actually characterised by «record inflation, economic instability, industrial unrest»811, by 
terrorism (Lois is still suffering from PTSD) and, ultimately, by racism (Aneeqa, a Muslim 
Black girl and a sort of surrogate daughter to Charlie, is quick to tell him that she would not 
want to go back to the 1970, which would have been, as Charlie himself acknowledges, «a shit 
decade for someone like»812 her).  
Although critical of an excessive idealisation of the 70s, Coe clearly believes Brexit to 
be, as Charlie states, a ‘symptom’ or a ‘distraction’ connected to the fact that what was good 
about that decade – the sense of community and the shelter the state represented back then – 
seems to be all gone. That «[s]omething’s been lost»813, as Charlie affirms, is indeed also 
suggested by other characters, in primis by Doug, who takes his daughter Coriander to see the 
factory where her grandad used to work and finds out that «there isn’t much of the old place 
left»814, implying that the England his and his father’s generation used to know is not there 
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anymore. The theme of national loss and decline Doug’s remark hints at is fully developed in 
the course of the narrative in parallel with «forms of personal loss»815. Starting from the way in 
which Benjamin mourns the death of his mother, his personal loss is linked to the public’s 
national loss – in relation to economic stability, job opportunities, privilege and prestige – 
through the use of Shirley Collins’ 1974 folk song Adieu to Old England, «one of the most eerie 
and melancholy English folk tunes ever written»816. The song in question, one of the many 
Benjamin selected for a playlist to listen to with his mother in her final days, is a prison ballad 
of the 19th century that gives voice to a prisoner facing transportation. The prisoner complains 
about his misfortunes in comparison to the past «[o]nce I could ride in my carriage» while 
«[n]ow I’m in prison»817), about the future as a scary reality bringing nothing else than 
«sorrows», and about his sentence, forcing him to leave everything behind and say «Adieu to 
old England»818. While the song could be easily interpreted as a representation of Benjamin’s 
mother’s condition, with her seen as a prisoner of her illness, stuck in her deathbed and 
preparing herself to say ‘adieu’ to her nearest and dearest (unable to speak, it is not a 
coincidence that, hearing Collins’ song, she nonetheless tries to sing it), there is no doubt that 
the change of fortune it describes, the regret for the world that has developed in a sorrowful 
reality and the farewell to ‘old’ England could be easily associated with the reality of present-
day England and the feelings of those people that, disappointed and scared by the future, would 
desire to vote for Brexit to express their anger and asked for a change. This association is 
suggested by Benjamin himself. Thus, listening to the song again after his mother’s funeral in 
April 2010, Benjamin suddenly realises that the words refer to «a story of loss, of loss of 
privilege, that resonated across the century»819 and perfectly matches the story of «resentment», 
«rage» and «simmering injustice»820 he has just heard from his friend Doug: 
People see these guys in the City who practically crashed the economy two years 
ago and never felt any consequences – none of them went to jail, and now they’re 
taking their bonuses again while the rest of us are supposed to be tightening our belts. 
Wages are frozen. People have got no job security, no pension plans, they can’t 
afford to take a family holiday or do repairs to the car. A few years ago they felt 
wealthy. Now they feel poor.821 
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Despite being able to connect the themes of Shirley Collins’ song to the contemporary 
situation, the fact that Benjamin associates the two only after his talk with Doug underlines, 
again, how «hopelessly remote»822 he really is, and not only from a geographical point of view. 
Thus, Benjamin is both a man of culture with a stable economic situation and one completely 
absorbed by his own reflective nostalgia, so much so that he is always half-present in the 
company of others, lost in his own thoughts about the past and uninterested in the present.  
This is quite evident when we look at Danny Boyle’s opening ceremony of the 2012 
London Olympics, a scene that represents «a sort of simulacrum of the televisual communion» 
Benjamin dearly remembers from the 70s, and «[o]ne of the pivotal moments»823 of the 
narrative in relation to Englishness, merging both traditional and progressive images of the 
country. Not by chance Sohan, a gay scholar whose family is originally from Sri-Lanka and a 
friend of Benjamin’s niece Sophie, «becomes obsessed with representations of Englishness 
after he sees the ceremony»824, focusing his research on the concept of «Deep England»825, an 
expression that has become of common use both in newspapers and academic journals. The 
way Sohan is struck by the event also reproduces Coe’s own reaction to the «resonant, complex 
vision» of the country the creators displayed, all «without resorting to cliché»826 and perfectly 
harmonising very different elements. Inserting this event in the narrative allows Coe to connect 
the characters and highlight the cultural divide between them. Thus, the characters that are in 
all respects members of the cultural elite (Sohan, Sophie, who is an art historian, Benjamin’s 
friends Doug and Philip, an editor) spend the opening ceremony looking out for «intertextual 
references»827 and trying to guess even the smallest acts of tribute in it (the pink pig flying over 
Battersea Power Station referring to 1977 Pink Floyd’s album Animals is an example). Instead, 
those who belong to the ‘ordinary people’ (Sophie’s husband Ian, a driving instructor, his 
mother Helena and Sophie’s grandfather Colin) show a completely uncritical approach: on the 
one hand, they are happy to see the more traditional images of Britishness (the «four different 
choirs, from all four countries in the United Kingdom, each one singing a different anthem»828, 
«the scenes of rural life», the Queen with Daniel Craig playing James Bond); on the other hand, 
they are depicted experiencing disappointment, anger or confusion when the ceremony refers 
 
822Thomas-Corr, J., «The English Disease» cit.  
823Derbyshire, J., op. cit.  
824Williams, J., «‘Middle England,’ a Traditional Novel Set in Our Very Unconventional Times», New York Times, 
21 August 2019 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/books/review-middle-england-jonathan-coe.html (5 
October 2019) 
825Coe, J., Middle England cit., p.202  
826Coe, J., «How Brexit Broke Britain and Revealed a Country at War With Itself» cit.  
827Coe, J., Middle England cit., p.130  
828Ibidem  
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to events they consider to be irrelevant (such as the arrival of the Windrush) or to works of 
culture that are unknown to the average public (like Pandemonium, an «obscure book»829 
written by the documentary film-maker Humphrey Jennings).  
Differently from the other characters, Benjamin is not even watching the ceremony, 
working instead on the new version of his novel (now entitled A Rose Without a Thorn and 
focusing oThomasnly on the love story between himself and Cicely), and when he does watch 
it, only switching on the TV after a call from his friend Philip, he constantly loses track of it, 
passing from one personal memory to another. Furthermore, the show leaves him with the 
impression of «a country at ease with itself» and the belief that «[a]ll was well»830, which 
ironically stresses once again, considering the contrasting reactions of the other characters and 
the clash between their vision of the country, the extent to which he is actually out of touch 
from reality. His detachment is also underlined by the fact that he does not understand that 
Charlie’s economic situation is dire enough to have forced him to use a food bank- Similarly, 
he does not understand that the rage his father feels at the idea that «the world’s laughing at 
us»831 has a lot to do with the erosion of the same values he complains about. Thus, the idea 
Colin has that people have «gone soft» (the same adjective the Alfred uses in Gee’s The White 
Family) and that country has turned into a «joke» –  only a ghost of the superpower it used to 
be – is strictly linked to the passage he has experienced first-hand from the «spirit» of 
community felt during the war, with «hundreds of people working together […] for the war 
effort», to the cult of «[e]veryman for himself, survival of the fittest, I’m all right Jack»832 at 
the core of Thatcherism. 
However, Benjamin is not the only one who could be described as ‘out of touch’, 
detached from the conditions of the lower strata of society. This is also the exact definition that 
Doug gives to himself, acknowledging that the fact that he lives «in a house in Chelsea worth 
millions» with a wife whose family owns «half of the Home Counties» makes him detached 
from «that resentment, that sense of hardship»833 he is trying to write about and that he detects 
as the main cause of the 2011 riots and the victory of the Leave vote in the Brexit referendum. 
Talking about the riots with Nigel Ives (a member of David Cameron’s staff), Doug indeed 
underlines that «these weren’t just people randomly and spontaneously running into shops and 
 
829Ivi, p.131  
830Ivi, p.139  
831Ivi, p.262  
832Ibidem  
833Ivi, p.15  
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stealing stuff»834 and that the protests, started by the police shooting of Mark Duggan835 and 
then degenerating in the riots, were, first and foremost, «about race, and about power 
relationship within the community. It was about people feeling victimized. Not listened to»836.  
The fact that people are not listened to by the political establishment is constantly proved 
by the conversations Doug has with Nigel, who candidly confesses, for instance, that «Dave 
and the whole team» thought people were saying «Brixit»837 instead of Brexit, and who 
constantly answers Doug’s «[e]xcellent points»838 about the state of the nation or the Brexit 
referendum with reiterated political slogans, symbolising the self-centredness of the political 
establishment. It follows that both the political and cultural elites are represented as living in a 
bubble, completely detached from the struggles, the feelings and the beliefs of a part of the 
society they substantially never meet with and often either idealise or ridicule. This is made 
evident, for instance, in the following examples: when Nigel describes to Doug the kind of 
conversation he believes the ‘ordinary people’ might have about Brexit and the pros and cons 
of staying in the European Union, going through details and considering angles only politicians 
could look at; Coe’s reference to the moment that Gordon Brown was caught on microphone 
describing one of his potential supporters as «‘a sort of bigoted woman’»839 after she expressed 
concerns about immigration; or when the writer Lionel Hampshire defines the «multicultural 
experiment in Britain […] by and large […] successful» and «[e]xtremes of left and right»840 
not appealing to the British people. As Sohan tells Sophie, referring specifically to intellectuals 
such as Hampshire, it is clear that «[t]hese people don’t know what they’re talking about»: 
[t]his so-called “tolerance” … Every day you come face to face with people who are 
not tolerant at all, whether it’s someone serving you in a shop, or just someone you 
pass in the street. They may not say anything aggressive but you can see it in their 
eyes and their whole way of behaving towards you. And they want to say something. 
Oh yes, they want to use one of those forbidden words on you, or just tell you to fuck 
off back to your own country – wherever they think that is – but they know they 
can’t. They know it’s not allowed. So as well as hating you, they also hate them- 
whoever they are – these faceless people who are sitting in judgement over them 
somewhere, legislating on what they can and can’t say out loud.841  
 
 
834Ivi, p.96  
835For further information, see «Mark Duggan death: Timeline of events», BBC News, 27 October 2015, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-14842416 (5 October 2019) 
836Coe, J., Middle England cit., p.96  
837Ivi, p.265  
838Ivi, p.96 
839Ivi, p.5  
840Ivi, p.30  
841Ivi, pp.30-31  
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In the novel, the characters that perfectly personify the attitude Sohan is describing, 
embodying people’s anger, resentment and disillusionment towards the political and cultural 
establishment and constantly complaining about political correctness, are Colin and Helena. 
Interestingly, they are also elderly people and the very ones struggling the most to cope with 
the new, progressive values the mainstream parties and the cultural elite are promoting. Not by 
chance, Colin and Helena are disappointed by the 2012 Olympics opening ceremony due to its 
«left-wing bias»842, even being enraged by the reference to Britain’s first Jamaican immigrants 
and the several «Victorian industrialists […] played by black actors»843. As Helena outlines, 
for people like them voting has become «a waste of time» since 
all the politicians subscribe to the same fashionable opinions. Of course I voted for 
Mr Cameron, but not with any enthusiasm. His values are not our values. He actually 
knows as little of our way of life as his political opponents do. They’re all on the 
same side, really – and it’s not our side.844  
 
Furthermore, both characters also live in areas that have been deeply affected, 
economically speaking, by the changes of the last decades. Colin is living in a Birmingham 
deeply marked by the dismantlement of the industrial sites, with the old factory buildings he 
and his mother used to work for now replaced by «housing, retail units and a new technical 
college»845, while Helena is living in Kernel Magna, a village where family businesses have all 
closed and the inhabitants, one by one, are moving out, looking for job opportunities and better 
living conditions in less remote, forgotten areas of England.  
Tellingly, Colin is so upset by the transformation of the area that he keeps forgetting 
that the factory has been closed – he even asks Benjamin to take him there to see the buildings 
– only remembering vividly the years before his retirement in 1995. His ‘selected’ memory 
clearly is an act of denial, as confirmed by the fact that he cannot stop wondering how the 
country is going to survive now that it does not manufacture anything, and how everything 
could have been wiped out so easily, without taking into account that a factory is, first and 
foremost, about people, meaning that it creates jobs and ensures the wellbeing and continued 
existence of the community. The perception he has of a nation changed for the worse, the sense 
of loss he is experiencing for his world erased and the disillusionment he feels towards the 
ruling political class are, ultimately, the factors that lead him to vote «Leave, of course» against 
the opinion of Sophie who, as Benjamin stressed, is «the one who’s going to be around the 
 
842Ivi, p.138  
843Ivi, p.130  
844Ivi, p.213  
845Ivi, p.257  
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longest»846, forced to live with the consequences of the referendum outcome. In Colin’s case, 
the Leave vote is clearly an act of protest against what the country has become and an 
opportunity, as Cairo too implies in The Cut, to make his voice be heard and to feel relevant 
again. The connection between the dismantlement of factories, the impoverishment of the 
community depending on them and the Brexit vote is also highlighted in Middle England by 
the many references to Hartlepool, the town from which Sohan’s new man Mike comes, a place 
deeply affected by deindustrialisation where «[s]eventy per cent» of the inhabitants «voted 
Leave»847. Moreover, the idea of the Leave vote as a vote of protest is also suggested by Helena 
after Cameron’s victory in the 2015 general elections, when she remarks that «[t]he people of 
Middle England» (implying people like her, believing in a conservative image of the country) 
did not have any real alternative to vote for and prophetically states that «if the time ever comes 
when we are given the opportunity to let him know what we really think of him, then believe 
me – we will take it»848.  
As anticipated, Helena too is struggling in dealing with the way the nation has changed, 
both economically and culturally speaking. Not only does Kernel Magna seem like a kind of 
ghost town – as Ian tells Sophie going to visit his mother for the first time, a few shops and 
abandoned buildings are «all that’s left of the village, now»849 – but the very composition of its 
population has been altered. This is made evident by Helena’s remark about the new shop, a 
place where «[y]ou never know what language they’re going to be speaking»850, and by the 
discovery that she is now going to be sent a foreign cleaning woman (Grete). Helena’s 
xenophobia, which is highlighted by the way she treats and distrusts Grete, is also hinted at 
when Sophie talks about her field of study. Thus, Sophie is an art historian specialised in 
contemporary portraits of Black European writers in the 19th century, a topic that makes Helena 
ask «[w]ho on earth could [Sophie] mean»851, as if ‘Black’ and ‘European’ are two adjectives 
necessarily contradicting one another. Helena’s rejection of the association between blackness 
and Europeanness clearly highlights her belief in white supremacy (a theme Coe also explicitly 
refers to inserting a minor character ‘briefing’ Benjamin and Philip on the ‘Kalergi Plan’852) 
 
846Ivi, p.307  
847Ivi, p.363  
848Ivi, p.214 
849Ivi, p.71  
850Ivi, p.73  
851Ivi, p.74  
852As Coe reports in the novel, ‘The Kalergi Plan’ (whose name derives from the Australian aristocrat Richard von 
Coudenhove-Kalergi), refers to the project of a pan-European state and to the man of the future as an individual 
of mixed race. Interestingly, the reference to it allows Coe to refer to conspiracy theories about the EU in the Brexit 
campaign, since the character in question believes ‘the Kalergi Plan’ to be underway, with the European Union as 
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and, consequently, in white privilege. Not by chance, when her son fails to get a promotion, 
Helena is outraged and convinced that Ian’s rival candidate (his Asian colleague Naheed) has 
got it only «because of her ethnic background and her skin colour»853, never contemplating that 
she could have simply been the superior candidate.  
This is exactly what Sophie suggests, in opposition to this line of thought, discussing 
the matter with another character she and Ian have met on a cruise. The character in question, 
Mr Wilcox, is a middle-aged man making his living selling and hiring out forklift trucks and 
possessing the same set of values as Colin and Helena. Not by chance, all the three characters 
complain about the same things: firstly, about the BBC representing only the point of view of 
the liberal elites of the country; and secondly, about the detachment of politicians and 
intellectuals from the everyday life of the «ordinary people»854 like him who, in contrast to 
members of the cultural elite like Sophie, would live with the consequences of economic decline 
and, using Byers’ expression in Perfidious Albion, of ‘equality run riot’. Thus, according to Mr 
Wilcox, «[p]eople like Ian don’t get a fair crack of the whip any more» because they do not 
belong to a minority group (meaning that they are not «Blacks, Asians, Muslims, gays»855), an 
idea that perfectly coincides with Alfred Darkin’s statement that – to get something from the 
state – the white English should change the colour of their skin.. Later on, Mr Wilcox’s 
ideological stance is reiterated by Ian, who tells Sophie that «respect for minorities basically 
means two fingers to the rest of us» and that people like him – «white, and male, and straight, 
and middle class» – have actually «become victims»856 in their own country. It is evident that 
what Helena, Wilcox and Ian are really complaining about is the loss of the privilege ‘the 
Anglo-Saxon whiteness’ once ensured in the light of the imperial racial hierarchy unofficially 
implemented in the division of labour. As Coe outlines quoting a tweet from İyad el-Baghdadi 
at the start of the ‘Deep England’ section, «[t]o the privileged, equality feels like a step 
down»857, fuelling a sense of victimhood exasperated by «the stress of precarity»858 and the 
perception of one’s grievances being ignored by the establishment. Ultimately, the source of 
this kind of discourse, as Newington writes, «quickly becomes clear» when «the grim spectre 
 
the pan-European state Kalergi thought of and doing nothing to stop the gradual genocide of the white races of 
Europe. 
853Coe, J., Middle England cit., p.213  
854Ivi, p.154  
855Ivi, p.166  
856Ivi, p.283  
857Ivi, p.141  
858Ayres, J., op. cit.  
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of Enoch Powell is invoked»859, with Helena commenting, after Ian become involved and was 
then injured in the 2011 riots, that Powell «was quite right […] “Rivers of blood”. He was the 
only one brave enough to say it»860.  
The reference to Powellism (and especially to its Rivers of Blood speech) immediately 
evokes the image of a country always «in a state of undeclared war»861, which is exactly the 
impression Coe wants the reader to get, stressing «that Sophie (and everyone like her) and 
Helena (and everyone like her) might be living cheek-by-jowl in the same country, but they 
also lived in different universes»862, divided by the values they believe in and the vision of the 
country they crave. Not by chance, Sophie admits to feeling «wholly estranged»863 both from 
Hartlepool, where she happens to go for Sohan and Mike’s wedding, and from Kernel Magna, 
which she associates, with its Golf and Country Club and the natives’ conservative views, to 
the ‘Deep England’ Sohan is researching. Interestingly, she finds it much easier to feel at ease 
in a European city such as Marseille – where she happens to attend a conference – rather than 
«in the country she was obliged to call home»864. The only ‘England’ she is in love with is, 
unsurprisingly, the progressive version of it that London represents, which is, with its mixture 
of languages and cultures, the dream of all ‘citizens of the world’. 
The deep divide between traditional and progressive visions of England exemplified by 
the cultural distance between Sophie and Helena is also represented by the personal differences 
between Ian and Sophie, whose «Leave-Remain» marriage ends up representing a «microcosm 
of Brexit»865. Their differences, for so long hidden under the carpet, are indeed only exacerbated 
by the Brexit outcome, so much so that they are forced to turn to marriage counselling. Here 
Coe is using a strategy similar to other Brexit novels – the use of a marital or relationship crisis 
to represent the national divide – and simultaneously referring to real events, given that the data 
shared by the marriage counselling charity Relate866 has shown Brexit to be one of the major 
 
859Newington, G., «Rotters in Brexitland», Dublin Reviews of Books, 1 February 2019, 
https://www.drb.ie/essays/rotters-in-brexitland (5 October 2019) 
860Coe, J., Middle England cit., p.90  
861Ivi, p.385 
862Ibidem  
863Ivi, p.369  
864Ivi, p.122  
865Turner, J., «'We've got to talk in a way that is not endlessly violent and confrontational': The author Jonathan 
Coe tackles Brexit in his latest novel — the country is still completely split, he tells Janice Turner», London, The 
Times, 3 Nov 2018, p.4. 
866For further information on the matter, see Worley, W., «Brexit arguments causing rifts between couples, 
counsellors say», The Independent, 29 December 2016, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-
news/brexit-anxieties-issue-troubled-couples-relationship-counsellors-experts-a7500876.html; Wooding, D., 
«NOT EU, IT'S ME. Brexit is leading to family break-ups as couples have furious rows over their vote», The Sun, 
28 April 2019, https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/brexit/8955572/brexit-causing-family-break-ups/ (5 October 2019)   
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issues named by the couples seeking counselling, «a tipping point»867 unveiling the different 
values they believe in, the different ideas of the country they envision and their different 
imagining of the future. This is also the case for Ian and Sophie, as confirmed by the fact that 
the answers they give to the therapist to explain their anger for each other’s vote do not relate 
to politics, but to their own personal identities. While Sophie accuses Ian of being less open 
than she thought, clearly implying, using Turner’s words, that he is «parochial» and «mildly 
bigoted»868, Ian believes that his wife lives «in a bubble», unable to see that «people around her 
might have a different opinion to hers»869 and  feeling morally superior (a typical criticism 
addressed to members of the cultural elite, and one that the reader can fairly recognise as true 
in relation to Sophie’s attitude towards Ian). Their answers, as Leith stresses, highlight the 
extent to which «the Brexit vote was experienced and has continued to be experienced as a 
matter of personal identity»870. As Sophie herself acknowledges, the Brexit result has indeed 
meant to her «that a small but important part of her own identity – her modern, layered, multiple 
identity – had been taken away from her»871, clearly meaning her cosmopolitan, European 
identity, which finds no room to exist in the Brexit narrative of isolationism, antagonism and 
fear of the Other.  
In the end, Coe focuses precisely on the dangers that are inherent in this narrative, 
already hinted at in the course of the novel by the reference to Jo Cox murder, which shakes 
Lois so deeply that it makes her realise that it is time to move on with her life. Taking inspiration 
from the many similar outbursts of bigotry that followed the Brexit vote, Coe depicts Helena’s 
ex cleaning woman Grete as a victim of verbal and physical abuse, attacked by a man that heard 
her speaking her native language and immediately associated her, following Brexit narrative, 
with the ‘invaders’ damaging the country and stealing jobs and benefits from natives like him. 
Even if the consequence of the assault is, luckily, only a broken phone, what happened is enough 
to persuade Grete and her husband that «there are other countries now where life might be easier 
for us»872 and to move to France to work for Benjamin and Lois, who are also trying to move 
forward by opening a sort of B&B and organising creative-writing courses. The event leads 
also to a sort of revelation. Thus, when Helena, who has incidentally witnessed the assault, 
refuses to come forward and confirm Grete’s version to the police, her son Ian suddenly realises 
that embracing a vision of the world based on the dichotomy of ‘us versus them’ as his mother 
 
867Coe, J., Middle England cit., p.326  
868Turner, J., op. cit.  
869Coe, J., Middle England cit., p.327  
870Leith, S., op. cit.   
871Coe, J., Middle England cit., p.326  
872Ivi, p.385  
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does means, at the end of the day, losing  one’s humanity. This is the same revelation Benjamin 
has while looking at UKIP’s ‘Breaking Point’ poster, whose open xenophobia finally drives 
him to engage politically, siding openly with the Remain front.  
 Ultimately, the following reconciliation between Ian and Sophie – who rushes to him 
after Grete tells her about the assault and Ian’s argument with his mother – and the baby they 
conceived clearly want to symbolise a reconciliation at the national level.873 Thus, the couple’s 
intention to work on their differences and their «tentative gesture of faith in their equivocal, 
unknowable future»874 would suggest the need for the country to «move on» from the past and 
«focus on the future»875, keeping in mind, as Jo Cox said, «that we are far more united and have 
far more in common with each other than things that divide us»876. 
  
 
873The due date of the baby is, not by chance, the 29th of March 2019, the designated date for the implementation 
of Brexit at the moment of the novel’s publication.   
874Coe, J., Middle England cit., p.421  
875Ivi, p.391  
876Jo Cox, maiden speech to the House of Common, 3 June 2015, cit in Coe, J., Middle England cit., p.313  
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Conclusion 
 
This study has focused on the literary representations of Brexit in relation to English 
literature, with the aim to investigate the impact of the referendum on literature itself and to 
achieve a better understanding of the Leave vote. In order to do this, the dissertation takes also 
into account literary works published before the referendum, looking for themes and images 
that were at the core of the Brexit campaign. 
Since Brexit is a political outcome, the research started with the analysis of economic 
and political studies published from the referendum onwards, which have been fundamental 
both for defining Brexit and to the framing of this dissertation. The studies taken into account 
have pointed out that Brexit is part of a wider framework. The vote was indeed affected by 
global trends, such as the disillusionment towards mainstream political parties, the rise of 
populism and the spread of nationalist movements. It was also deeply influenced by global 
issues and events, such as globalisation, the economic crash, terrorist attacks on British soil and 
the migrant and refugee crisis. Secondly, the analyses have also underlined that Brexit is the 
most visible manifestation of a crisis of consensus towards the EU, which is traceable in many 
other European countries. This crisis would be especially related to the idea that the EU is 
undemocratic and overly-bureaucratic, as well as to fear regarding its possible transformation 
into a fully-fledged European super-state. In the British case, these studies have especially 
outlined the role played by traditional British Euroscepticism, with EU membership never 
considered to be an achievement but rather a further proof of the country’s diminished status in 
the world. Many scholars have indeed pointed out that, since joining the EEC in 1973, British 
support towards the EU has always been purely utilitarian and that the British have no European 
myth to cement their belonging to the Union. This discrepancy between the British and the 
other EU members is particularly evident when talking about the Second World War, whose 
phantom presence is at the very core of the EU foundation. While in the other European 
countries WWII is defined as a catastrophe and the EU is portrayed as a sort of defensive 
bulwark against the future dangers of nationalism, in the British consciousness the war stands 
as the country’s last great victory, pinned against the constant economic and political decline 
of the following decades. This also explains why references to the war – a traditional strategy 
to stem EU opposition – were not effective in reducing Leave support and ended up, on the 
contrary, increasing it by helping to reinforce the idea of a lost greatness.  In the end, the studies 
have drawn a line between England and the other nations that constitute the UK, revealing that 
both Brexit and British Euroscepticism are, first and foremost, an English phenomenon. Thus, 
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while Scotland and Northern Ireland voted for Remain, and Wales registered a small majority 
in favour of Leave, England was central to the Brexit outcome. England was not only the nation 
where the majority in favour of Leave was the largest but, being home to the greater part of the 
population, its vote outweighed Remain majority in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Moreover, 
in contrast to the other nations that compose the UK, it is England that perceives Europe, 
accordingly to traditional cultural imaginaries, as the enemy in opposition. The idea of Brexit 
as an English phenomenon has also been confirmed by the analyses focusing specifically on 
attitudes towards the vote and their correlation to national identities, which have found out that 
those prioritising their English identity over others (in primis Britishness) were more inclined 
to vote for Leave. Ultimately, it is exactly on this factor – voters’ identification with Englishness 
and its connection to the Leave vote – that this study has been centred on, starting from a further 
analysis of the political campaign and then moving on to literary works published before and 
after the referendum. The analysis of the themes and the images at the core of the Leave 
campaign, in particular, has been essential in narrowing the research, outlining the structures of 
feeling that are deeply rooted in English identity and that were then exploited by Brexiteers to 
affect people’s support.  
A closer look at the campaign has indeed disclosed that Brexit storytelling was 
especially based on the national narratives of identity related to the Second World War and the 
British Empire, leveraging a long-established English nostalgia for the wartime and the imperial 
era as well as their sense of victimhood. Both feelings are generated by a sense of loss triggered 
by the many changes the country has undergone. Politically and economically speaking, this 
sense of loss would be related, firstly, to the actual loss of jobs, to economic insecurity and to 
the dismantlement of the welfare system; secondly, to the demise of the British Empire and the 
loss of geopolitical power; thirdly, to the devolution process, in which the English had no say 
and no chance to have an ‘assembly’ on their own as the other nations of the UK; and, 
ultimately, to the attitude of the political and cultural establishment of the country, generally 
ignoring, ridiculing and silencing any English nationalist outburst or grievance. From a cultural 
point of view, the perception of having lost something would be, instead, strictly related to 
English question of identity. In contrast with the other national identities comprising the UK, 
Englishness was indeed largely used for constructing a supranational identity (Britishness) and 
now is often confused with it as the two concepts are no longer separable. After the 
dismantlement of the empire, massive immigration from the ex-colonies and the development 
of Britishness into a multicultural identity, the English were forced to re-negotiate their sense 
of themselves. In the end, the vision of the country that most English seem to have embraced is 
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one long lost in the past: a rural, pastoral and exclusively white England. This vision of the 
country, linked to traditional ways of representing the nation and to the imperial racial 
hierarchy, is diametrically opposed to present-day England. In this way, the selected imagining 
is another element that contributes to English sense of loss, especially concerning ideas of white 
Anglo-Saxon superiority and privilege. In the end, this is exactly the same vision of the country 
the Brexiteers advertised, which is one of the main reasons of the success of their campaign 
among the English.  
These considerations have been crucial in relation to the second section of this 
dissertation – which focuses on pre-Brexit fictions – defining the very criteria of selection that 
has been applied to the choice of the literary works: being set in England; being particularly 
concerned with Englishness; engaging with the structures of feeling that were at the core of the 
Brexit campaign related to nostalgia (for WWII and the British Empire) and tribalism (imperial 
racial hierarchy and the clash between the elites and the people). Following these criteria, the 
novels selected for close reading were Speak for England (2005) by James Hawes and The 
White Family (2002) by Maggie Gee, which are both particularly concerned with the clash 
between traditional and progressive images of the nation. Although written well before Brexit, 
the novels are characterised by many of the themes and images that were part of Brexit 
storytelling:  distrust towards the elites; nostalgia for a past that is believed to be better than the 
present and the future; the idea that the nation should be a homogeneous body; a diffuse sense 
of victimhood; fear of immigration and xenophobia. 
The same themes and images are, unsurprisingly, at the core of the novels published 
after the Brexit referendum and deeply influenced by the Brexit campaign. The novels in 
question are the focus of the third section of this work, which does not want to be – and also 
cannot be, considering the timeliness of the subgenre and the on-going publications of new 
fictions – a comprehensive account but only an introduction to Brexit Literature. Described also 
as ‘BrexLit’, Brexit Literature is a flourishing subgenre composed of fictions that respond – 
implicitly or explicitly – to the Brexit outcome, engaging with the themes and strategies of the 
political campaign and depicting the cultural divide the referendum has disclosed. The novels 
that have been already identified as BrexLit fictions belong to different genres but share similar 
characteristics, so much so that they can easily be distinguished into two macro-categories: the 
political novels and the intimate ones.  
Novels that are defined as part of the political category of BrexLit tend to insert the 
referendum in a wider framework and depict dystopic post-Brexit scenarios. They also refer – 
more or less openly – to the Brexit campaign, challenging Brexit narrative and focusing on 
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post-truth, nostalgia and political mendaciousness. Michael Paraskos’ Rabbitman (2017), 
Douglas Board’s Time of Lies (2017), John Lanchester’s The Wall (2019), Ali Smith’s Autumn 
(2016), Winter (2017) and Spring (2019), are all examples of this category that have been 
analysed in the course of this work. The intimate novels are, instead, fictions that are more 
concerned with the national divide, focusing on both Remainers’ and Leavers’ perspective. 
These novels are usually set in English areas that have been deeply affected by the process of 
de-industrialisation and the 2008 economic crisis, depicting the everyday life of the most 
vulnerable members of contemporary society. More than opposing to Brexit narrative, the 
intimate novels aim to understand the Leave vote. Novels that belong to this category and that 
have been taken into account in this study are Anthony Cartwright’s The Cut (2016), Amanda 
Craig’s The Lie of the Land (2017) and Adam Thorpe’s Missing Fay (2017).  
After introducing BrexLit from a general point of view, the study focuses more closely 
on two BrexLit fictions: Perfidious Albion (2018) by Sam Byers and Middle England (2018) 
by Jonathan Coe. These two novels show elements that are typical of both of the macro-
categories of Brexit Literature and could indicate a further development of the sub-genre. 
Moreover, both novels engage directly with the structures of feeling at the core of the Brexit 
campaign in a very similar way to the novels analysed in the previous section, focusing on the 
English sense of victimhood and exposing the national divide between liberal and conservative 
imaginings of the national future.  
Although very different in the approach adopted, all these novels appear to be united by 
the same concerns: offering «escape as well as insight»877 in relation to an event – Brexit – that 
is tearing people apart, trying not only to make sense of it but also to heal the national wound 
it has opened up recovering, through literary representation, a sense of community. For what 
concerns, especially, the Leave vote, what emerges from the analysis of both the pre-Brexit and 
the post-Brexit novels taken into consideration is that underneath Brexit there is – beyond 
economic and political factors – a desire to go back in time, unravelling what England (and the 
world itself) has become. As Linda Grant writes in her state-of-the-nation novel A Stranger City 
(2019), the idea that fuelled the Brexit vote is that anyone should go home to his/her country of 
origin, that we all should «go back into our original boxes like we’re not mongrels from here 
there and everywhere»878. It is evident that this is an idea in line with traditional conceptions of 
what a national community should be, but completely outdated in a world where communities 
 
877Ferguson, D., «From epic myths to rural fables, how our national turmoil created ‘Brexlit’», The 
Guardian, 27 October 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/oct/27/brexlit-new-literary-genre-
political-turmoil-myths-fables (30 October 2019) 
878Grant, L., A Stranger City, Great Britain, Virago Press, 2019, p.320  
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are becoming every single day more multinational. Ultimately, what all the novels analysed 
clearly imply is the need for the English to embrace «a more positive sense of national 
belonging»879. Abandoning «the illusion, which currently is our reality, that there are no other 
futures than the nation-state»880, the English might conversely focus on new ways of imagining 
the country and its people as open to change and diversity.  
  
 
879O’Toole, F., op. cit., p.200  
880Cheyette, B., «English Literature saved my life», in Eaglestone, R., op. cit., p.69  
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